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2ABSTRACT
This report examines the problems associated with plant closings
in Illinois and various attempts to mitigate the negative consequences
of disinvestment and economic dislocation. The study first compares
nineteenth and twentieth century industrial development in Illinois to
illustrate the areas of continuity and change in the development
patterns and structure of the economy. This history demonstrates that
plant closings, far from being a recent occurrence, have recurred
throughout the past century under similar circumstances as today.
Plant closings have received increasing public attention in recent
years because of their high incidence and concentration in industries
and communities that once constituted the foundation for economic
strength of entire regions. An investigation of these plant closings
leads directly to underlying structural shifts in the Illinois, U.S.
and world economies. These shifts are geographical, with U.S. corporate
investment shifting away from the Northeast and Midwest toward the
South, West and foreign countries. They are sectoral, or away from
manufacturing to services, at least in the U.S. These changes are
occurring in terms of corporate structure, from huge, single-industry
corporations to even larger, diversified, transnational corporations.
They are occurring in terms of occupations, from jobs associated with
manufacturing to service jobs. Labor-management relations are on
uncertain ground, given the weakened position of organized labor at the
bargaining table and a management strategy to establish businesses in
less militant or non-union environments. Finally, technological change,
symbolized by the computer revolution, has already begun to induce
changes in the nature of products and the organization of produc-
tion, thus affecting occupations and working conditions.
This report reviews collective bargaining, union direct action,
plant closing legislation, and social and economic planning in terms
of their potential to address the fundamental and particular aspects
of problems associated with plant closings. One case of the social
and economic olanninq aDproach, the olant closing project of the Man-
power Assistance Program (MAP) of the Illinois State AFL-CIO, is
examined in detail. The MAP, funded by the Illinois Department of
Commerce and Community Affairs, began its plant closing work in 1980
and has since coordinated services and provided te-nnical assistance
to displaced workers from more than fifteen different plant shutdowns.
At the present time, it is the only project of its kind in the nation
operated by a state AFL-CIO.
The report finds that the plant closing work of the MAP represents
a notable contribution to the development of services for plant closing
victims, even though the Program is not in a position to directly
combat plant closings. The MAP is also important for the numerous
questions it raises about the details of how such orograms should be
run; the role of orqanized labor in such programs; the impact of such
programs within the labor movement and among organized labor, state
3government, management and community groups; the relationship of such
programs to other responses to the problem; and the benefits and
limitations of such programs. The report also finds that all of the
responses, while progress is being made, require further development
if they are to be more effective in preventing plant closings and
minimizing the negative consequences of those that occur.
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NOTE ON FIELD RESEARCH
During the summer of 1981, while working in Chicago, I contacted
Mr. Doug Richardson, Field Services Coordinator, Region I, AFL-CIO,
to discuss my interest in writing a thesis related to economic
development and employment policy in Illinois. The problem of plant
closings in the State came up and he referred me to Melva Meacham,
Coordinator of the plant closing project of the Illinois AFL-CIO
Manpower Assistance Program (MAP). I met with Ms. Meacham and we
discussed various aspects of the work in which she was involved
that warranted further research. After a number of conversations
we agreed that I would conduct research on a number of the plant
closing programs that had been coordinated by her project.
Originally I intended to focus on the retraining programs that
had been conducted for displaced workers in four communities in
Illinois. This turned out to be an unrealistic goal, because it
was not possible to arrange contacts with both retrainees and non-
retrainees and interview them adequately during the six weeks of
my field research. Rather than change topics entirely, I decided
to write about the plant closings work of the MAP in general. -
I spent my winter break in Illinois, from early January to
mid-February, 1982. During this time, I travelled back and forth
across the State--from Chicago north to Waukegan, west to Rochelle
and the Quad Cities, northwest to Elgin, and southwest to Peoria
and Springfield. I conducted personal interviews with more than
thirty individuals in these communities to learn about the various
responses to plant closings that had been developed. I observed
one meeting between Melva Meacham and local union officials to pre-
11
pare for an Adjustment Assistance Workshop. (See Chapter Four).
I attended two Workshops for displaced workers in Peoria and Elgin.
I also collected a substantial amount of background material specific
to Illinois, including government reports, local newspaper articles
and program documents.
My interviews tended to emphasize three points: 1) background
information and/or history of the situation, including, where rele-
vant, both the plant closing and the community response; 2) the
individual's analysis of the specific situation; and 3) the indi-
vidual's opinion on policy issues, such as the use of CETA funds for
displaced workers, or the State Federation of Labor's role in
providing plant closing services. All of the personal quotations
in this report are taken from my interview tapes. The Program
history and analysis could not have been written without these
interviews. Even though I have thanked them elsewhere, my grati-
tude to each person I interviewed for their cooperation bears
restating.
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INTRODUCTION
Teamsters Union Hall, Peoria, Illinois, February 5, 1982:
Despite the fact that it had been snowing heavily since the
previous night, more than fifty Pabst Brewery* workers from the first
wave of permanent layoffs at the plant arrived at the Teamsters Hall
to attend an Adjustment Assistance Workshop. The Workshop had been
organized by the Peoria area AFL-CIO Community Services Representative,
in consultation with the local union and Melva Meacham, coordinator
of the plant closing project of the Manpower Assistance Program (MAP)
a technical assistance and services project of the Illinois State
AFL-CIO. Ms. Meacham, who had organized and conducted at least twelve
similar workshops throughout Illinois during the previous year, was
scheduled to give the opening address. She faced this Workshop with
difficulty. Several months prior she lost her job when the Hirman
Walker Distillery began its two-year shutdown process that eliminated
1100 jobs in Peoria. Her memories of that experience were vivid
enough to make this return to Peoria especially painful. The town,
the circumstances and the people were too familiar.
The President of the Pabst Brewery Workers Teamsters Local Union
introduced Ms. Meacham as a person who knew what the Brewery Workers
*
Pabst was scheduled to close completely in late February or early
March, thus eliminating approximately 700 jobs in Peoria.
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were experiencing because she had been a plant closing victim herself.
The audience remained still as she began to speak.
She started by telling the audience briefly about her own
experience at Hiram Walker--how she had spent twelve years at the end
of a bottling line putting codes on cases. Ms. Meacham recounted that
she and her co-workers had not believed that the plant would actually
close. She described their stages of emotion, including disbelief,
anger and finally, sadness.
Halting momentarily, Ms. Meacham shifted from herself to the
Workshop. The Workshop itself was certainly not enough, she
acknowledged, but it was more than the employees of Hiram Walker
recieved, since no programs existed when she lost her job. She
explained what they would hear during the Workshop, including
information about social services, job seeking skills, local training
opportunities, public assistance and unemployment insurance. While
conceding that some of the topics might not seem of interest or use
to them, Ms. Meacham almost pleaded with the audience to listen, if
not for themselves then for their union brothers and sisters who were
unable to attend the Workshop. "At some point down the road," she
stated, "you may need some assistance. And you should not feel shy
about taking those services, because you paid for them with your tax
dollars and through contributions to United Way. Furthermore, you are
not alone. Union members all over the State are in the same position
as you are today."
She stated frankly that no one at the Workshop had any jobs for
them. She wished she had, but instead "I feel like a lady with a box
full of bandaids in a room full of dying people." Finally, not wanting
14
to end on such a negative note, Ms. Meacham concluded her presentation
with some words of encouragement. "This is not going to be an easy
time for you. Believe me, I know. However, you can and will make it.
This doesn't have to be the worst thing that ever happened to you."
* * *
Since 1980, when the plant closing project of the Manpower
Assistance Program, Illinois State AFL-CIO, was first funded by
the State of Illinois, Melva Meacham has coordinated more than fifteen
similar Adjustment Assistance Workshops throughout Illinois, serving
several thousand workers. She has also provided technical assistance
to numerous International Unions, other State Labor Federations, and
the Human Resources Development Institute (HRDI) of the national AFL-
CIO. In less than two years of operation, Melva Meacham and the MAP
of the Illinois AFL-CIO have earned a national reputation.
This report tells the history of the MAP and analyzes its
activities to date. Even though it is a relatively young and limited
program (Ms. Meacham is presently the sole full-time staff for the
plant closing project), it is unique in the nation. Thus far no other
State AFL-CIO has developed a similar program to address the needs
of workers displaced by plant shutdowns. Some states, such as
California and Michigan, and a few International Unions, such as the
United Food and Commercial workers, the Allied Industrial workers and
the United Auto Workers*, are experimenting with plant closing
*These examples are not intended to be totally inclusive of all the
projects that exist.
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programs, but the need nation-wide exceeds the available resources
and programs.
It is crucial, therefore, to study Illinois experience in order
to improve our capacity to address the myriad of social and economic
stresses that result from plant closings and other instances of
economic dislocation. The MAP illustrates both the concrete benefits
and limitations of such programs. It demonstrates the'types of
cooperation and conflict that occur when organized labor, community
groups, private business and public agencies attempt to work together
on socio-economic problems. The Program also raises specific choices
for the labor movement regarding how to respond to rapidly changing
economic and political circumstances.
The MAP experience also leads to broader insights and questions,
about fundamental economic and political issues. In a sense, this
study of the MAP is akin to discovering much about the universe by
exploring one's own backyard. The boundaries of this case are
definite: one small project serving one limited group of unionized,
industrial workers displaced by plant shutdowns in one state of fifty
in one country of the world. Scrutiny of the details within these
boundaries directs us to the universe, meaning the larger economic
forces and political traditions that determine the specific
characteristics and significance of the events that occur in the
microcosm. A fundamental issue for American society is implicit in
this inquiry that moves back and forth between the minute details of
plant closings and Adjustment Assistance Workshops, and broad
political debates and economic changes. How are the resources--
natural, human and financial-- of our society to be allocated and
16
utilized in the production and distribution of goods and services to
maximize the economic and social well-being of all our citizens?
This question lays at the core of the specific problem of plant
closings and the MAP as one response to this problem.
This broad view is essential, in addition to the perspective it
provides on the MAP, for the insights it raises about the nature of
the general problem underlying plant closings. Chapter One develops
this perspective by examining the nineteenth century industrial
development of Illinois. From this history, we learn that plant
closings occured during this earlier era of industrialization. We
learn that communities prospered and declined on waves of changing
investment decisions. We learn also that a heated debate about the
costs and benefits, winners and losers, of these investment.
decisions raged even during this time of unprecedented economic
growth.
Chapter One adds to this historical view with an examination of
major current changes in the structure of the Illinois economy. This
comparison between present and past illustrates areas of continuity
and change. For more than a century the resource distribution
question stated above has been the underlying theme of political debate
about plant closings and socially disruptive economic change. In U.S
history, this debate is framed in terms of trade-offs between the
public good and private economic gain. A second point emerges from
this historical analysis. Each era is faced with a particular set of
economic challenges and choices about what should be produced and how
available technology should be applied in this production. Thus, the
issue of plant closings presents a general problem that has two
17
interconnected dimensions--one political and the other economic.
Chapter Two illustrates in much detail these two aspects of the
problem of plant closings. It presents data on a variety of specific
closings that have occured in Illinois during the past decade. This
Chapter demonstrates that there is a reasonable cause to question the
rationalefor many of these shutdowns because the circumstances, in
most cases, do not indicate business failure.
Chapters One and Two together establish the issues that must be
addressed ultimately by any efforts to minimize and/or prevent the
negative consequences of plant shutdowns. Chapter Three describes a
wide range of current responses to these problems, including collective
bargaining, plant closing legislation, union direct action, and social
and economic planning. These responses are discussed in terms of their
ability to mitigate the specific consequences of plant closings, as
well as tackle their political and economic origins. The story of the
MAP is then presented in Chapter Four as an example of the social and
economic planning response category. Chapter Five expands the
discussion of planning and analyzes MAP's experience primarily in terms
of the potential and limitations of participation in planning by
organized labor.
We find that the MAP, like the other responses, is not adequate
as a single approach to address the problems associated with plant
closings. All of the responses combined are still not able, at the
present time, to address the underlying political and economic
causes of plant closings. These responses are currently evolving,
however. It is too early to predict what will be the particular
contribution of each approach to resolving the problems associated
18
with plant closings.
The MAP represents one step in the evolution of the willingness
and capacity of organized labor to deal with the effects of plant
shutdowns. 1t also signifies one step, even if experimental, toward
greater participation of the labor movement in social and economic
planning. The focus of this report on the steps of the Program
raises one set of specific, detailed questions about how to cope
with economic dislocation. The historical context explored
in this report raises a set of broader questions about the
distribution and application of resources in our society. The
answers will require an immense amount of work, consisting of both
reflection and action. The answers also present a challenge which
we, as citizens, are obligated to address.
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CHAPTER ONE
CONTINUITY AND CHANGE IN THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF ILLINOIS
Introduction
Why should a study of a current public policy problem begin with
the events of a century ago? The reason is that a thorough knowledge
of the history of one's nation, like the understanding of ourselves as
individuals, can provide several valuable insights. Personal and
historical memory, while it cannot prevent- the repetition of mistakes,
can aid in decision-making and problem-solving. Contemplation of past
successes and failures can guide present action.
History also provides a measurement of both change and continuity.
Checking last year's height line on the kitchen wall confirms a child's
growth. High school and college reunions perform a similar function:
"You're bald now, but you haven't lost your sense of humor".
Historians scrutinize society in the way that old friends examine each
other. They perceive familiar signs, variations on past themes, and
sometimes, unprecedented change. While the analogy between person-
alities and nations is limited, they both also possess characteristic
traits, or themes.
Historians have identified several themes characteristic of
the United States. The frontier theme is one of the most familiar.
Former President Kennedy's designation of outer space as the "New
Frontier" during the 1960's was no accident. Other common themes
are defined as fundamental, recurring conflicts. One example is the
conflict between the public good and private economic gain. This
20
theme is the specific formulation of the fundamental resource
distribution question noted in the Introduction. The assumption
implicit in framing this issue as a conflict, or debate, is that
policies conducive to private gain may not necessarily promote the
public good. In many cases, in fact, actions that support private gain
are detrimental to the public good. This divergence of interests is
evident in many examples throughout U.S. history.
During the 1890's the campaign against large corporations that
eventually led to the Sherman Anti-Trust Act was an example of this
conflict. The debate of the New Deal regarding the extent to which the
government should intervene in the market and regulate private industry
was a variation on this theme. In the 1970's and 1980's, plant
closings and increasing structural unemployment are causing people to
question corporate strategies that do not serve the well-being of work-
ing people and their communities. Today, labor unions concerned with
displaced workers, housing activists fighting against neighborhood
displacement and environmentalists seeking pollution controls have at
least one thing in common: they are all standing squarely on the
shoulders of a central, long-standing American dilemma.
Thus, before beginning an assessment of the current situation in
Illinois, we turn briefly to the history of the State's industrial
development for two reasons. This history will, like checking last
year's mark on the wall or seeing old friends, help us to assess what
is similar and what is different about our present economic situation.
This comparison will enrich our understanding of the nature of the
problem represented by plant closings. Second, this understanding of
the problem will contribute to the analysis of present problem-solving
21
efforts in the second half of this report.
The Industrial Development of Illinois
For many people, the Great Lakes states of Michigan, Ohio, Indiana,
Illinois and Wisconsin evoke two constrasting images: forbidding,
acrid agglomerations of smokestacks and industrial waste centered in
the reputedly unliveable cities of Detroit, Cleveland, Gary, Chicago
and Milwaukee; and seemingly endless rural lands, the horizons of which
are punctuated only with grain elevators and an occasional water tower.
Illinois, especially, is experienced as simply one stop on the way to
somewhere else. For many travelers, it is the crossroads of O'Hare
Airport in Chicago, or the edge of the industrial belt that stretches
westward along Highway 94 from Buffalo, New York. Chicago is even
more predominant in the popular imagination than Illinois. Chicago
is the grain trade center, an international financial center, and more
than thirty miles of neighborhoods stretched out in grid form along the
lake, housing millions of people.
These general impressions illustrate key elements of the economic
foundation of the industrial heartland. The Great Lakes states,
although not dramatic in their terrain, were endowed with natural
resources highly conducive to the economic development of the nine-
teenth century--lakes and waterways, forests, coal, iron ore and
productive soil. Illinois had the advantage of bordering on the
Mississippi River and Lake Michigan, thus providing it with two major
ports at Chicago and St. Louis, Illinois also had substantial coal
reserves.
The industrial development of the region did not occur for more
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than a century after the first settlements of European immigrants were
established in the late seventeenth century. A history of the lakefront
cities links their development, not surprisingly, to a waterway.
"The Erie Canal, especially, opened up a whole new
region tributary to the Great Lakes and triggered the
growth of a new urban complex on the shores of the lakes.
Beginning with Buffalo and continuing westward to
Duluth, from the latter 1820's on, the cities of the
Great Lakes region grew faster than the lder river
towns and came to eclipse them in size."
Natural resources and geography conducive to trade were not the
sole causes of development, but were contributing factors. Entre-
preneurs and financiers played an even more significant role in the
development of both towns and industry.
"These major cities of the Middle West did not "just grow".
the promotional activities of the original speculator-
founders were only the beginning of a long-time program
in which newspaper editors, merchants, and citizens
at large combined their efforts to attract settlers and
business to a given city and away from its neighboring
rivals."2
The planning of the Illinois Central Railroad illustrates some of the
practices and motivation behind this promotional activity.
"Numerous cities in the West owe their importance to
the fact that groups of energetic local promoters with
substantial investments in local real estate were able...
to persuade railroads to build to their particular
locations... The techniques of town development and the
system of bargaining with competing communities were
perfected by the Illinois Central Railroad, chartered in
1851 to build southward from Chicago through the heart of
the state. The company used the threat of building new
towns or running its tracks through neighboring places in
order to force local officials in established communities
to offer concessions of right-of-ways, railroad station
site donations, or stock purchases... The company's charter
prohibited the railroad from laying out towns on its lines,
but Illinois Central leaders circumvented this restriction
by creating a land company called "The Associates" for the
specific purpose of managing town-site speculations... Profits
from the Illinois Central's town promotions were large..."
23
In Illinois this urbanization was accompanied by rapid industrial-
ization. The fastest-growing, most important industries were rooted
in the state's natural resources.
"Basic to all of these growing cities were the agri-
cultural foundations of their infancy. From these
developed diversified industries to convert the area's
natural resources into finished goods. The more
industries a city could generate...the better able it
was to continue to grow. Collinsville's clay topsoil
became bricks, its corn became liquor, its coal fueled
the smelter. Tomatoes from surrounding fields fed
the canning factory..."
By 1880, slaughtering and meatpacking was one of the most important
industries in Illinois. The Census of 1880 recorded that "the
concentration of this industry is startling, the single state of
Illinois contributing almost one-third of the nation's whole."5 The
iron and steel industry, located primarily in Chicago, also grew
phenomenally during this period. The state boasted thirteen rolling
mills and steelworks by 1880.
In 1847 Cyrus McCormick transferred his agricultural implement
factory to Chicago from Virginia, and became the leading manufacturer
of farm machinery. He thus joined the ranks of several rapidly
growing enterprises that led Chicago to national economic prominence.
"Chicago not only dominated the state, it was also fast
becoming a recognized national center for industry, ranking
third, behind New York and Philadelphia, in gross product
in 1880. It ranked first in slaughtering, sash doors and
blinds, and planed lumber; second in agricultural implements,
brick and tile, furniture, iron and steel, and tanned
leather; and third in printing and publishing; distilled
liquor, foundry and machine shop products, and men's
clothing. "6
Finally, in addition to its reputation for manufacturing, Chicago
became established as an important trade and financial center second
only to New York City.
24
The railroads could not have been constructed, the towns built,
the factories operated, nor the products consumed without the inmigrants
who arrived in Illinois in large numbers and represented 20 percent of
the state's population in 1870.
"Labor from the immigrant stream was another necessity.
It was the presence of the immigrants that gave much
of the flavor to Illinois towns... Immigrants buttressed
the work force that sped industrialization, the consumers
who supported the economy... Between 1870 and 1900, over
450,000 immigrants entered the state bringing the total
foreign-born population to 966,747."
Thus the latter third of the nineteenth century hurled rural
Illinois into the industrial age. Between 1870 and 1900, the population
of the state nearly doubled, the number of workers in manufacturing
quadrupled and the capital invested in industry multiplied more than
eight times. 8
Patterns of Early Industrial Development in Illinois
This phenomenal growth and development did not occur smoothly.
Business, communities and workers each experienced particular stresses
and strains to which they responded with a variety of strategies. The
strategies adopted by these groups to cope with the difficulties of
rapid industrialization significantly influenced the nature of develop-
ment in this era, and for decades to follow. The following key
patterns emerged: 1) Business responded to economic stresses by
reorganizing into large corporations; 2) Communities competed among
one another to attract business and industry; 3) Technological advances
in transportation and communication contributed to the mobility of
industry; and 4) Workers, seeking to organize unions for their own
protection, came into direct conflict with business and, in some cases,
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communities. Each of these patterns is discussed below.
The rapid growth of corporations, and their increasing mobility,
were two interlocking trends that precipitated substantial controversy.
"For the general public, the most conspicuous results of industrial
development in the post-Civil War decades were the creation of a new
group of multi-millionaires."9 The trend toward corporate concentration
of this wealth is thought to have been a response to the intense
competition of the period.
"The primary cause of this concentration was the wave of
combinations and mergers that took place at an unprecedented
rate during the last quarter of the nineteenth century.
This merger movement was the outgrowth of the particularly
severe competition that had ravaged and destroyed scores
of businesses... The scope of the merger movement was so
great that by 1904 it had basically altered the structure
of American industry. By the beginning of that year there
were over three hundred large industrial combinations with
a combined capitalization in excess of $7 billion. They
controlled more than two-fifths of the manufacturing capital
of the country and had affected about four-fifths of important
American industries. "10
Businesses in Illinois were fully involved in this merger movement.
"Illinois firms experimented with each of the classic sequence
of devices meant to abandon clawing competition... When
(associations and gentlemen's agreements) became ineffective,
industrialists resorted to trusts or contracts that placed
the voting stock of several companies in the hands of
"trustees"... The most significant movement toward economic
order was finance capitalism. This phenomenon resulted
from the accumulation of capital in the hands of a few
American and European financiers, enabling them to dominate
their own investment markets, and the industrialists'
willingness to accept outside or banker leadership in the
1890's when their credit need increasTY just as the economy
was entering a period of depression."
Cities and towns hoped to bolster their local economies by
sponsoring advertising campaigns and offering incentives to convince
businesses to locate in their vicinity.
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"Just as they eagerly sought railroads, cities wooed new
industries. Cairo was one of many downstate cities that
appointed a committee to secure industry from within the
U.S. or abroad by offering free land and a variety of
"other encouragements". When the Quincy Improvement
Association was organized in 1870, "all the speakers
recognized the indispensable necessity of an increase in
the number, vari y, and extent of our manufacturing
establishments."
The efforts of these towns were partly supported by technological
advances that facilitated the mobility of business and the de-
centralization of manufacturing.
"In the late nineteenth century, the substitution of electric
power for steam in industry and improvements in transportation
made it possible for manufacturers to move away from central
cities, and they were encouraged to do so by a number of
factors: the need for vast amounts of cheap land to build
factories incorporating all stages of large-scale complex
production, lower taxes, and freedom from regulation in
regard to smoke and noise." 13
At the same time as businesses and communities were organizing to
further their interests, workers were organizing as well. Illinois
has a long history of trade unionism, dating to the 1850's.
"A firm nucleus of trade unions existed in Illinois by
1865, in spite of the anti-union LaSalle Black Law passed
two years before. The National Typographical Union had
locals in Chicago and Peoria in the 1850's, and the rail-
road brotherhoods appeared in a number of cities in the
1860's. Following the pattern of craft unions, the Iron
Molders organized in Chicago, Quincy, Bloomington, and
Springfield.,.. Bargaining relationships between the (Iron
Molders) and the huge McCormick reaper company were constant
and effective from 1862-1886... The building trades began to
unite in Chicago, tailors unionized the lake city (Chicago)
and in Springfield, and a cigar makers' local appeared in
Jacksonville by 1873... These efforts at organization
resulted in an impres ve nucleus of trade unions in Illinois
in the early 1870's."1-
During the 1860's, workers in Chicago organized several eight
hour leagues and were successful in passing an eight-hour ordinance
through the Chicago City Council in 1867. From the late 1870's to the
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end of the century, there were waves of intense labor conflict. In
the 1877 national railroad strike, the National Guard was sent to
Chicago, Peoria, Galesburg, Decatur, East St. Louts, Braidwood and
LaSalle to quell labor unrest. In total, the National Guard was dis-
patched in Illinois at least thirty times between 1877 and 1898.15
This labor militancy was another factor, according to observers
of this period, that triggered the relocation of businesses. This
phenomenon, which was observed initially in New England, later spread
to the Midwest.
"But cheap labor, even when supplied from abroad, did not
long remain content in America, and the shoe industry
produced some of the most determined union-organizing drives
of these decades. Unfortunately, from the viewpoint of the
cities involved, when union demands mounted in one town,
many firms sought new sites, such as Milwaukee, Chicago, or
Manchester, New ampshire, where the organizers had not
yet penetrated."
Chicago did not remain attractive as a destination for companies
fleeing unions. The following testimony by Chicago industrialists
presented to the U.S. Industrial Commission at the turn-of-the-century
illustrates that the organizers could relocate as well.
The President of Fraser and Chalmers Co. in Chicago:
"Chicago today is the hotbed of trades unionism... If it
were not for the high investment [manufacturers] have in
their machines and plants, many of them would leave
Chicago at once, because of the labor trouble that exists
here... In fact, in Chicago, within the last two months
we have lost some of the very largest corporations that
operated here."
President of a contracting firm in Chicago: "... all
these controversies and strikes that we have had here
for some years have... prevented outsiders from coming
here and investing their capital... It has discouraged
capital at home... It has drawn the manufacturers away
from the city, because they are afraid their men will get
into trouble and get into strikes... The result is, all
around Chicago for forty or fifty miles, the sma ler
towns are getting these manufacturing plants..." 7
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Jay Gould, an infamous business magnate of the era, presented the
following views of the relationship between business and workers to
the Senate Committee on Education and Labor in 1883.
"And is it not true also that capital, if it gets better
remuneration in some other country than it gets here, will
go there? You cannot transfer your house, but you can
transfer your money; and if labor is put up too high here,
all the manufacturing will be done abroad, because the
capitalists will go where they can get cheaper labor... Q:
Labor, you think, gets its fair share? A: Yes sir. The
returns of capital are not high; they are going lower.
Manufacturers, for instance, do not expect to make the
profits that they made some years ago... I think that if
left alone, (employers and employees) would mutually
regulate their relations. I think there is no disagreement
between the great mass of the employees and their employers.
These societies that are gotten up magnify these things
and create evils which do not exist--create troubles which
ought not exist." 18
The business community's alarm about organized labor was matched
by equally committed views from workers and their advocates. The
following samples from testimony presented to the Senate Committee on
ducatlIon anu Lauo at hearings conducted in New York in 1883
illustrate commonly-held opinions on these issues:
"The general fact is that there exists among the laboring
classes of the United States a great and growing feeling
of dissatisfaction and discontent... The tendency of
business of all kinds, both in production and in exchange,
is concentration, to the massing of large capital, and to
the massing of men. The inventions and improvements of
all kinds that have done so much to change all the aspects
of production, and which are still going on, tend to re-
quire more and more capital, and to make it more and more
difficult for a man who has nothing but his labor to
become his own employer, or to rise to a position of
independence in his craft or occupation."
Q: "What is the social condition of the machinists in
New York and the surrounding towns and cities? A: It is
rather low compared to what their social condition was ten
or fifteen years ago. Q: Do you remember when it was
better? A: When I first went to learn the trade a
machinist considered himself more than the average work-
ingman; in fact he did not like to be called a workingman.
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He liked to be called a mechanic... and felt he be-
longed to the middle class; but today he recognizes the
fact that he is simply the same as any other ordinary
laborer."20
"As I read the problem of society today, there are large
forces making for the interests of capital and land,
as against the interests of labor--these three factors
together creating all wealth. Legislation works against
labor,... and industrial development works against labor...
Society has the right to limit the growth of the private
fortunes which it really creates. If it finds them
becoming excessive and so harmful, it can take measures
to limit them."21
Even the Governor of Illinois during this period was moved to
support the right of working people to organize.
"When capital aggregates itself and forms vast combinations,
surely labor has a right to do the same thing, and all
legitimate efforts of the wage-earners of our country
to better their conditions should receive both moral
and legal encouragement. This is particularly true for
the reason that it is much more difficult for laborers
to combine for industrial and moral ends than it is
for capital." 2 2
These anti-corporate sentiments (although not anti-business) were
mobilized into a popular movement that "became so widespread and
intense that in the presidential campaign of 1888, both the Democrats
and the Republicans advocated federal laws to curb the abuses of big
corporations... Only when public pressure reached incredible heights
did Congress respond."23 This achievement was only a partial victory.
It even became counterproductive when the law was eventually applied
against unions.
"The primary effect of the Sherman Act over the next few
decades was to weaken labor unions. What had begun as
as concession to the public's hatred of abuses by big
business became an antilabor law. This effect followed
because the courts ruled that many union strikes constituted
constraints of trade. On this basis the government arrested
numerous union leaders and broke up many unions." 24
This glimpse into the past illustrates the threads, or patterns,
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that have remained interwoven in the fabric of our economy since the
nineteenth century. Then, the investment practices of entrepreneurs
and financiers substantially influenced the growth and decline of towns,
as exemplified by the planning of the railroads. Today, investment
practices have shifted the locus of economic growth in the U.S. from the
north to the south, and from the U.S. to other countries. Nineteenth
century towns competed among themselves to offer incentives to
attract industry. Today, tax incentive packages are the centerpiece
of many states' economic development strategy. The nineteenth century
wave of mergers dramatically concentrated U.S. wealth and industry
into huge corporations. Since the 1960's, a second merger wave has
produced even larger, diversified conglomerates and transnational
corporations. Both of these merger waves, combined with business
migration, have left closed plants and depressed communities in their
wake. In the nineteenth century these business activities triggered
two counter responses: one from workers in the form of union organizing
and militancy; and the other from a broad-based anti-monopoly movement.
Today, unions and community groups have been protesting abuses of
corporate power and seeking remedies through plant closings legislation.
Changes in technology--electricity in the nineteenth century and
computers today--have significantly altered the direction of industrial
development.
The Changing Structure of the Illinois Economy
Continuity with the past, however, is only half of the story.
We obviously live in a world that is dramatically different from a
century ago. What was the industrial era is now the post-industrial
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age, seriously in need of reindustrialization. What was a time of
growth (although not without recession) is now a time of persistent
stagnation. The time of expanding U.S. influence in the world is now
a time of declining U.S. political and economic power. In the nine-
teenth century, businesses relocated across the nation, now they locate
throughout the world. The nineteenth century factory system and the
assembly line displaced many craftsmen. Today, robots are replacing
factory workers.
These changes portend profound consequences for our society and
economy. Professor Bennett Harrison of MIT noted this in a recent
article comparing jobs in older and younger cities.
"There is an important historical transformation underway
which lies beneath the surface of all the political
furor over declining vs. growing areas... and the new
war between the states... The older areas are definitely
undergoing a qualitatively different kind of economic develop-
ment than the new areas. Why? Who, or, rather, what forces
control the process of change? What are the implications
of this transformation for employment and income of working
people in the different regions?"25
Professor Harrison sought to answer these questions in a comprehensive
study of the New England economy, the results of which are summarized
in a report entitled, "Rationalization, Restructuring, and Industrial
Reorganization in Older Regions: The Economic Transformation of New
England Since World War II." This report cites four "developmental
tendencies" that shape the economy: 1) Rationalization of the labor
process through extending the division of labor in the workplace with
task fragmentation and standardization, thereby reducing the firm's
need for skilled workers; 2) Geographic restructuring whereby firms
"look to previously peripheral locations, both within the country and
beyond its borders, to find new sources of cheap and (at least
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initial-ly) tractable labor power."; 3) Corporate reorganization,
meaning the "tendency toward increased economic centralization and
concentration of control over productive capital."; and 4) Class
conflict, meaning that "the timing of major waves of private investment
and disinvestment is closely tied to the basic tension between labor
and management. ,26
It is important to note similarities between these "developmental
tendencies" highlighted in Professor Harrison's analysis and the
patterns of development we observed in the nineteenth century. The
next section explores the specific character and consequences of these
tendencies in Illinois. The application of this framework to Illinois
yields the following observations:
1. Investment and production are being redirected and reorganized
geographically (Harrison's corporate reorganization and geographic
restructuring) within the U.S. and around the world. Illinois
has been experiencing slower growth and basic structural changes
as a consequence of this process.
2. One of these structural changes is the decline of manufacturing
relative to services as the predominant sector in the Illinois
economy.
3. This shift in the industrial mix affects the occupational mix.
In Illinois, most service jobs are different from most manufactur-
ing jobs in terms ofskili, earnings and job security.
4. Technological innovations, as applied by management, alter the
characteristics of occupations and working conditions in a plant.
(Harrison's rationalization of the labor process)
5. All of the above are affecting labor-management relations
(Harrison's class struggle) and the political context for unions
in Illinois.
Shifting Locations of Investment and Production
The nineteenth century entrepreneurs who saw dollar signs in the
resources of New England and the Midwest might have anticipated that
33
their precious locations would one day be passed over for other sites.
It would have been difficult for them to imagine, however, the
sophisticated technology and international organization of business
that has enabled their twentieth century counterparts to redefine the
earlier relationship between location and development.
During the past few decades, U.S. capital investment has been
shifting within the U.S. from the Frostbelt to the Sunbelt, and from
the U.S. to other countries in the world. Both of these trends have
had a detrimental impact on the Illinois economy.
Differences in investment among regions in the U.S. are confirmed
by several different indicators. Per capita income showed a higher
percentage increase in the South and West than in the Northeast and
Midwest from 1970-79. Illinois had the lowest average percentage
increase of all the Midwestern states during that period. From 1970-
80, employment increased 44 percent in the South and West, 14.1% in
the Northeast and Midwest, and 11% in Illinois. Manufacturing employ-
ment declined 11.3 percent in Illinois from 1970-80, compared to a
midwestern average decline of 5%, and an average gain of 21.8% in
the South and West. Investment in new capital equipment increased
77.2% in Illinois, 108% in the Midwest, and 158.9% in the South and
West from 1970-77. Investment in non-residential structures from
1970-79 increased 131.6% in Illinois, 170% in the Midwest, and 227.7%
in the South and West from 1970-79. (See Tables 1, 2, and 3.)
These regional imbalances were also true for public investment.
In FY 1979 the Federal Balance of Payments was -$35 million in the
Northeast and Midwest, and $22 million in the South and West.
(See Table 4)
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The Northeast Midwest Institute "reported that in 1979
the Midwest region got back only 84 cents of each tax dollar
sent to Washington, while states in the south and west over-
all received $1.09. .. As a whole, Midwestern states got back
only 72 cents on the dollar. Illinois was near the bottom
of the ta gayer return list with 73 cents on the dollar in
1975-79. "
The percentage change figures are used to illustrate relative
growth rates, but they can be misleading if not examined in reference
to the absolute numbers. For example, even though the Illinois per
capita income had one of the slowest average growth rates in the
nation, Illinois had one of the highest absolute average per capita
incomes in the U.S.
These shifts have not resulted from businesses migrating out of
Illinois and the Midwest to the Sunbelt in large numbers. The research
of David Birch and others has shown that the different growth rates
between north and south can be explained by much higher rates of
firm expansion and firm start-ups in the south than in the north.
Professors Bennett Harrison and Barry Bluestone, writing in Capital and
Communities, confirm this point and add a second key insight.
"Other researchers have argued that interstate and inter-
regional differences in economic growth rates are
attributable mainly to differential corporate branching...
There is no question that this accuragely describes the
basic pattern of new corporate investment. But companies
also actually shut down older plants and stores in all
parts of the country... One the average, Frostbelt firms
destroyed about 111 jobs through plant closings for every
100 new jobs they created through openings, while Sunbelt
and Far Western companies shut down an average of only 80
jobs through business closings for every 100 that they
created through openings." 28
It has been popular wisdom that the South and West were more
attractive because of the lower costs of doing business in these
states. Recent evidence indicates that whatever cost variations
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existed are beginning to erode.
The Senior Vice-president of Fantus Co., the world's largest
site location firm, stated that, "The total operating cost
differential between the North and South is narrowing. The
South will have problems in the 1980's. Wage levels in
some urban areas in the South equal or sometimes surpass
those in the North. Skilled metal-working wages in non-
urban areas are about the same." He added that the energy and
transportation cost differential is also eroding. Z9
A recent Northeast-Midwest Institute report provides data for comparing
the costs of production among regions. The costs of natural gas and
other fuels are now nearly the same in the Midwest and the South, and
electricity is cheaper in the Midwest than in the South. Moreover, in
1975, the state and local effective business tax rate in Illinois was
1.50%, or lower than all other regions except the South Atlantic and
South Central states. (See Tables5-8) This lowtax rate was confirmed
in a statement from the Research Director of the Illinois Chamber of
Commerce, quoted by the Chicago Sun Times. "As for taxes, Illinois'
tax rate actually is toward the lower end. Besides, taxes and tax
incentives play a minor part in employer decisions." 30
Even though costs may be equalizing nationally, businesses are
likely to continue to be attracted to lower costs, especially in
terms of labor, available through foreign investment.
While it is difficult to trace the direct impact of this foreign
investment on Illinois, we do know that substantial foreign investment
has occurred in industries that are important to the Illinois economy,
such as autos, steel, food processing, chemicals, electrical
industries and non-electrical machinery. The following figures
illustrate the magnitude of the job loss in the United States.
"American corporations' overseas investment rose from $11.8
billion in 1950 to $118.6 billion in 1974. By the end of
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1978, the figure was up to $168 billion, and $200 billion
by 1980. An important Labor Department study found that
in 1980, "each $1 billion of direct private U.S. foreign
investment eliminates at least 26,500 domestic jobs on
the average." Thus, about 3 million U.S. workers are now
jobless due to foreign investment by U.S.-based multi-
nationals. "31
The Shift From Manufacturinq to Services
The national weather pattern of the Snowbelt tends to flow from
west to east, but certain economic trends have travelled in the opposite
direction. The first wave of industrial and urban development in the
U.S. proceeded, as we have seen, from east to west. Disinvestment in
manufacturing occurred first in the New England textile and shoe
industries before moving westward to the manufacturing belt dominated
by durable goods. While there are substantial differences between
New England and the Midwest, especially with respect to agriculture and
the dominant industries, there are enough parallel trends to warrant
attentiveness to the New England economic experience.
This is particularly true for Illinois, whose current economic
development strategy is directed toward high technology industries,
rather than steel. According to The New York Times, "Illinois has
ambitious hopes in the high-technology field. State planners envision
a cluster of research enterprises along Interstate 55 near Naperville
that would rival Route 128 outside Boston."32 Hence, when Professor
Bennett Harrison concludes from his study of New England that the "true
essence of the economic transformation lies in the enormous changes in
the industry mix",33 it is essential for the Midwest to assess its own
evolution on this score.
The total number of manufacturing jobs in Illinois peaked in 1969
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at just under 1.5 million jobs, after a decade of growth. From 1970-
81, the State lost about 187,000 jobs, a decline of 13.8 percent. This
decline brought the number of manufacturing jobs in Illinois to a
point below the 1950 level. In 1950, manufacturing jobs represented
38.2 percent of all nonagricultural employment in the State. This
proportion dropped to 24.1 percent by 1981. (See Tables.) and 10)
Within the manufacturing sector, nondurable goods suffered a higher
percentage job decline than durable goods from 1972-80, although non-
durables lost fewer total jobs than durables. - Food
products and apparel suffered the greatest job losses in nondurables
from 1972-80, declining by 11,500 and 9,100 jobs respectively. Chemical
products were the only category of nondurables that gained jobs from
72-80, numbering about 3,800. Fabricated metals and electrical
equipment were the major losers among durable goods, together losing
38,000 jobs from 72-80. Stone, clay, glass and instruments each lost
about 6,000 in the same years. The only job gains from 72-80 were in
machinery and transportation, together gaining about 29,000 jobs.
(See Tables lla and lb)
The Illinois manufacturing sector experienced its highest job
losses of the past decade, not surprisingly, during the 74-75 re-
cession. In that year alone, the state lost 145,000 manufacturing
jobs. Almost none of the manufacturing industries have recovered their
pre-recession job levels. Professor Bennett Harrison and Ed Hill,
in their study of younger and older cities, observed a similar trend
in other older industrial areas.
"...during recessions, rundowns in capacity and/or actual
disinvestment will occur first in places where the capital
stock is the relatively least productive and where the
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external diseconomies of agglomeration (crowding,
pollution, etc.) are the greatest so that places with
older capital tend to fall farther and farther behind
the places with younger capital with each recession."34
The current recession already seems to be having the same effect.
As the Fiscal Year 1982 Planning Report for Illinois stated, "another
impact of the current recession has been to accelerate job losses in
industries which were already declining."35  During 1980, primary and
fabricated metals were hit the hardest with a loss of 16,300 jobs,
followed by electrical and electronic equipment, which lost 7,800
jobs. 36 In nondurable goods, the largest average annual decline in
1980 was registered for chemical products.
Worse yet, the long-awaited "recovery" is rarely a true recovery
to previous employment levels.
"Many economists say that even after a recovery, businesses
add workers slowly and cautiously and many managers use slow
periods to permanently reduce their workforces. A secretary
who was laid off last month from the GAF building materials
plant in Joliet, said she has seen examples of this at GAF
since she started working there a few years ago. 'Every
year they lay off people, saying it's temporary.' The
office staff (has) dwindled to 17 from 45 during her tenure,
while the production force, at 300 now, is about a third of
what it had been." 37
The foregoing story of job loss and decline is reversed if the
analysis turns to the service sector. Manufacturing's loss of its
high share of the Illinois economy from 1950-81 was the gain of the
nonmanufacturing sector. In 1950, manufacturing, mining and
construction held 43.9% of the economy. By 1981, non-goods producing
sectors had grown from 56.1 percent to 71.1 percent, a dramatic shift
in a traditionally manufacturing state. The services sector grew
faster than any other sectors: 31.7 percent from 1950-60; 40.9 per-
cent from 1960-70; and 42.5 percent from 1970-81. (See Table 10)
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Business and health services were the main sources of growth in the
services sector. Banking and insurance carriers represented the main
job gainers in the finance, insurance and real estate sector. The
rate of growth in retail trade was slower than wholesale trade from
1972-80, yet retail trade gained substantially more jobs.
The most recent figures suggest that services have not been
completely resistant to the recession. As noted by the FY 1982 Plan
for Illinois, "although the current recession did not result in overall
employment losses, the 1979-80 increase was well below prior years'
rates of change. ,38 Trade and transportation experienced their first
losses since 1975.
The foregoing numbers demonstrate that the Illinois economy,
paralleling that of the Midwest and the nation, has been undergoing a
substantial shift from manufacturing to services during the past three
decades. The full consequences of this shift are difficult to
determine since we are still in the midst of the change. In Illinois
the decline of manufacturing has implications for the export base of
the state, and therefore, the general health of the economy.
The prosperity of Illinois has largely been a function of its
strength as an exporter of manufactured goods and agricultural products.
In 1976, Illinois ranked third nationally as an exporter of manufactured
goods. The state exported $6,660 million, or 8 percent of U.S.
exports.39 The three leading.products were non-electric machinery,
food products and electric and electronic equipment. Illinois was
first in the U.S. in foreign sales of the first two products, and fourth
in the third. The state also sold large amounts of chemicals and
transportation equipment overseas. (See Table 12)
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Illinois was first in the nation in agricultural
exports in 1977; the most important products were feed grains, soy-
beans, protein meal and soybean oil. It was also the nation's second
largest exporter of meats. An estimated 86,900 (6.9 percent of total)
jobs were related to exports in 1976.40
Exports are invaluable to an economy because of the additional
development they stimulate within the exporting region. According to
economic base theory, exports constitute the basic sector upon which
the non-basic, or non-exporting, sector depends. In Illinois,
manufacturing dominates the basic sector. Money entering the Illinois
economy from foreign sales is used, among other things, to purchase
services and inputs from local businesses that support the manufacturing
industries. The model is not perfect, of course, since all of the
money will not be spent in Illinois, but a benefit is realized by
the State's economy. The decline of the manufacturing industries key
to the Illinois export base has serious consequences for the long-run
health of the state's economy. The growing service sector theoretically
has the potential to become an exporting sector as well. Its perform-
ance in this regard remains to be seen. The State's economic develop-
ment strategy should aim for the maintenance of a viable export sector.
Shifts in Occupations
A superficial look at the net job increases in Illinois might lead
one to dismiss the manufacturing job losses, since these jobs have been
replaced with service jobs. Several important qualitative aspects of
work are missed by this view. We need to examine closely the types of
jobs that are being lost and gained in terms of their earnings, skill
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level, and potential security.
In their study of the differences in jobs between older and younger
cities, Harrison and Hill differentiate between "predominantly high-
wage, full-year" jobs and "predominantly low-wage, part-year" jobs.41
Using the labor market segmentation theory definitions of the secondary
and primary labor markets, they assign industries by SIC code to
each of these categories. They analyzed the wages of all two-digit SIC
industry groups for their ten sample cities in 1970 and derived the
following categorization:
"Predominantly low-wage, part-year: Manufacturing, including
apparel, lumber, leather, furniture and textiles; Non-
manufacturing, including retail trade, business services,
health services, nongovernmental education services, other
services (except legal and professional). Predominantly
high-wage, full-year: Manufacturing, including food,
printing and publishing, chemicals, petroleum and coal,
rubber and plastics, stone and glass, primary and fabricated
metals, machinery, electrical equipment transportation
equipment and instruments; Nonmanufacturing, including
transportation services, utilities, wholesale trade,
finance, insurance, real estate, legal services and
professional services. "42
This assignment of industries to a particular labor market segment
illustrates several aspects of the changing occupational structure in
Illinois. Jobs have been lost-in both low-wage and- high-wage manufact-
uring, though the largest number of jobs lost has been in the high wage
category. The only manufacturing industries in the high wage group
that have continued to provide jobs in Illinois are mining, machinery
and transportation equipment, although growth in the latter two has
fallen off during the current recession. The nonmanufacturing industry
groups that have experienced the fastest growth and added the largest
number of jobs to the economy have been those in the low-wage, part-
year sector, i.e., business services, health services and retail trade.
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The high-wage nonmanufacturing industries that have been expanding,
such as wholesale trade, finance, insurance, and legal and professional
services, provide fewer jobs in total, and tend to be dominated by
occupations with high training and/or experience requirements. Another
aspect of this change is that most jobs are being lost in industries
with the highest rates of unionization, while jobs are being gained
in industries with relatively low rates of unionization.
The pay differential observed by Harrison and Hill in 1970 persists
in current Illinois wage scales, whether analyzed by occupation or by
industry. Professional, technical and managerial occupations in
Illinois have the highest salaries; clerical, sales and service
occupations' categories have the lowest earnings; and the occpuations
associated with manufacturing are in between these two groups. (See
Table 13) The
industry wage scales indicate that the lowest paying nonmanufacturing
groups in Illinois in 1981 were retail trade, banking, business
services and health services.
The average pay of nonmanufacturing jobs in 1981 was $9,700,
compared to $11,500 for manufacturing. Different levels of benefits
also exist between lower wage, nonunionized jobs and higher paying,
generally unionized jobs. This "benefit differential" exists in
terms of health coverage, pension plans, vacation time, workplace
health and safety, and grievance procedures. While these differences
are more difficult to quantify, they are critically important from
the employee's point of view.
Data from the Illinois Bureau of Employment Security illustrates
some of these dynamics at work in the Illinois labor market. Of all
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the people who were unemployed, and covered by unemployment insurance
benefits in 1980, 11% last worked as professional and technical workers,
17.3% were clerical and sales workers, 11.4% were service workers, and
60.3% were industrial workers.43 Thus the loss of manufacturing jobs
has put a substantial number of blue collar workers on unemployment
insurance. Manufacturing occupations also had the highest ratio of
applications to available jobs, according to the Illinois job service
listings. There were 11.2 applicants for every processing opening,
12.5 applicants for every machine trades occupation. Some of the
individual numbers are even more striking: 74 applicants for every
auto assembly opening, 35 applicants for every production line opening,
94 applicants for every heavy equipment operator job opening. In
contrast, the ratio of applicants to openings in sales was 4.4 per
opening, 5.4 in services, and 6.0 in clerical. 4 4
The mismatch between available workers and available jobs is
indicated by information on those jobs most difficult to fill through
the job service, as measured by frequency and duration of each listing.
Professional, managerial, and technical occpuations were reportedly
difficult to fill because of the high credentials required. While
clerical, sales and entry-level services were slightly easier to fill,
"the labor turnover is high due to low wages and poor working
conditions... the average pay for service job titles ($4.05/hr. Feb.
1981) was the lowest paid of any of the nine occpuational categories,
with the exception of farming."45
The future expansion and security of many of these service sector
jobs is not guaranteed. The Illinois Occupation Outlook Handbook,
1976-85, cites several sectors that are expected to grow in terms of
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sales and/or volume, but without a commensurate expansion of jobs.
For example, "although the demand for the services provided by the
communications industries will increase rapidly, advances in technology
are expected to limit employment growth in some occupations,
particularly in telephone communications." 46
The volume of sales in trade is expected to rise but
"due to labor-saving innovations, employment in this
sector is not expected to grow as fast as sales. The
use of computers for inventory control and billing...
may limit the need for additional clerical workers.
Improved methods of handling and storing merchandise
will limit the demand for laborers."47
The expanded use of electronic registers is also expected to reduce the
demand for workers in food stores.
Health and business services, which have grown substantially,
are expected to continue to provide expanding job opportunities. This
is likely to be true, but there are two factors that promise to
limit this growth. Progress is being made toward the "automated office"
which may slacken the demand for clerical workers. Also, the
significant role of governmental expenditures in the growth of the
health care sector has rarely been fully acknowledged. Current
governmental cutbacks, as well as a heightened concern for health care
costs, cast a shadow on the future growth potential of health services.
In the past year, at least three Chicago hospitals have announced that
they plan to close.
Shifts in Occupations and Working Conditions from Technology
"Automation? Depends how it's applied. It frightens me
if it puts me out on the street. It doesn't frighten
me if it shortens my work week. You read that little
thing: what are you going to do when this computer
replaces you? Blow up computers. (Laughs) Really.
Blow up computers. I'll be goddamned if a computer
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is gonna eat before I dol.... Machines
can either liberate man or enslave 'im, because they're
pretty neutral. It's man whg has the bias to put the
thing one place or another."" 8
The sentiments of this steelworker would likely bring support from
workers in a variety of industries, including autos, petrochemicals, and
information processing. It is too late, however, to counter the conse-
quences of computers through destruction because they are already widely
used.
"The widespread application of computers, silicon chips,
and industrial robots, and the speed with which these and
similar technological advances are being developed, portend
vast changes... In essence, our socigty is involved in a
rapid and massive redesign of work." 9
This redesign of work through the application of computer tech-
nology by management is having several consequences for workers. The
first, most obvious, impact is job elimination through increasing
automation of the assembly line and use of industrial robots. A recent
report on plant closings prepared for the National Alliance of Business
stated that 30% of assemblers jobs, 65% of production painters' jobs,
50% of machinists' jobs and 50% of welders' jobs could be done by
industrial robots with rudimentary sensory input. (See Table 14)
Harley Shaiken, writing about the impact of robotics on the auto
industry, has stated that "Robot welders in use today can each dis-
place three or four workers, and create comparatively few jobs for
their repair and maintenance." 50
Advocates of this "labor saving" technology argue that new jobs
are created as these old jobs are destroyed. Although some new jobs
are created, they are fewer in number and do not replace all of the
previous blue collar jobs. The jobs that are created to employ blue
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collar workers are frequently of a lower skill level. The skilled
machinist is left to monitor and press buttons on the computer that
executes work previously done by human hands. The "skilled" aspects
of the task are transferred to the engineers who design the computer
programs. Thus, we observe what Harry Braverman, writing in Labor and
Monopoly Capital, has called the "deskilling" of work. A report on
the impact of computer technology on communications workers found the
same phenomenon.
"The few new nonmanagement jobs (Bell's nonmanagement work-
force of 780,000 is expected to grow by one-tenth) will be
limited to unskilled, primarily clerical work. And this
growth in unskilled jobs will be matched by a precipitous
decline in the skilled crafts. From 1974-78, craft
employment dropped by almost 22,000 jobs, a trend that
is certain to continue."51
The application of computer technology also affects working
conditions by introducing sophisticated systems for controlling the
pace of work and monitoring worker output and behavior. Harley
Shaiken has written about this process in the auto industry.
"The highly flexible new computer technology can be used
not only to coordinate production but also to control
workers. The next generation of robots, for example,
is targeted for light assembly jobs and machine loading--
areas where workers currently exercise some control
over work pace. G.M.'s Puma System (Programmable
Universal Machines for Assembly) alternates workers and
robots on an assembly line. People and mechanical arms
are regarded as interchangeable, so that if a robot
breaks down, a worker is inserted in its place... Not
to be outdone by its healthier rivals, Chrysler is
computerizing its hourly personnel and attendance
records at seventeen plants."
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Shifts in Labor-Management Relations
The headline of a recent New York Times article expressed the
theme of this section: "The Mobility of Capital Disperses Unions'
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Power".53 The geographical, sectoral, occupational and technological
changes that have been discussed are having a significant affect on
organized labor. Labor unions are experiencing membership losses,
the erosion of earnings and benefits, and dilution of their political
power, at least in the short run.
As stated by the New York Times, "American labor unions have hit
difficult times--and the recession is not the only cause... the inter-
nationalization of work and the movement of jobs from America to
foreign countries" is perhaps the most significant factor.54 Within
the United States, many plants have relocated or expanded in right-
to-work states, or states with a low rate of unionization. All of
the 20 right-to-work states in 1978 had unionization rates of 20 percent
or less, with the exception of Nevada.
Labor union membership increased in Illinois from 1964 to 78, but
it declined as a proportion of total employment, from 38.4 percent in
1964 to 31.5 percent in 1978. The rate of growth also slowed during
this period, as did the national rate of labor union membership. The
national rate of unionization was 29.5 percent in 1964, and 23.6
percent in 1978. Throughout the period, Illinois had the fourth
highest number of unionized workers, behind New York, California and
Pennsylvania. (See Table. 15)
Union membership has also suffered because job losses have been
concentrated in the highly unionized goods producing industries. The
Independent Radionic Workers of America, which represented Zenith
before it shutdown in Chicago, had 10,500 members in 1967. In 1980
the union had only 2,450 members. 55 The Chicago Building Trades Council
now has about 80,000 members in Cook County, or two-thirds their
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membership of twenty years ago. In Chicago, the United Food and
Commercial Workers lost 10% of its members from 1976-81. These
membership losses have hurt unions financially, precisely at a time
when they need resources. The UAW, with 30,000 Chicago-area members,
lost 15% of its regional membership from 1979-81 and laid off 10% of
its union staff.56
Job gains, on the other hand, have been concentrated in the
service sector, which is generally less unionized than manufacturing.
One of the most highly unionized nonmanufacturing groups, public
sector jobs, have been experiencing job losses due to budget cutbacks.
The second major impact of these structural shifts on organized
labor is being experienced in terms of earnings. Many blue collar
workers must look to the lower wage service sector for employment
opportunities. A study of earnings losses of permanently displaced
male workers, reported by Professors Bennett Harrison and Barry
Bluestone in their forthcoming book, found that "even after six years,
workers in some industries continued to suffer as much as an 18
percent loss. The greatest reduction in income was suffered by those
displaces from the better paying unionized industries like meat-
packing, flat glass, auto, aerospace, steel, and petroleum refining."57
Frequently, health benefits and pensions are not totally recovered in
the transfer from union to non-union employment, and hence the
effective earnings are lower due to additional "costs" of non-union
jobs.
A Forbes Magazine follow-up study of workers displaced when
Zenith shutdown in Chicago during the late 1970's documented this
shift of industrial workers into the service sector. Of the 150 ex-
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Zenith workers contacted, "70 percent are working again, nearly twice
as many in the service industries as in manufacturing... (They)
found jobs... (as) cashiers at a Jewel Food store, bus drivers,
bookkeepers, clerks, cooks, secretaries, travel agents and TV repair."58
Workers who actually lose their jobs are not alone in the
reduction of their earnings. Employees in communities where a number
of plant shutdowns have occurred are also subject to downward wage
pressure. For example, employees of Little Giant Products, Inc.,
Peoria, manufacturer of attachments for lift trucks and road sweepers,
were asked to vote on a wage reduction of 11.5 percent in their December
1981 contract or face a shutdown of the plant.59 This occurred in
the midst of two major closing in Peoria--Hiram Walker, 1,100 workers,
January 1982, and Pabst, 700 workers, February 1982--and after a decade
of major closings.
Finally technological innovations are having an impact on member-
ship through direct job elimination, and through the facilitation
of capital mobility to other parts of the country and the world. Harley
Shaiken has written that a:
"Profound structural transformation is taking place as
auto makers race to install the latest forms of computer
technology, downsize cars, automate factories and re-
structure operations on a global scale... The revitalized
auto industry that emerges however, will be one that employs
far fewer workers and produces more of its basic components
outside the United States." 60
Finally, there are implications for labor-management relations in the
political sphere. In addition to a weakened position
at the bargaining table, organized labor has experienced recent set-
backs in the legislative front. The lack of progress on labor law
reform during the Carter administration, state cutbacks on unemployment
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compensation, the attack on the minimum wage and the current weakening
of OSHA are indicators of this trend.
A recent article on the Midwest economy suggested a relationship
between this weakened position of organized labor and the improving
business climate of the region.
"The Middle West has had to do alot to make its business
climate competitive with those of the Northeast and the Sun
belt. Last year Illinois and Michigan reformed their un-
employment insurance and workers' compensation programs.
Businesses will save $497 million in Illinois and $650
million in Michigan... Many skilled workers in the region
are looking for jobs, and organized labor's attitude is
described as cooperative. 'The whole issue of labor
militancy has been brought under control,'" according
to the director of the Michigan Department of Commerce.61
Professor Robert McKersie of MIT has expressed the view, however,
that organized labor may be fighting back.
"The phenomenon of increasing resistance to economic dis-
location warrants further attention... What appears to be
emerging in this country is a belief that job loss is.below
the social minimum that workers are entitled to enjoy... A
new trend is emerging on the economic scene, namely, workers
taking ma ers into their own hands and refusing to accept
changes."
We can note indicators of both trends. On the one hand, as
reported by the New York Times,
"The number of strikes fell last year to their lowest
number since 1942,... the number of days lost to strikes
and the number of workers involved fell to their lowest
level in 20 years. Only four major strikes involving
a total of f 91er than 10,000 workers were in progress early
this month."
Yet in Illinois, organized labor has shown substantial strength
in counteracting a recent upsurge in anti-labor legislation in the
Illinois legislature.
"Springfield legislators began paying closer attention to
labor lobbyists after 20,000 Illinois trade unionists
descended on the Capitol lawn June 2. They were there to
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defeat what Illinois AFL-CIO President Robert Gibson
calls a 'deluge of anti-labor legislation', including
the first right-to-work bill to escape a House Committee
in Illinois history... Union leaders also blanched as other
pieces of legislation showed up in the hopper in Springfield,
including a semi-serious proposal to require unions to
give one year's notice before striking, proposals to
repeal prevailing wage laws and several dozen bills
designed to substantially reduce benefits and qualifications
for unemployment insurance and workers compensation."64
If Professor McKersie is correct, we may see a new era of labor
organizing and militancy. Robert Gibson projected this scenario when
he stated that "The unions will become more militant, even increase in
size. People will turn to unions. When they find there's no place
else to turn, they will turn to each other."65
The labor movement faces difficult and unprecedented challenges
ahead. The organizing that is necessary to achieve Gibson's goa- must
be conducted in an anti-labor political climate. Changing economic
realities will require organizing in new occupations and across
national boundaries, neither of which have yet occurred on any major
scale, even though there have been steps in these directions.
Summary
This Chapter has established three essential points about the
challenge presented to us by the problems associated with plant
closings. First, the patterns of economic development embedded in our
society have caused the phenomena of economic dislocation--plant shut-
downs, technological displacement, boom and bust cycles--to recur
throughout the past century. Second, the social disruption and dis-
content associated with this economic dislocation has led to a funda-
mental political debate in our society about the economic wisdom and
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social equity of certain aspects of these patterns of development.
The language of the debate is commonly framed in terms of the balance
between the public good and private economic gain. Finally, even
though we have been confronted with the same resource distribution
question for over a century, the changing characteristics of technology
and the world economy today require us to generate responses for
dealing with social and economic problems that have not yet been
developed. Thus, while economic dislocation in general is not a
recent occurrence, its form today demands careful analysis and the
development of strategies that are tailored to the unprecedented
circumstances with which we are faced.
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CHAPTER TWO
PLANT CLOSINGS IN ILLINOIS
Introduction
The previous Chapter demonstrated that current patterns of
economic development are eroding traditional industries, displacing
jobs and occupations, and weakening the power of labor unions in the
U.S. These structural changes are apparent in a variety of events,
only one of which is plant closings. This Chapter's focus on plant
closings in Illinois illustrates, in microcosm, the political and
economic dimensions of these broader changes. This anlaysis also
enriches our understanding of the problem faced by the plant closing
project of the Manpower Assistance Program, Illinois State AFL-CIO, as
well as other organizations attempting to address the causes and
consequences of plant closings.
While a focus on shutdowns depicts the personal and community
disruption that occurs when plants close, it can understate the overall
impact of the disinvestment process. An analogy to death and illness
is not inappropriate in this instance. For example, the number of
actual deaths due to cancer or heart disease, while dramatic, under-
states the larger impact of the disease if we do not also know how many
people live disabled by the illness. A look at plant closings, like
deaths, overlooks the extensive number of near-deaths, such as division
closings and indefinite layoffs. In 1979 and 1980, 69,970 layoffs
were reported to the Illinois Bureau of Employment Security with only
6,239 reported recalls.I Furthermore, the number of jobs lost at the
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exact time of a closing is often less than the plant capacity. In
many cases, firms have experienced a slow but steady erosion of their
workforce that is not reflected by the final closing data. Westclox
Company, in Peru, Illinois, once employed 5,000 people, while the
workforce prior to closing was 1,200.2 The workforce of Admiral Corp.,
Harvard, Illinois, had been reduced from 4,000 to 1,000 workers at the
time of the shutdown. 3
In addition to layoffs in the plants that remain open, other
changes affecting earnings and working conditions in these plants
may occur. Overtime may be reduced to cutback production and reduce
the earnings of employees. Conversely, the workforce remaining in
a plant experiencing substantial layoffs may be subjected to additional
work without compensation or required overtime. A company considering
closing a plant may also be less likely to continue maintenance and
repairs in a plant, which can make the work both more hazardous and
less productive. A company may also be remiss about processing
grievances in a plant it is planning to close, thus adversely
affecting working conditions.
Threats of layoffs and/or plant closings also affect collective
bargaining. This has been demonstrated by the recent contract
negotiations of the UAW with Ford and GM, where negotiations occurred
in light of earlier threats of plant closings by the companies.
To carry the disease analogy one step further, many people who
have a particular illness are not counted because they never see a
doctor. Likewise, there are many workers who have experienced lay-
offs and plant closings who have not been systematically counted.
Non-unionized workers are less likely to be counted than union
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workers. Employees of small sub-contracting shops and small businesses
who lose their jobs due to the ripple effect of larger closings are
rarely reported or counted. Finally, little systematic tracking
of public employees displaced by budget cutbacks has occurred. These
points emphasize the fact that any count of plant closing victims is
bound to underestimate the total number of displaced workers.
A cautionary note should be added r.egarding the limited
applicability of the death analogy to plant closings. A policy bias
against assistance on behalf of troubled firms and industries is
implicit in this analogy. The misleading connotation is that since
human death is inevitable, business and industry deaths must also be
inevitable. Worse yet,, it is often assumed that these businesses
probably deserve to die. Why should any resources be applied to
prevent inevitable and deserved deaths?
The critical flaw in this logic, in addition to the fact that the
life cycles of humans and institutions are actually quite different, is
that death itself is simply an outcome that can result from a variety
of circumstances or causes. When researchers examined the causes
of "dying" neighborhoods and "dying" cities during the 1960's and
1970's, they often found evidence of systematic neglect and dis-
investment that had undermined the life of these communities. In
the case of businesses and industries, it would be more accurate to
differentiate, based on qualitative data regarding the causes of
failure, between firms that were intentionally neglected and allowed
to die and those that suffered from documented circumstances beyond
their control. The policy debate might be quite different if business
murder rates were identified along with business death rates.
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Overview of the Data
It would seem that plant closings, given their visibility and
finality, would be relatively easy to count. Unfortunately, this is
not true. Very little information is readily available, and the
quality of available data is poor.
In Illinois, the Research and Analysis Division of the Illinois
Bureau of Employment Security (IBES) is the official collector of
information on mass layoffs and plant closings. The timeliness and
accuracy of their data depends on whether or not firms report their
closings. It also depends on the follow-up conducted by the IBES
Office. It seems that there is a substantial amount of underreporting.
From 1978 to 1981, IBES counted 109 plant closings. From my own
research, I found an additional 35 closings during the same years.
(See Table 16)
The underreporting seems especially concentrated in the trade
and service SIC (Standard Industrial Classification) codes. Even
though these are growing sectors, firms in the trade category have a
higher failure rate than manufacturing establishments according to
David Birch's d'ata on Illinois. These "deaths" should register as
plant closings. Thus, the official data are limited by an undercount
and the absence of nonmanufacturing closings. Another major weakness
of the data is its absence of detail.
Neither the IBES listings nor newspaper articles distinguish
consistently between production workers and management in their reports
on the number of jobs lost. Little information is available regarding
the circumstances of the closings. It is even more difficult to find
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out what happened to a plant after it closed.
This lack of information is a serious hindrance because it is
impossible to make informed decisions about the appropriate public
policy regarding plant closings without adequate data. No one knows
the full magnitude of the problem. We do not know the extent of the
revenue loss suffered by the State and its communities from lowered
corporate and personal income taxes, property taxes and sales taxes.
We do not know the costs incurred by the State through the provision
of services to individuals and communities. We do not know if the
majority of the shutdowns occurred in firms whose headquarters are
not based in Illinois. We do not know how many of the closings might
have been prevented. In short, the State has almost none of the
detailed information that is essential for planning and program
development. This issue will be raised again in later sections of the
report.
Given the limits of data availability, I have compiled the single-
most comprehensive list of plant closings in Illinois during the
1970's. The sample includes approximately 310 plants that closed from
1970 to March 1982, representing over 60,000 employees. (See Tables
17-19) The highest numbers of closings
occurred in 1980 and 1981. This increase may represent improved
reporting rates, and not necessarily an absolute increase in the rate
of closings over previous years. It may also suggest the impact of
the current recession.
The numbers on this list are preliminary, because they do not
represent a complete count of plant closings in the State. The
sample does provide enough information, however, to begin to understand
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the causes and consequences of plant shutdowns in Illinois.
Circumstances of the Plant Closings
The plant closings presented in this section were selected to
illustrate the main circumstances of shutdowns that have been occurring
in Illinois. One of the striking similarities among all of these
examples, with the possible exception of the closings due to product
changes, is their planned quality. In most cases, the company did not
go out of business, but shifted operations to a different location. In
the total sample I have of over 300 firms, less than five were actual
bankruptcies. Some companies, like Pabst, Hiram Walker and Swift,
reported that they were profitable up until the time of the closings,
but not profitable enough.
This point is critically important because it runs counter to the
popular wisdom that plant shutdowns are unpredictable and unavoidable
events. Most closings are attributed to "economic forces" that carry
the weight of inevitability. It is in the interests of the business
community to perpetuate this idea because they can be less accountable
to workers and communities if they can argue that a plant closing was
beyond their control. They can displace blame to "economic forces".
During a recession, it is even more difficult to combat this view,
because the slow economy does cause some business failures. This
view of the problem leads logically to the conclusion that efforts to
prevent plant closings are relatively futile. An even more extreme
view is that preventive efforts are counter-productive, because shut-
downs represent a healthy "weeding out" of weak firms.
The evidence presented here, however, demonstrates that many
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closings (including closings of profitable firms), are intentional and
planned in advance. They are planned by conglomerates making changes
in their subsidiary portfolios. They are planned by companies that
have built or purchased similar plants in other locations. They are
planned to coincide with union contract negotiations and planned to
eliminate a union from a plant. The knowledge that many, albeit not
all, plant closings are the result of corporate planning leads to very
different possibilities for prevention than does the "economic forces"
argument. Presumably, if we knew how and when shutdowns were planned,
we could identify a number of points for strategic intervention to
alter the course of events. If it is possible to plan a shutdown, it
should be possible to plan for the continued viability of firms and
industries, especially those that are vital to our economy.
Given present political conditions, it is not possible to identify
these opportunities for strategic intervention and develop programs for
the prevention of unnecessary closings on any broad scale. Labor
unions, community groups, elected officials and state economic develop-
ment agencies, although affected by plant closings, do not have the
power to participate in the decisions of private business on this
issue. These groups can, and do, attempt to influence these decisions.
It requires a considerable amount of pressure to alter a company's
decision to close a plant, and few successes have occurred. Such
efforts are further hampered by these groups' lack of information and
resulting inability to argue a convincing, alternative position to
that of the company.
The point here is not that all plant closings should or could be
prevented. The issue is that the public does not have adequate
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information to assess each situation. Furthermore, even if the
information were available, the public has essentially no vote in the
matter, even though it bears many of the costs of plant closings.
The Illinois data presented here should be considered in reference
to this issue. Two sets of questions should be kept in mind. From
a technical perspective, we need to ask a cost/benefit question
about these closings: Are the social and economic costs of this shut-
down greater or less than its benefits? Who bears the costs and who
reaps the benefits? Are the costs of preventing this shutdown greater
or less than the benefits of preventing it? Second, from a strategic
perspective, we. need to ask a political question about what would
be required for the public, including workers and their communities,
to participate meaningfully in making these decisions? What alter-
native outcomes might occur, if any, if this participation in economic
decisions were to occur?
Plants Relocating Out of Illinois
Of the total sample of plant closings in Illinois, the majority
of plants that relocated out of Illinois went to Southern states,
most of which have right-to-work laws. At least two plants moved
to Juarez, Mexico to take advantage of the twin plant, or "maquiladora"
program. Several of the relocating plants reported that they relocated
to lower their labor costs. The following examples do not represent
all of the out-migrating firms in the total sample.
- In December 1981, the Galesburg, Ill., newspaper reported
that OMC Corporation, manufacturer of Lawn-Boy mowers, would
be moving 800 jobs out of Galesburg. Assembly production
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was moved to a former suitcase factory in a small town in
Mississippi. The sub-assembly of carburetors was transferred
to a plant in Juarez, Mexico, and the electronic components
production was relocated to Hong Kong.4
About 210 jobs were exported to Juarez, Mexico, from Oglesby,
Illinois, by Indiana General, a firm that produced electric
motors. The unionized steelworkers employed in the plant
were not happy to hear their plant manager stated on a local
radio talk show that Juarez's major attraction was its low cost
labor. He went on to say that "while Oglesby's 1976 wages were
about $4 an hour, Indiana General would pay about $1 an hour
in an hour in Mexico... He admitted that wages weren't
very high in Oglesby, and the labor supply was adequate,
but he said companies just don't have to deal with unions
anymore.',5
In these cases, Juarez, Mexico, was not selected at random.
Rather, Juarez has sytematically marketed its "Industrialization
Program" to corporations and has attracted them primarily with lower
labor costs. According to an 1980 El Paso Times series on the program,
"The Border Industrialization Program began in 1965.
Laws were changed to accomodate the program and
it was renamed the Mexican Industrialization Program
in 1971... Wages are 20-25% of U.S. costs... Total
border plants number more than 500, employing about
121,000 workers... more than $200 million has been
invested, including plant and equipment." 6
The manager of one Juarez firm describes how his company uses the
program.
"(The) firm started out moving all the simple, menial
tasks to Mexico, keeping the more sophisticated operations
in plants in the Midwest. Today, the simplest operations
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are being performed in plants in Taiwan, and the
Juarez workers are performing more sophist cated
tasks once reserved for American workers."
Hiram Walker Distillery in Peoria closed its doors to 1100
workers in January 1982 and transferred production to a new,
highly automated plant in Fort Smith, Arkansas, a right-to-
work state. Employees at Hiram Walker, members of the
Distillery Workers Union, attempted to bargain for transfer
rights in the shutdown agreement, but were refused. They were
told that the company had agreed to hire local residents
exclusively and in return for some regulatory changes from the
Arkansas government.8 Owens Illinois Glass Co., Illinois,
reported the elimination of 50 jobs associated with the Walker
closing. Owens supplied glass bottles to Walkers. 9
- Chicago Rawhide, manufacturer of miscellaneous industrial goods
such as oil, rubber seals and gears, closed two Chicago plants
in 1972 and 1977 and moved a total of approximately 710 jobs
to North Carolina. 0
- Two food equipment companies, Chemetron of Chicago and
Rexham of Rockford together terminated 330 jobs and moved to
Kentucky in '78 and Florida in '77, respectively. Both
companies had been organized by the Machinists Union (IAM)
and the closing reports stated that the companies moved South
in search of lower labor costs. Rexham had offered to remain
in Rockford in exchange for a $3.00 per/hour cut in pay from
the employees, which they refused. 11
- Crane Co., a producer of plumbing and building products
that employed 6,000 steelworkers in Chicago during the late
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1960's, shutdown 800 jobs in 1977. During the 1970's, Crane's
operation was transferred to Iowa and Arkansas, both right-to-
work states. 12
Elgin and Waltham Watch, Co. relocated part of its operation
from Chicago to Florida, thus transferring 700 jobs. Accord-
ing to the company president, "the effect of Illinois workmen's
compensation laws that business often cite as harming the
state's business climate," was not a major factor in their
relocation decision.13 Lower wages rates, lower property
tax rates and no state income tax were cited as the reasons
that the company relocated when faced with its declining share
of the market for watches. This move was announced six months
after the firm was acquired by Katy Industries. 14
W. F. Hall, a printing company that is now a subsidiary of
Mobil, was partly relocated to a 1,000 acre industrial park
in Corinth, Mississippi. Wurlitzer Co., formerly of DeKalb,
Illinois, also relocated 200 jobs to Corinth. The Graphic
Arts International Union that still represents the employees
at Hall's Chicago plant has been defeated twice in union
elections at the Corinth plant. According to the President of
a United Rubber Workers local in Corinth, "You won't find lower
wages unless you go to the Orient... This town will do anything
to keep unions out... Being union is the kiss of death here.
If my plant closed, I couldn't walk into a single plant and
get a job. They know (my) name."15 In addition to the
Corinth plant, W. F. Hall relocated other Chicago operations
to Dresden, Tennessee, during the 1970's. In 1981 the company
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was building another plant in Augusta, Georgia.
Acquisition Prior to Closing
Plant closings following acquisition by another corporation are no
more an exclusively modern phenomenon than are plant closings due to
business relocation, as the following example illustrates.
"Bicycle companies sprang up in a host of towns during
the early nineties, but shortly after 1899, when the
American Bicycle Company absorbed forty-eight of them,
production was centered plants at Springfield, Massachusetts,
and Hartford, Connecticut, each of which suffered a severe
blow when the trust collapsed a few seasons later."16
A century later, the Antitrust Subcommittee of the U.S. House of
Representatives Committee on Small Business investigated the same
process. Their report, published in 1980, stated that,
"communities affected by mergers 'are caught in the middle
of a huge corporate investment game' that sometimes triggers
the closing of once-profitable business." The subcommittee
heard testimony "from officials in Hopedale and Clinton,
Massachusetts, Youngstown, Ohio, Lewiston, Maine, and
Staunton, Virginia. In all five communities, local
businesses were shut down or sold after being pirchased by
outside firms specializing in other products."
The Illinois Public Action Council, a citizen action and public
interest research organization, investigated the same phenomenon. In
a survey of 50 plant closings that occurred during the 1970's, 85
percent of them were owned by multi-national corporations.18 Examples
of some of these firms follow.
- Westclox Co., manufacturer of clocks and watches, was taken
over by Talley Industries and the company transferred
operations gradually to Alabama and Georgia, thus eliminating
*19500 jobs of United Steelworkers in Peru, Illinois.
- Woodbrooks, a piano parts manufacturer in Rockford, was taken
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over by Aurora Corp. in 1965. The plant, which was 30 years
old at the time of purchase, was closed in 1970. Aurora
shifted its operations to Mexico, thus eliminating 400 jobs in
Rockford.20
- General Molded Products, of Des Plaines, Illinois, was shut-
down after being acquired by Sunbeam Corporation. Sunbeam
shifted production to other facilities, thus eliminating 120
jobs in Des Plaines. 21
- Walworth Steel, of Kewanee, was closed after being acquired
by Anaconda Copper. Production was shifted elsewhere, and
Kewanee lost 130 jobs.22
- Elgin Metal Casket Company, Elgin had its operation shutdown
and production shifted to Indiana. This occurred within a
few years after the Casket Company was acquired by Gulf and
Western. About 200 jobs were eliminated in Elgin. 23
- About 900 employees of Montgomery Wards in Chicago, lost their
jobs when Mobil Corporation, the parent corporation, decided
to shift operations to Cincinnati.24
- Rockwell International, a large conglomerate, closed at least
two of its Illinois subsidiaries in Illinois during the 1970's.
"Colonel Rockwell (of Rockwell International) was once
described by Fortune Magazine as someone who picks up
and discards companies like a gin-rummy player'. The
Colonel himself once prophesized: 'By 1980, 200
companies will control 60 to 75 percent of the world's
gross product, and we intend to be one of them.' Rockwell
International ranks today as one of the 100 largest
manufacturing companies in the worl with a product
roster that spans many industries."
In 1979 Rockwell closed the Admiral Corporation in Harvard,
Illinois, which manufactured TV's and radios, thus eliminating
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1,000 jobs. The plant had about 4,000 jobs just 4 years prior
to the closing.26 Goss Manufacturers, Chicago, produced steel
products and was purchased by Rockwell International in 1972.
The company announced the closing during the 1976 strike over
work rules and overtime, and shifted operations to Iowa. 850
jobs were lost.27
Product Changes
Product changes are a seemingly inevitable cause of plant closings.
One wonders, however, if some of them, especially the examples pre-
sented below, could have been prevented. There is very little
data available to answer this question. Why was the change not
anticipated? Was it ignored on purpose, to allow the company to go
out of business? Were new markets sought? Were there other uses for
the plants? At the present time, we have no way of answering these
questions.
- General Electric closed a Rockford plant that had been pro-
ducing wooden TV and radio cabinets in 1975, thus ending 300
jobs. They reportedly closed due to competition from plastic
cabinets.28
- A switch to plastic bottles over glass bottles reportedly
precipitated the January 1979 closing of Obear-Nester Glass in
East St. Louis, Illinois. Approximately 1,330jobs were lost. 2 9
- Continental Can Co. closed its 17 year old Peoria Heights
plant in February 1980 due to a shift in demand for a two-
piece can instead of a three-piece can. by Pabst. Continental
was unable to produce the two-piece aluminum cans that Pabst
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wanted. 30
Labor Disputes
The fact that plants are shutdown or relocated to escape union
wage rates has already been documented. Shutdowns can also occur at
the specific time of a labor dispute or contract negotiations.
- Bun-o-Matic, a coffee machine manufacturer in Springfield,
Illinois, announced their closing during a strike of the
Teamsters and refused to negotiate further. They eliminated
350 jobs in 1977 and shifted operations to Iowa, a right-to-
work -state. 31
- The story of Lee-Norse Co., a subsidiary of Ingersoll-Rand,
of New Jersey, illustrates the ability of firms to use plant
closing threats between parallel plants.as leverage during
labor disputes. Lee Norse, located in Taylorville, employed
200 people producing coal mining machinery. The company
announced a possible closing due to declining demand in
December 1979 and thus delayed opening contract talks with the
USWA local at Taylorville, whose contract expired January 21,
1980. While the Lee-Norse workers in Illinois waited in limbo,
the plant closing threat was used by corporate officials at
the two sister plants--one in Pennsylvania and the other in
West Virginia. According to the local newspaper, "the contract
(at Lee Norse in Pennsylvania) expires in April but the company
has asked for a union decision on a contract offer by January
15... (during negotiations at Lee Norse in West Virginia) equip-
ment was shipped from West Virginia to Taylorville while the
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plant was down in January, but when a new contract was signed,
the equipment was shipped back."32 By January 17, four days
before the contract was to expire at Taylorville, the plant
closing was announced. According to one of the Lee Norse
employees at Taylorville, "We've probably had the best union-
company relationship in the whole company structure. But
Ingersoll-Rand owns 150 companies and it's probably their
policy that we're seeing. 33
Management Practice
In recent years, the contributions of corporate management to
current economic ills have made the front pages of such mainstream
journals as the "Harvard Business Review". It is too soon to know
what changes, if any, will result from this identification of problems
associated with management practices. In the meantime, it remains
very difficult for non-management groups, including government,
workers and communities to identify mismanagement in detail when they
suspect that it occurs. Even with this information, it may be
impossible to reverse trends already set in motion.
We can identify three general ways that management practice can
lead to plant closings. The first is intentional, or a "managed" shut-
down, wherein the management carefully plans the shutdown in advance
and has a relocation plan, or where management buys a profitable firm
with the intention of selling or closing it after a certain number
of years. The second kind is unintentional, or a mismanaged shutdown,
wherein the business fails due to poor management. The third is
simply a combination of the first two. The following account of the
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Pabst closing appears to be an example of a combination of an in-
tentional shutdown and mismanagement. Company officials themselves
acknowledged their role in Pabst's loss of market share. At the same
time, according to the Wall Street Journal, they have a strategy for
retrenching their capacity that involves the purchase of other
breweries.
The closing of the Pabst Brewing Co., and the elimination of 800
jobs in Peoria Heights, illustrates a shutdown having more to do with
management practice than labor problems. William Smith Jr., Pabst's
president of four months, decided to shutdown the plant despite
concessions offered by nine unions at the Brewery, the plant's record
of profits and efficiency, and a $5 million three-year improvement
plan that was already underway. Pabst's overall market share had been
declining, and the Peoria Brewery was a source of over-capacity. In
a December 1981 meeting with union leaders, a Pabst official stated
that "our problems have not been caused by any (person) in this room
or by any (workers) who are represented by people in this room. The
problem has been in top management, particularly in marketing and
sales."34 During the first week of February 1982, when laid off
Pabst workers were beginning to feel the impact of the closing, Pabst
announced a decision to acquire Pittsburgh Brewing, Co., just five
months after William Smith, the new President of Pabst, had resigned
as the President of the Pittsburgh Brewing. The Wall Street Journal
reported that "Pabst wants to buy the additional capacity even though
it is retrenching its own capacity, because of Pittsburgh Brewing's
35
"brand leadership" .
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Industry-Wide Closings: The Case of Meatpacking
This case is presented in substantial detail because it
illustrates several of the causes of plant closings identified in the
previous sections.
As noted previously, meatpacking was a leading industry in
Illinois by the end of the 19th century.
"After 1880 the slaughtering and meatpacking industry in
Chicago grew in importance and was dominated by the "Big
Three" of packing: Philip Armour, Gustavus Swift, and
Nelson Morris... Swift, for example, incorporated in 1885
with a capitalization of $300,000, recapitalized in 1886
at $3 million, and by 1893 the concern boasted capital
of $15 million... By 1900 the industry gave employment
to 27,861 wage-earners, or 7.1 percent of the wage earners
employed in the state, and the products were valued at
22.9 percent of the total value of products of Illinois."36
Swift did not begin to diversify until 1968, when it acquired
Vickers Petroleum. By then, their meat business was slipping behind
the competition of Iowa Beef Processors and Missouri Beef Packers,
and so they decided to decrease their participation in this market.
Since 1969, they have closed over fifty meatpacking plants and laid
off or retired more than 18,000 workers.
Swift changed its name to Esmark in 1973, to update its image.
The conglomerate now holds such diverse businesses as insect spray,
gasoline, bras, car stereo speakers, peanut butter and toothbrushes.
Swift and Co. is now simply the food division of Esmark. In 1980,
Esmark was #55 on the Forbes 500 list, with sales of almost $7
billion. 37  -
Other businesses in the meatpacking industry have been involved
in multiple shutdowns besides Swift. From 1951-65, Armour Co., closed
21 plants employing 14,000 workers and replaced them with eight plants
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employing 900 workers during the early 1960's. 38
In addition to reorganization through total shutdowns, the meat-
packing industry has been systematically trying to replace master
union contracts with local union contracts, or eliminate contracts
altogether, in an effort to cut costs and discipline the work force.
Swift closed down one of its beef processing plants in Des Moines,
Iowa, in 1979 and idled about 480 employees. A company official cited
"non-competitive labor costs" as the reason for the shutdown. Workers
represented by the UFCW were making $13 an hour in wages and fringe
benefits under a national master contract. The wages and fringe
benefits in local non-union plants and union plants with local
contracts averaged about 30 percent less. Swift reopened the plant
in January, 1981, 1 1/2 years after the shutdown, with no union
representation. According to the Des Moines Register,
"While the beefpacking industry is still fairly highly
unionized, master agreements have just about disappeared
in the industry, with local contract agreements usually
calling for lower wages and fewer benefits, replacing
them. The old agreement at Swift (in Des Moines) was part
of the master contract. In essence, Swift quietly has
accomplished through a 1 1/2 year shutdown and a corporate
restructuring what other Iowa companies have achieved only
after long, bitter and sometime violent struggles - he
elimination of a 'non-competitive' union contract." 3 '
On June 30, 1980, Swift and Co. announced the closing of eight
plants, one each in Illinois, Georgia, Ohio, New York, Colorado,
Michigan, Texas and Oregon, all scheduled to occur in December 1980 or
early 1981.40 These closings represented a separation of fresh meat
and processing operations, and an attempt to cut "noncompetitive" labor
costs.
The Illinois closing, in Rochelle, affected 700 employees. I
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asked the Director of the Greater Rochelle Economic Development
Corporation his view of the reason for the shutdown.
"Well, everyone has their own view, but my personal
opinion is that it was a change in philosophy as to
their (Swift) potential for income, as well as the
number of businesses that Esmark owns. Processed
food is the biggest potential for income for
the meat industry. Rochelle was a three-phase
plant--pork, beef and process. Esmark, or Swift,
will be probably entirely "process" during the next
few years. So they merely made a corporate decision
to get out of fresh meat. We suffered along with seven
other closings that were announced the same day.
I don't think it was the community, I don't even
think it was the unions."
I will quote at length from an interview with a UFCW union
offical from Swift regarding the changes in the meatpacking industry.
"Question: When did it become clear that the plant would
close? A: Probably in the early 1970's when the packing
industry was going through a lot of changes, not only Swift,
but also ArmourHormel, Morrell. They were getting away
from what we call a full-line plant where you kill the hogs,
lamb, cattle and veal and process them all in the same
plant. Rochelle was the last full-line plant built in the
U.S. that killed a variety of meats. The new plants that
were being built were strictly all pork or all beef. They
tried to centrally locate plants around the country for
processing such things as sausage, sliced bacon, lunch
meat, and this was the beginning of the end for the
Rochelle plant. In '78 we had what we call a partial Dept.
closing. They opened the Omaha Ham Canning Plant, and they
took the boneless ham operation from the Rochelle plant to
Omaha, and we lost 40 jobs at that time. The rumors of a
closing picked up and from meetings between Swift and the
union we knew that it was just a matter of time. I really
thought the whole thing was going down during the latter
part of 1978. Swift was building a new plant down in Canton
City--strictly all processing--and due to some cost overruns
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and missed dates, we got a year longer than we expected.
We had a meeting in April 1980, before the announcement,
and it was clear that there was nothing we could do to
save the Rochelle plant, whether it be pay cuts or whatever.
I stated at the time that we could have worked for nothing
and the plant still would have closed. It wasn't a matter
of the plant not making money. The company maintained
that the plant was profitable up until they closed. But
they didn't feel that it was enough to keep operating,
because they could make more at the specialized plants."
Esmark eventually sold the Rochelle plant to Dubuque Packing, an
Iowa firm that shutdown its unionized plant in Dubuque to move its
hog butchering operation to Rochelle. When Dubuque Packing Company
reopened in Rochelle in late summer, 1981, it had negotiated a
sweetheart union contract with a Teamsters local. This action was
later disciplined by the National Labor Relations Board.
"The NLRB, acting on charges filed by the UFCW union,
announced it will seek an injunction against Dubuque
Packing Company. The NLRB move was made because of the
packing firm's voluntary recognition of Local 710 of the
Teamsters... the NLRB concluded probable cause had been
established to believe Dubuque Packing Company violated 41the federal labor law in illegally assisting the Teamsters."
A Chicago business paper reported that workers at the Rochelle
plant under Dubuque's ownership would experience more than a 25% drop
in salary compared to Swift's wages. "Dubuque will offer workers $7
dollars an hour, and benefits will be restricted to comprehensive
health insurance and a week's paid vacation."42 The wage and fringe
package paid by Swift was $14 an hour.
The following editorial comment from the business press
illustrates their view of the significance of the events in Rochelle.
"As it turns out, the workers aren't faring poorly at all.
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All but 400 found employment elsewhere, and those still
collecting unemployment benefits have endured little
deterioration in their living standards.. Insulated as the
workers have been from the effects of the Swift shutdown,
the question arises, however, whether it has dawned on
Rochelle workers that their recent bout with unemployment--
painless as it may have been--was a direct result of
unrealistic wage rates... Thanks to Dubuque Packing, Rochelle
is getting another chance. As the Food Workers being
positioning themselves for an organizing drive when the
new plant opens, we hope that Rochelle workers have learned
that 75% of something is better than 100% of nothing."43
This editorial comment raises an important issue that is a di-
gression from the meatpacking case specifically, but is relevant to the
Chapter's discussion of labor costs as a factor in plant closings.
In the same issue of the business newspaper where this editorial
appeared, another article described the lifestyle of one former
Swift employee. In an effort to emphasize his comfortable situation,
the article mentioned that he owned a home, a speed-boat and that
he took vacations in the Smoky Mountains of North Carolina.
The tone of the article's commentary was consistent with many of
the statements we hear today about the excessively high wages of
unionized workers. There are several points that must be raised to
put the implications of these remarks about blue collar wages in
perspective. First, when we hear about the wages of blue collar
workers, we rarely hear about the wages of management and executives as
contributors to the "labor costs" of the company. Second, it is
rarely acknowledged that these wages were earned from highly profit-
able companies, and won by consent through negotiation with corporate
management. These wages were not, as is sometimes implied, extorted
from unprofitable firms. Third, these wages played an important
role in supporting strong consumer demand for the products that enabled
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corporations to continue to profit from high sales volumes. Finally,
blue collar workers were encouraged, even exhorted, by the "American
dream" to buy homes, boats, trailers and summer vacations, and send
their children to college. The fact that the degree of material
comfort represented by home ownership is now being turned against
working people is an extremely bitter pill indeed.
Besides being an insult, this analysis that presents the wage
bill as the primary cause of plant closings and the malaise of our
industrial base is inaccurate and leads to inadequate solutions. This
point may not be widely realized until it becomes clear that current
wage concessions, if they remain the only new corporate strategy,
will not set these industries on the road to recovery.
On the other hand, it may be true that wages rates and cost-of-
living-adjustments (COLA's) won during prosperous economic times
cannot be maintained by certain troubled companies or industries. To
acknowledge this point is not the same as stating that high wages
caused major industries to decline. The whole problem, however,
cannot be either adequately understood or resolved if the blame is
laid solely on one group.
We can now return to the meatpacking case.
The older companies, like Swift, have been challenged by companies
like Iowa Beef Processors, who have been able to cut costs through
several strategies.
"When Iowa Beef Processors Inc. (IBP) of Dakota City,
Nebraska, began shipping boxed beef directly to super-
markets, thereby eliminating butchers, the industry knew
a revolution had started. This "new breed of packer"
shaved costs further by locating plants closer to supply
sources and keeping it workers non-unionized."44
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Iowa Beef, recently acquired by Occidental Petroleum Corporation,
is employing other methods to cut its costs. Iowa Beef, now the
nation's most successful beef packer, is moving into hogs. It
approached two small communities, one in Iowa and the other in Illinois,
with plans to construct a large pork plant. These two communities
were pitted against each other,
"As each tries to offer more in the way of environmental,
political and tax advantages... To that end, the company
supplied both Sheffield and Stanwood with a checklist of
resources, services and concessions it wanted. The tiny
and ailing communities can ill afford some of them.
Illinois is trying to assist Sheffield by offering to help
train the employees who would work at Iowa Beef, and by
promising to push through any environmental applications
the company must make for its waste water.-.. Not to be out-
done, Iowa lowered the distance Iowa Beef must keep between
its waste water and a residence... And the County Board
brags that Iowa is a right-to-work state, while nearly
every business in Illinois is unionized."45
Iowa Beef Processors has also been engaged in other activities
to earn their label as a "new breed of packer". The company manager,
a former Swift slaughterhouse butcher, reportedly stated that:
"Business as we pursue it here at IBP is very much like
waging war." (The Manager) and Iowa Beef were convicted
in 1974 of conspiring with a Mafia figure to bribe their
way into New York City, the world's largest meat market,
by paying off butcher's union officials and supermarket
executives. The Wall Street Journal reported that Iowa
Beef's "history is laced with criminals, gangland figures,
civil wrongdoers, brazen conflicts of interest and possible
violations of antitrust and labor law. Floating in and out
of the scene are peple engaged in vicious beatings, shootings
and fire-bombings."
Illinois experienced several other meatpacking closings during
the 1970's: High Life Packing, Chicago, 58 employees; DuQuoin
Packing, DuQuoin, 341 employees; Oscar Mayer and Company, Quad
Cities, 400 employees; Peoria Packing, Peoria; Blue Bell Packing,
81
Centralia; Hunter Packing, 900 employees and Circle Packing, both of
East St. Louis.
The story of Hunter Packing illustrates failed community efforts
to maintain the plant. According to an official in the Mayor's Office
of East St. Louis, Hunter Packing, a Division of Morrell, subsidiary
of United Fruit Co., gave a six months notice that it would either
close or rebuild its operation in East St. Louis. Through a long
series of negotiations, the Mayor gained approval on a $10 million
Urban Development Action Grant (UDAG) to subsidize their project.
Just as the deal was being finalized, Hunter increased their request
to $20 million, and when they were refused, they announced plans to
close. The official suggested that Hunter planned to close, regard-
less of incentives like the UDAG and union concessions. The employees
wanted to purchase the plant, but Hunter wouldn't sell because they
wanted to maintain it as a distribution center. One hundred employees
from Hunter each put $1,000 of their severance pay into a cooperative,
and they are still seeking financing to reopen the closed Circle
Packing Plant and produce smoked meats and sausage.
Industry-wide Closings: The Case of Steel
Steel production, like meatpacking, was a key industry in the
development of Illinois. The mills, concentrated around Chicago, have
been affected by the national crisis in steel, but they have not yet
been decimated as severely as steel plants in Pennsylvania and Ohio.
In the fall of 1979, U.S. Steel announced the total and partial closing
of more than a dozen plants nation-wide, affecting 13,000 workers.
This decision affected three plants in the Chicago area: a wire mill
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in Waukegan, 560 employees; a wire mill at Joliet, 800 employees; and
a steel container plant, Dolton, with 130 employees. At the time,
U.S. Steel continued to employ 40,000 workers in the Chicago area.
The company announced that these operations were being closed because
they were noncompetitive. Reasons for this included "operating costs,
unfairly priced imports, high energy costs, taxes and labor costs...
Another spokesman noted that almost all the plants to be closed are
turn-of-the-century mills that have become antiquated."47
The largest single closing in the steel industry in Illinois
occurred at Wisconsin Steel in 1980. This plant, also located in
Chicago, displaced 3,400 workers who belonged to an independent union,
called the Progressive Steelworkers. Closings of several other
smaller steel plants occurred during the 1970's: American Steel
Foundry, Granite City, 196 employees; Penn-Dixie Steel, Blue Island,
and Laclede Steel, Madison, 280 employees.
A Note on Impact
The stories of these closings would be much more complete if there
were more information regarding the impact of the shutdowns on
individual workers and their families, and on the economic and fiscal
stability of specific communities and the State as a whole. As noted
in the Chapter Introduction, however, very little data specific to
Illinois has been collected on these post-shutdown economic and social
consequences.
The absence of a detailed discussion on the impacts of these
plant closings is more a function of this lack of information than a
lack of consequences. Several types of information would be required
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for an impact analysis. In terms of the impact on individuals, data
on lost earnings, duration of unemployment, obsolete skills,
characteristics of new jobs, financial losses, family stresses and
health status would be necessary. A community impact analysis would
need information about local tax losses from individuals and
businesses, changing service levels related to these revenue losses,
the decline in local demand for goods and services, and local
businesses affected by the shutdown. Identifying the impacts on the
State would require a fiscal analysis of revenue losses and increased
expenditures. It would also involve an economic analysis of job
losses, the occupations and industries being displaced, changing
income levels and changes in the export capacity of the State.
In the absence of this information for Illinois, it is possible
to examine other research about the impacts of plant shutdowns. Most
of the research has concentrated on consequences for individuals
rather than local and state economies. A number of references for this
type of research are included in the Bibliography.
Summary
This overview of plant closings in Illinois provides us with
valuable information, even though preliminary and incomplete, about
the patterns of plant closings in Illinois. To a certain extent, the
findings of this Chapter echo the central points of Chapter One.
Plant closings today result from some of the same circumstances as
did plant closings of a century ago, including business relocation,
corporate acquisition, technological change and labor-management
conflict. The shutdowns presented here, however, are concentrated
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in the industries and communities that were the original nodes of
growth and development in Illinois. The decline exemplified by these
plant closings signals the substantial structural changes occurring
in the economy.
These changes raise difficult questions about the future viability
and economic potential of this older industrial infrastructure. In
other words, what is the appropriate reindustrialization strategy vis-
a-vis older and newer industries? To what extent can/should these
older industries be preserved and revitalized? The details of the
plant closings presented here also illustrate the complexity of the
decision-making process underlying plant shutdowns. Very little
information is available or accessible during the process of these
shutdown decisions. This fact raises questions about how "the public"
could gain access to the information it would need to monitor and
influence business decisions about investment and disinvestment, and
thereby prevent unnecessary plant closings. Information, of course,
is only one aspect of the conditions required -to prevent closings.
Also, is public participation in private decisions about plant closings
the only, or even the best, way to approach this issue?
The detailed picture of plant closings presented here provides
a rich perspective on the complexity of the problem, and also prepares
us to analyze the responses to plant closings more critically in
reference to the problem.
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CHAPTER THREE
RESPONSES TO PLANT CLOSINGS
Introduction
This Chapter presents four categories of responses to plant
closings: 1) Collective Bargaining; 2) Plant Closing Legislation; 3)
Union Direct Action; and 4) Economic and Social Planning. These
categories include a broad range of strategies that are generally
intended to achieve at least one of three goals: 1) Prevent shutdowns
that are scheduled to occur and those that might occur in the future;
2) Provide the best possible financial benefits, social services and
reemployment opportunities to displaced workers; and 3) Enable the
community to plan a response to the shutdown and provide resources to
assist its economic recovery.
Collective bargaining has traditionally emphasized good financial
benefits for displaced workers through severence pay, supplemental
unemployment benefits, early retirement and extended insurance.
Recently, however, more attention has been directed to the prevention
of shutdowns in union contracts, as exemplified by the UAW and UFCW.
Plant closing legislation has not aimed to prevent plant closings so
much as to assist communities and workers adjust after the closing.
Union direct action is usually a strategy intended to halt a shutdown
already on progress, though it may be applied to increasing benefits
paid to workers by the company. Economic and social planning, as
applied to plant closings in the U.S., seeks to provide services to
workers for adjustment and reemployment, and assistance to communities
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for economic development. For the most part, planning efforts in the
U.S. have not been directed toward the prevention of plant closings.
Ideally, each response category should be analyzed from as many
angles as possible in order to determine the potential and limitations
of each as a strategy for addressing the key problems associated with
plant closings. The history of each strategy should be examined to
assess its past performance as an approach to solving social and
economic problems. The institutional base of the actors involved in
each strategy should be investigated to determine the financial,
technical and political resources available to support the success
of the approach. A comparison should be made among these responses
and their institutional foundations. The analysis would need to
differentiate among the group roles and identities within each response
category. For example, in terms of the labor movement, we would
distinguish between the positions of leadership and rank and file,
among the service, industrial and craft unions, and among locals in
the same international union. Finally, we would need to examine the
potential of each response in terms of short-term and long-term goals,
and ameliorative vs. preventive strategies. There are more
possibilities, most of which are beyond the scope of this analysis.
These possibilities are raised to acknowledge that any analysis of
responses to a fundamental problem such as plant closings would need
to be more complex than the discussion presented here.
Each category of response is discussed here in terms of its
main activities and stage of development. The strong and weak points
of each are presented. One set of responses is not necessarily better
or worse than the others. As the discussion will illustrate, each
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approach contributes essential alternatives to a comprehensive
package of responses to plant closings. In the U.S. today, each
individual response category is weak and far less developed than it
might be. Thus it is important that efforts be made to improve the
quality and effectiveness of the strategies in each response category.
Each of these response categories is currently in flux. The
"state of the art" in each is changing as this report is being written.
This should be interpreted as a positive sign that the individuals
and organizations concerned about the problems associated with plant
closings are not accepting the limitations of our current set of
responses.
The first three responses are described briefly in order to
provide an overview of recent trends. The response of economic and
social planning is discussed in more detail, because the MAP is a case
example of this approach.
Collective Bargaining
Collective bargaining has been the most successful approach to
plant closings for unionized workers. Despite its limitations,
bargaining has at least secured financial benefits for individual
workers displaced by shutdowns.
The first advantage is that, where union recognition has been
won, bargaining is required by law. Detailed rules, practices and
expectations govern its operation. The law, however, limits the
unions' ability to prevent closings because of restrictions on the
type of decision that can be negotiated.
"The National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) and the courts
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have extended unions the right to bargain over closings
in certain limited situations. An employer only has to
bargain over a relocation decision that does not change
the basic scope or nature of the business. Such a
decision usually will involve a proposal to subcontract
part of a plant's operation, or relocate operations to
other plants producing the same products with similar
equipment... Under the National Labor Relations Act,
federal law requires the employer to bargain over the
effects of a planned move or shutdown, even if no specific
clause in the contract has anticipated this situation...
Failure by the employer to bargain in good faith over
these issues constitutes an Unfair Labor Practice under
Section 8(a)(5) of the Act... Should the union fail to
make such a request it gives up the right to bargain
over these issues."''
Typical issues included in the contract relating to shutdowns
include transfer rights, severence pay, supplemental unemployment
benefits, advance notice of the closing and health insurance and
pension benefits.
One limitation of collective bargaining presently is the lack
of consistent protection for all unionized workers. A recent review
of about two thousand collective bargaining agreements covering
bargaining units of one hundred or more workers conducted by the
Bureau of Labor Statistics illustrates this point.
"32.6 percent of the contracts contained transfer
provisions for workers to other units of the
company in the event of displacement; 9.9% provided
for the transfer of part or all of seniority benefits
to another company plant; 29.6% contained provisions
for severence pay in the event of a shutdown; and
3.7% provided some form of advance notice."2
Recent contract negotiations, wherein job security is being
sought even more aggressively than in the past, suggest that we can
expect more contract provisions that anticipate plant shutdowns.
"The UFCW Union last month accepted a four-year wage
freeze for 40,000 meatpacking members in exchange
for promises on an 18-month moratorium on plant
closings by four companies... The packing houses
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also will provide the union with detailed apnual
reports on capital spending on each plant."
In a similar trade-off, the United Auto Workers have tried to limit
plant closings by bargaining over the "outsourcing" practices of the
auto companies.
Doiug Richardson, a Field Services Representative at the Midwest
Regional Office of the national AFL-CIO emphasized the flexibility
of the collective bargaining process when asked about responses to
plant closings.
"Alotof people don't understand that things happen
in the workplace because of advocacy of certain
issues over others in the bargaining process. An
example of this is what (Doug) Frazer (of the UAW)
is trying to pull off... I think there is some room
for optimism here, because unions take their
business seriously... Right now they deal with the
problem at the point when the plant is going to
close. Eventually it will back up in the process
and be anticipated."
A further advantage is that collective bargaining represents the
best existing structure for insuring that the private sector pays
(at least partially) for the consequences of its decisions. It thus
promotes the privatization of social costs associated with plant
closings. This point was illustrated by the Director of the Greater
Rochelle Economic Development Corporation when I asked him about the
impact of the Swift closing on the local economy.
"Fortunately for the community, the financial impact
was not staggering. Many of the employees were given
final settlements of up to a year's salary, and
consequently their financial potential was not lost
to a major degree. They cutback on major expenditures,
but people were still able to provide for their
necessities. Auto sales here were affected, but
services and retail businesses held their own."
In a very different case, when Wisconsin Steel declared bankruptcy
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and left over 3,000 workers with virtually nothing (several of the
final paychecks bounced), several hundred workers and their families
were immediately eligible for food stamps and in need of a variety of
public services. In this case, the absence of financial protection
guaranteed through the collective bargaining process resulted in the
government, not the company, bearing the financial burden of the
closing. Thus, strong financial protection for workers displaced by a
shutdown indirectly serves the interests of both government and local
small businesses.
The obvious limitation of collective bargaining is that only one-
quarter of the U.S. workforce enjoys the benefits of such protection.
The collective bargaining process is also not designed to compensate
each community which bears the costs of a plant closing. Still,
collective bargaining remains a guaranteed arena for negotiations
over plant closings for unionized workers. In the absence of progress
on the legislative front, collective bargaining will continue to be
a laboratory for creating effective and innovative responses to the
problem. According to a UAW Research Director quoted by the Wall Street
Journal, "The political climate is so adverse from our standpoint
that we have to rely on bargaining more than ever."4
Plant Closing Legislation
Theoretically, plant c-losing legislation addresses the central
limitations of collective bargaining and union direction by extending
minimal protection to non-unionzed workers, and by requiring some
payment to the community or state for an economic recovery fund. The
legislative campaigns have been successful in educating the public
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about the problem, but to date few concrete legislative achievements
have occurred. The strongest fights have been waged at the state
level, but many people acknowledge serious limitations with this
approach. Given the current fierce competition among states to
attract business, the likelihood that a few states will pass strong
plant closing legislation is slim. Others argue that the national
bills are too weak to merit a serious national campaign, and that
organizing resources should be directed elsewhere.
The first statewide campaign for plant closing legislation was
pioneered in Ohio under the leadership of the Ohio Public Interest
Campaign. In Ohio, OPIC organized from 1975-77 to have their model
legislation, the Community Reinvestment Act, introduced in the Ohio
legislature. Public hearings were held throughout the State from
1978-80, which generated much support and exposure for the bill. While
the legislation has been introduced in every new legislative session,
it has never come to a vote on the floor of the House or the Senate.
Throughout this period, numerous conferences on plant closing
legislation were held throughout the U.S. and several additional states
developed their own legislation. In Illinois, The Employer Relocation
Act, (HB2768), was introduced by Rep. Miriam Balanoff and Rep. Glen
Dawson in April, 1979. At least four public hearings occurred in the
following year: Springfield, May 1979; Chicago, November 1979; Peoria,
January, 1980; and Edwardsville, February, 1980. The bill finally
passed out of the House Committee in May, 1980, but was defeated.
A research report on plant closing legislation prepared by the
United Rubber, Cork, Linoleum and Plastic Workers of America (URCLPWA)
95
reported that, as of May 1, 1981,
"Twenty-two states, at one time or another, have introduced
a plant closing bill in their state assembly. In addition
to state plant closing bills, there were five bills
introduced in the 96th Session of Congress that would
assist the displaced worker. Three of these bills were
directly related to plant closing legislation while the
other two bills provided federal loan guarantees for
employee buy-outs of closing plants... Two plant closing
bills on a national level have been introduced in the
97th Session. One bill (HR 565) has introduced by Rep.
Robert Roe, D-New Jersey, and the ot er (HR 1037) by
Rep. Joseph Gaydos, D-Pennsylvania."
In addition to this review of the legislation, the URCLPWA
surveyed State AFL-CIO Presidents regarding their attitudes about
plant closing legislation. When asked, "How do you view the feasibility
of a plant closing bill being enacted in your state or on a national
level in 1981?", only 3.1 percent of 32 respondents thought that the
chances were good. The other 96.9 percent rated the chances as being
poor or nil, with slightly more optimism for the chances of a national
bill than a state bill. 43.8 percent thought that labor should
concentrate its lobbying efforts for plant closing legislation at the
national level alone. 3.1 percent at the state level along, and 43.8
percent at both state and national levels. With regard to the level of
support for legislation in their areas, 9.3% reported excellent support,
59.4% reported some support and 31.3% reported no support.6
Recently, a new plant closing bill (#2839) was voted out of
Committee in the California Legislature. The bill, introduced by
Assemblywoman Maxine Waters,
"would require employers of 50 or more employees at a single
workplace... to give specified public notice when planning
or undertaking a full or partial closure or relocation
of the workplace. Upon receiving this notice, the Depart-
ment of Industrial Relations would be required to prepare
a statement of the economic and social impact of the reduction
of operations, investigate alternatives to the reduc-
tion,
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review the relevant financial records of the business
operation, determine the feasibility of establishing a
community-owned business to continue operations at
the workplace, and provide specified public services
and technical assistance to individuals and communities
adversely affected by the reduction.
"The bill would require... the employer to provide
affected employees with income maintenance, retention
of employment benefits, relocation expenses and transfer
rights under specified conditions.
"The bill would establish civil penalties on
employers which may be assessed by the Department
of Industrial Relations against any employer which
fails to provide the notice required by the bill.
"This bill would impose specified tax penalities
on employers who close a workplace or relocate a
workplace outside a taxing district." (Assembly Bill
#2839, California Legislature, 2/25/82)
The low rate of success in passing such legislation should not be
interpreted as a sign of complete defeat. After all, the plant closing
legislation campaigns are less than a decade old. This is relatively
young for legislation that challenges traditional management pre-
rogatives in a fundamental way. There is still much more education
and organizing to be developed around this concept, especially at the
national level.
Plant closing legislation, if and when it ever passes, cannot be
a substitute for any of the other three responses. Collective
bargaining is still necessary to resolve issues at a level of detail
not conducive to legislation. Direct action is needed to enforce
legislation even when it exists, as we have seen with civil rights law
in the U.S. Finally legislation does not solve basic economic problems
and decisions that will have to be addressed through planning.
Union Direct Action
Union direct action is defined here to mean activities initiated
and controlled by trade unions that are outside of the realm of the
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collective bargaining process, the provision of social services to
union members and traditional legislative and electoral lobbying. As
a strategy for addressing the problems of plant closings, direct
action is distinctly different from the other three approaches being
discussed in this Chapter. All of the other three involve formal
procedures and regulations specified by law and/or informal precedent.
The direct action approach typically involves forms of organizing and
protest that are informal, ad hoc and sometimes illegal. The otier
three approaches emphasize minimizing the negative consequences of
plant closings while the direct action approach emphasizes stopping
shutdowns. In general, unions opt for direct action only when the
results of collective bargaining are unsatisfactory. In addition to
protest, union-initiated economic planning is another form of direct
action. Examples of both are presented here.
The protest form of direct action has descended from a rich
history of worker and community protest in the U.S. and throughout the
world. These tactics include activities such as sit-ins, mass marches,
boycotts, vigils, rallies, work stoppages, and community-labor
coalitions. The strategy is generally intended to pressure the company
to consider alternatives to the shutdown or increased worker benefits
through confrontation, publicity and broad-based public pressure.
During the past decade, labor unions in the U.S. have rarely used
direct action as a strategy to combat specific plant closings. There
are several possible explanations for this relative quiescence. One
of the most powerful deterrents is the general assumption that plant
closings are inevitable. Once the workers are notified, it appears
that the decision is irreversible. Another restraint is that the
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plant may not seem to be (and may not be) worth saving. Direct
action tactics require financial resources and a high level of
motivation and discipline from the workers and community groups
involved. If illegal action is necessary, this strategy becomes even
more risky. Finally, labor leadership has not advocated this approach
to plant closings. Thus, when the perception of a low potential for
success is combined with the reality of high personal and organizational
risks, direct action may not seem worth the effort.
The disadvantages of this type of strategy is that workers may risk
whatever benefits they had through the negotiated shutdown agreement.
This approach is also difficult to sustain for any length of time.
The advantage is the potential to keep the plant open. An indirect
advantage is that it may induce other companies to behave differently
in other closings to avoid publicity and confrontation. These types of
victories may also serve to catalyze a broad-based popular movement
with the potential capacity to combat plant closings more
comprehensively than on a plant-by-plant basis. This strategy is more
difficult for non-unionized workers, who generally lack a cohesive
organization and leadership to coordinate the protest.
This reluctance to fight plant shutdowns directly oustide of the-
formal collective bargaining process has given way in some instances in
the U.S. in recent years. This trend was noted by the Wall Street
Journal. "Throughout the U.S., union anger over plant closings is
growing. Workers are trying new forms of resistance, such as community
protests, and they are demandtng that companies do something to help
those who are suddenly jobless."7  The Wall Street Journal article
cited the case of Paragon Gears, Inc., in Taunton, Massachusetts, as
99
an example. The United Electrical Workers, working together with
community groups attempted, "to save Paragon Gears, Inc., a marine
engine transmission factory scheduled to close by summer. In its
campaign to keep the 65 jobs, the union at Paragon has sponsored a
school essay contest and placed posters in most downtown stores." 8
In April, 1982, the International Association of Machinists (IAM)
occupied a plant in Philadelphia that was scheduled to shutdown. They
were not able to prevent the closing, but they did improve their
severence package.
Union Protest in Canada
Several plant takeovers have occurred during the past two years
in Canada. A wave of plant shutdowns and mass layoffs, especially in
the Canadian auto industry, led Canadian UAW Director to say, "If
people don't sit up and pay attention to what's happening, then we
should seize those plants until such time that they do pay attention." 9
Delegates to the UAW Council where these words were spoken took the
message to heart. Representatives from a Windsor, Ontario plant that
was scheduled to close entered the plant with a group of workers and
occupied it for 24 hours until an adequate severance package was
negotiated.
The next occupation, much more dramatic than the first, occurred
at a bumper plant in Oshawa, Ontario, that was scheduled to close in
October 1980. The firm had been acquired less than two years
previously by a Florida-based conglomerate named KKR. The final
severance package, which eliminated all health coverage, was not
acceptable to the union.
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"The company's final offer had left the workers little
choice but to occupy the plant. The bargaining
committee went down to the lunchroom where the men
had gathered... and told them what they had in mind...
As reporters began to assemble, they saw UAW members
from other factories bundling food supplies, sleeping
bags, darts, checkers, TV's and radios into the plant
for the occupiers... The union tried to put on a "media
event" each day... When it became clear that the workers
were winning public opinion to their side despite the
illegality of their occupation, the Ontario government
was forced to act. It proposed to mediate new negotiations,
but the company insisted the occupation had to end first.
The UAW refused, and under enormous public and governmental
pressure the company relented." 10
After twelve days, negotiations began. The settlement proved to
be an improvement over the company's final offer that had triggered
the occupation.
Such militant action has not been limited to the Oshawa plant.
UAW members at Beach Appliances in Ottawa, and United Electrical
Workers at Tung-Sol in Mississaugua, Ontario, both occupied their
plants for better severance packages. Workers at Windsor Bumper,
Ontario, actually saved their plant after an eight-day sit-in in 1981.
The Corporate Plan of the Lucas Aerospace Workers
The efforts of the workers at Lucas Aerospace, part of a British-
based multinational corporation, to promote job security and social
goals through the development of an alternative business plan for the
corporation represent a highly significant example for the labor
movement in all countries. It exemplifies union direct action, in the
sense that the activity has been initiated and controlled by unions.
Also, it has developed outside of the formal collective bargaining
process and traditional political approaches of organized labor. On
the other hand, it is an atypical form of direct action. It is
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atypical because the Lucas Aerospace workers have become involved
in genuine industrial planning, as distinct from forms of protest,
This case provides an excellent transition between the discussion of
traditional direct action efforts and customary economic and social
planning activities in the U,S, As we shall see, the planning approach
of the Lucas Aerospace unions is substantially different than planning
as we experience it in the U.S.
Lucas Aerospace is a part of Lucas Industries, a company that
produces "a wide range of electrical andmechanical systems and
components for the motor car, aerospace and the engineering industries
generally."12  It concentrates on small batch precision engineering,
about half of which is related to defense. About 13,000 workers are
employed by Lucas Aerospace at seventeen sites around Great Britain.
Both blue and white collar workers are organized into thirteen
different unions.
In 1972, all of the unions formed a multi-union committee, called
The Lucas Aerospace Combine Shop Stewards Committee. Its function was
"to coordinate the fight for better wages, conditions and job
security."13 The Combine Committee established a "Science and
Technology Advisory Service" in 1974 to address a variety of problems
related to the introduction of new technology in the workplace, such
as "skill fragmentation, increased work tempo, job security, dangers
of shift working, and possible hazards in the use of new processes and
materials. ",4
During the early seventies, Lucas Aerospace was reducing its
workforce through increasing automation and the transfer of
manufacturing operations out of Great Britain to other countries such
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as France and Brazil. In addition to job elimination by Lucas itself,
the industry was vulnerable to anticipated cuts in defense spending.
The Combine Committee supported these defense reductions as a matter
of principle, even though their jobs were threatened,
The Combine Committee, faced with these job losses, realized
that their "defensive strategy" was inadequate to facilitate the
achievement of their goals,
They observed that: "Some workers in the U.K. had
already tried to defend themselves against redundancy
and factory closures by 'sitting in' and in some cases
'working in'. In a few instances this had led to the
setting up, with government support, of workers
cooperatives, run and owned by the workforce. There
were grave problems with this tactic: ... The end
result was often that the workers had to exploit
themselves in order to remain in businem. The
Lucas workers sought another approach."
This alternative approach became what is called "The Corporate
Plan". The goals of the Plan included job protection, the manufacture
of socially useful products and a safe, stimulating environment
within the workplace. The plan was generated from 1974-76 through a
democratic process whereby project teams at different sites developed
"ideas for alternative products based on their knowledge
of the existing products, the factories' equipment,
services, siting and layout, and the skills of the
workforce... The complete Plan consists of five 200
page documents outlining some 150 new products and
making a number of radical proposals for how production
should be organized."16
The product list include kidney machines, transport systems including
electric vehicles, solar collectors, devices for undersea oil rig
maintenance and remote control mining, Job upgrading and skill
retraining were also included in the Plan.
Four months after the Corporate Plan was made public, the Company
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responded and essentially refused to discuss the Plan seriously. The
Company reiterated its support for its own product choices and the
regular channels of negotiating issues with the unions. This
rejection, although initially disappointing, strengthened the
workers' support for the plan. With renewed resolve, they focused
their efforts to implement the Plan on the local level, even though
the Plan had been designed to require the involvement of all the
Lucas Aerospace plants.
The workers at the Burnley, Lancashire plant achieved the most
success with this strategy. During 1976 they held several meetings
with workers and management to educate them about the Plan and involve
people in tailoring the plan to local circumstances so that parts of
it, at least, could be started.
"In September 1976,... the local Burnely management
agreed to set up a programme of heat pump development
and to look into other non-aerospace alternatives." While
this development represented a "major breakthrough for
the Corporate Plan concept... It is unclear whether this
will remain an isolated exception--or spread to other sites...
This is more than an academic point since full protection
of heat pump systems woul ..require the cooperation of other
Lucas Aerospace sites... " t
Although the Plan has never been adopted by the Company, it
constitutes an impressive advance in union strategy for several
reasons. The conscientious commitment of the Plan to socially useful
products and humane production techniques, in addition to job
security, represents progress in the thinking of the labor movement.
The democratic process through which the Plan was developed, with union
representatives from different sites, illustrates the political
capacity of the trade unionists at Lucas. Furthermore, a technically
rigorous document -The Plan- was the outcome of this political process.
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More impressive than even the Plan itself is the advancement in
the thinking of the Lucas trade unions about their capacity to
plan, and the legitimacy, indeed the necessity, of their participation
in economic planning.
The Combine Committee of Lucas Aerospace, like the UAW workers
in Oshaw) Ontario, has served as an example for other unions that are
concerned with the same issues of job security, and conversion from
the production of war-related products to peace-related products.
"For example~a resolution passed at United Auto Workers'
Aerospace Conference included: 'A solar unit for every
American home, noise reduction units for American
factories... Skills of aerospace workers are readily
adapted to perform the work necessary for the design
and building of equipment and systems that could help
in the resolution of some of the pressing problems
of our society, such as mass transportation, energy,
education, environment, hwgsing and dozens of other
aspects of modern life. '"
We cannot escape the obvious point that innovative union direct
action responses to plant closings, in terms of both protest and
planning, have been initiated outside of the U.S. It appears that
some unions in the U.S. are beginning to move more aggressively in
this area, but the examples are still few. One advantage of following
the lead of unions in other countries is that trade unions here can
learn from the experience of other countries. For example, the
Lucas Aerospace workers rejected "sit-ins" and worker-takeover of
troubled firms as inadequate strategies for them. They also confronted
problems with their own established institution for participation in
planning through "planning agreements".
In Britain these "planning agreements" are established through
a process whereby corporate managers present a corporate plan to the
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government. Both parties discuss the plan, which enables the
government to develop a more coherent national industrial development
plan. Frequently the government will provide tax subsidies or develop-
ment grants to companies that enter into these planning agreements.
These plans are also subject to negotiations with trade unions, who
thereby have some influence over corporate strategies. This concept
is already a quite advanced form of planning compared to anything that
exists in the U.S. today. However, according to an analyst of the
Lucas Combine Committee,
"the Lucas approach is both different to and demonstrates
the weakness of the current concept of planning agreements.
For in the Lucas case, the initiative was firmly in the
hands of the trade union side. If planning agreements
are to be anything more than just a new sort of
bureaucratic administration, coupled with token involvement
of the trade union bureaucracy, then shop floor initiated
campaigns like that at Lucas, must become the norm rather
than an exception."19
The efforts of the Lucas Combine Committee represented a
substantial departure from the conventional planning agreements
because their Corporate Plan was initiated by the unions, as
opposed to the management. The significance of this case cannot be
overemphasized because it opens many doors to alternative scenarios
about how economic decisions are made, as well as what kinds of
decisions are made.
Social and Economic Planning
This response category may be divided into three sub-
categories: 1) Social Services and Income Maintenance; 2) Employment
and Training Services; and 3) Economic Development. Planning -
responses to plant closings in the U.S. usually occur on two levels
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in each of these subcategories. First is the planning that occurs
on a regular basis in the federal, state and local agencies that
provide the generalized services in each of these subcategories, such
as the Departments of Public Aid, Mental Health, Labor, Commerce and
Human Services. Very few of the formal "plans" of these agencies
identify displaced workers or industries in trouble as a special
target group. The MAP represents one rare example of these services
being built into a state plan on a regular basis. California is the
only state that has developed an ongoing plant closure unit directly
within an office of State government. A couple of the job training
bills that have been introduced recently in the U.S. Congress have
identified displaced workers as a target group distinct from the
economically disadvantaged. These include the Community Partnership
for Employment and Training Act (H.R. 5320), introduced by Rep.
Hawkins, and the Training for Jobs Act (S. 2036), introduced by Senator
Quale, and co-sponsored by Senators Kennedy, Pell and Hawkins. If
either of these bills, or a similar bill, were to pass, a greater
degree of planning for displaced workers would be required by law.
Thus, the situation shows a few signs of change. However, the vast
majority of routine social and economic .planning that occurs is not
conscientious about the problems of individuals and communities
that result from plant closings.
The second and most common level of planning in each of the sub-
categories is ad hoc, crisis intervention activities that occur when a
plant closes. Typically, this planning involves bringing a variety of
public agencies, community groups and unions together to determine and
coordinate a local, usually short-term response.
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These two levels of planning describe the approach that
characterizes the majority of planning practice in the U.S. These
activities do not begin to describe what a comprehensive approach to
planning a response to plant shutdowns might include. The Lucas
Aerospace case, for example, suggests a wholly different method of
planning. The essential point is that what passes for planning in
the U.S. -- ad hoc coordinating committees and executive agencies
planning to implement legislative mandates within narrow regulatory
and resource constraints -- does not begin to portray the potential
of planning.
Social Services and Income Maintenance
Most policy-makers involved in this issue now agree that
implementing a community support network is the minimum that displaced
workers deserve. This has not always been the case. When the Armour
Automation Committee was established in 1959 to bring together union,
company and government officials to address the needs of several
thousand workers being displaced by Armour plant shutdowns, they noted
their break with the recent past. In past decades, worker displacement
was left to resolve itself in the market. "This passive attitude
toward economic dislocation has been supplanted in many quarters by
a belief that active policies are required to ease the transition to
the new set of circumstances of the worker and the community alike. "20
In recent years, many communities have worked together to develop
these ad hoc responses to the immediate needs of displaced workers.
The efforts initiated to provide social services and income maintenance
generally include the following: 1) Assist workers to sign up for
unemployment insurance (UI) and the Job Service (JS) by placing staff
from these agencies in the company for a certain number of days, or
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by setting aside certain times at the UI and JS offices for displaced
workers; 2) Provide workers with information on public aid eligibility
requirements, and local social and mental health services; 3)
Arrange credit and insurance counseling for workers; 4) Provide work-
shops to give the workers all of this information at one time;
5) Establish a drop-in or crisis center where workers can go for
information and referrals and peer support; 6) Provide special training
to local social service professionals to sensitize them to the needs
of this population.
The implementation of this "best practice" during a plant shut-
down has been uneven in the state. Even though the response rate may
be improving as more communities become aware of what can be done,
many workers still have not benefited from these types of programs in
their communities. The lack of services provided and/or utilized is a
function of a couple of problems. In terms of utilization, several
individuals I interviewed emphasized that union members do not want
to see themselves as "welfare recipients". This attitude makes them
reluctant to take advantage of available services. If unions are
involved in planning specialized services for displaced workers, this
can break through the ice for their members and may facilitate their
ability to find ways of coping with the stress of unemployment.
Local service agencies are sometimes reluctant to relocate a
staff person to the union hall for counseling and/or CETA intake to
overcome the barriers felt by displaced workers about going to the
welfare office. This resistance to offering specialized services may
be based on ambivalence about the types of services that displaced
workers deserve. Their eligibility for certain financial benefits
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through the entitlement programs such as food stamps, general
assistance, medical aid and unemployment insurance is set legally.
The dispute focuses on how much, if at all, to alter these require-
ments or set up special programs, like financial support for health
insurance, for displaced workers. Two questions underlie this issue.
Will additional financial benefits and/or services be a disincentive
for displaced workers to seek employment? Will additional benefits
for displaced workers be taken away from services for the poor? This
issue is discussed in the following section on the use of CETA funds
for displaced workers.
Even though few people would deny that social services and
income maintenance support are the minimum that displaced workers
deserve, this response is not as developed as it could be. Very few
national or state resources are targeted to this end. Almost no
states have developed a strategy and capability for systematically
assisting workers when their plants close. Almost no research has
assessed the few programs that do exist. One exception to this is
that the U.S. Department of Labor is currently funding an evaluation
of the Downriver Community Conference Program for displaced workers
in communities surrounding Detroit. This approach should not be
discounted simply because it does not address the more fundamental
aspects of the problems associated with plant closings. The need for
progress in this response category makes it all the more important to
learn from programs, like the MAP, that are intended to coordinate
and provide much-needed services.
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Employment Services and Retraining
The objective of this approach is to facilitate the reentry of
displaced workers into the labor market. As with social services,
various communities have approached this problem differently, depending
on their resources, the condition of their local labor market, and
their philosophy about what approach best enables displaced workers to
find a job. The most common programs include short-term workshops on
job seeking skills, career assessment and placement services, job
clubs and skill retraining.
Near unanimity exists for the goal of reemploying displaced
workers. Most people accept this goal for at least one of a number
of reasons. Unemployed people collect public benefits and services
and therefore place a burden on the public sector. Idle workers
represent a drain on the productivity of the economy. Unemployment
exacerbates social, psychological and health problems. Consumer
demand declines when the unemployed have less disposable income.
Finally, unemployment can have political consequences of either in-
creased apathy and citizen withdrawal or increased activism and
militancy.
Substantial disagreement exists, however, about the best way to
facilitate reemployment, especially when public resources for such
efforts are scarce. The least controversial employment services are
the short-term workshops, career placement efforts, job clubs and self-
directed job search programs. These efforts are much less costly
than retraining and can usually be designed, staffed and implemented
in a relatively brief time period. This latter feature makes them
appropriate for plant shutdowns. The underlying rationale for these
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programs, although rarely stated explicitly, is that something is
better than nothing. It is difficult to prove a direct benefit from
these types of programs, but most agree that something should be done
for displaced workers. These programs offer the opportunity to learn
how to write resumes, handle job interviews, talk with an experienced
vocational counselors about interests and aptitudes, and learn about
available jobs. This approach has the potential to boost an
individual's morale and motivation at a difficult time. One subtle
potential problem exists with this approach--the blame-the-victim
syndrome. The success of these programs relies on a premise that jobs
are available, if a person looks diligently enough. The implication
is that the individual is at fault if they don't find a job, when in
fact there may be no suitable jobs available,
Skill retraining, or the process of teaching workers different
skills than they had previously, is more controversial. The research
literature on retraining, that spans decades by now, gives retraining
mixed reviews. On the whole, the balance tilts to the positive side,
but not without numerous qualifiers. This ambivalence is partly a
consequence of the case-study basis of much of the research and
problems with the research methodology. While the researchers remain
somewhat skeptical, most employment policy-makers maintain that re-
training is an essential part of an overall economic development
strategy. The manager of the Illinois Office of Statewide Employment
and Training Services expressed his views on this issue to me in an
interview.
"My views flip-flop about retraining, because both sides
have a lot of merit. Retraining and upgrading are becoming
more important because of technological change. In the
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very long run, these are perhaps the most important
issues to think about. But when you look in the short
run, we have a lot of more immediate problems. If there
is a machine operator laid off from John Deere in the
Quad Cities, and Caterpillar wants to pick up a machine
operator, but a little bit of retraining is necessary --
it is a tragedy whenever you can't do the simple kinds of
immediate retraining that can have an immediate pay-off.
At the same time, whenever you look down the road ten
years, you're not talking about that kind of retraining,
you are talking about massive overhaul of the current skill
level of our current labor force. The private sector
spends $10-30 billion on its own training, how can we
expect them to work with us when we spend a drop in
the bucket?"
We can safely assume that the new version of CETA will have a re-
training component. Whether or not displaced workers are included,
and in what way, requires grappling with three issues.
The single most common response I received when I asked people
their views on retraining was, "Sure, retraining is a great idea, but
retrain for what?" Two themes were behind this guarded enthusiasm.
People were resonding to the recession and saying why spend money to
train people for jobs that don't exist. Second, an awareness of
structural changes in the economy was reflected in this remark. People
were wondering what occupations to train life-time blue collar workers
for--to work in McDonalds? To be an engineer? Or, were there still
jobs for welders and machinests for which people could be retrained?
The second issue, common to the retraining debate, is about the
best setting and circumstances in which to retrain people. Should
people be retrained in the classroom or on the job? Should retraining
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be tailor-made for specific local industries? Should a variety of
programs be available for workers and employers with different needs
and interests? Most research shows that OJT, or OJT combined with
classroom retraining, is better than classroom training alone. It
may, however, be difficult to meet the needs of the displaced through
OJT contracts in a depressed local economy.
The most sensitive question involves where the money is going to
come from and who is eligible. As with the social service question,
the debate is framed as a trade-off between the 'heedy" and the "truly
needy". This conflict was built into the CETA system by alloviing the
TIC monies theoretically available for displaced workers to go into
the IIB pool for disadvantaged workers. An official from the Illinois
Office of Employment and Training Services described the problem.
"In the current system, about the only thing that is
out there at the local level is CETA. TIC monies are
scarce--they weren't that much to begin with. Alot of
prime sponsors don't even utilize TIC money. It is
a local decision if IIB money is to revert to IIC. Again,
though, that isn't what CETA was intended to do. Criticism
could be levelled from some audiences that they are
diverting the purpose of a national program. The key
issue is will there be a set-aside, or a floating fund, for
displaced workers in a new national employment and training
system? If it is a separate component, you won't get into
the moral issues you now have. Another key consideration
is how much money will be there, or there may not be any
money nationally and then it will be up to the state. If
the new national system takes a broader approach, and expands
its parameters to include both income maintenance and economic
development, and an industrial intervention program, then
the Governor will be obligated to divert some resources to
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displaced workers. It will be a very tough transition
to make, even if we have the money, to shift our
priorities somewhat."
The following statement from Doug Richardson of the AFL-CIO
expresses a different view of retraining for displaced workers.
"I agree that we should not train or retrain people for
jobs that don't exist. But it is only logical to help
people transfer from declining jobs to growing jobs. But
we have this dogma that says that people have to destroy
themselves and their families before they can get help to
make this change. Those people have paid taxes, and when
they need a little help, they ought to get it. Paying
taxes ought to be like an employment insurance policy.
When something that the worker has no control over, like
declining manufacturing in the Midwest, or someone decides
to build the world car, you shouldn't expect the individual
auto worker to be responsible to overcome the shortcomings
of the auto industry. So you have to give the guy a break.
What is the goal? Is the goal to get people back on the
tax roles? That isn't a bad goal. Now, how do we do it?
In terms of services, it is not an either/or situation.
It is a matter of having a range of services in place so
that whatever fits the situation or the individual is
available."
How can this dilemma be addressed, wherein displaced workers and
disadvantaged workers are in competition for scarce resources? The
most essential point is that both groups suffer from the unemployment
of the other. Indeed, all of society suffers from excessive un-
employment. When blue collar workers are unemployed in large numbers,
disadvantaged workers have more difficulty finding jobs. This occurs
in two ways. In a local labor market, displaced blue collar workers
frequently move into service sector jobs which are predominately the
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jobs accessible to disadvantaged workers. The preferences of employers
for workers with stable job experience may put the hard core unemployed
at an additional disadvantage.
One study of the shutdown of the Campbell Works of Youngstown
Sheet and Tube in 1977 found this effect. One of the study's
conclusions was that "those previously unemployed bore the brunt of
the plant shutdown as the jobs that they may have obtained were
taken by the laid-off workers. This result is certainly not
applicable to all communities, because this effect depends on a
variety of factors. However, it suggests the potential of an indirect
job displacement effect on so-called hard-core unemployed from the
direct displacement of blue collar workers.
One exception to this example is potential discrimination against
previous union members. Second, when blue collar workers are un-
employed due to full or partial plant shutdowns, there may be a ripple
effect on other businesses in the area. Small retail trade and
service businesses, which are some of the most likely businesses
to be hiring disadvantaged workers, may be forced to lay people off.
Blue collar workers also suffer from the unemployment of the
disadvantaged. Disadvantaged workers have been used in the past as
strike-breakers, or as union-busting labor. The perpetuation of a
large, low-income sector in society has the effect of depressing
aggregate demand. Therefore, there is less demand for the products
that blue collar workers produce. Both groups suffer because un-
employment decreases the revenue and increases the expenditures of the
public sector. Finally, the general economic slowdown that occurs in
communities where unemployment is high hampers the ability of both
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groups to find adequate employment.
Politically, it is absolutely essential that these two groups
recognize their mutual self-interest and work together for an economy
that can maximize employment, rather than maximize conflict and
antagonism over the scarce resources of public programs. This
cooperation will be very difficult to achieve. These times of
budget cutbacks, recession and political sentiment against both the
poor and organized labor can induce groups to be even more competitive
for scarce resources, which is ultimately counterproductive. In
addition to the present stresses on these groups, they must overcome
a history of hostility. The myth that welfare and CETA recipients
are the main source of the tax burden of working people represents just
one impediment to cooperation that must be overcome. These alliances
will be hard to build, but they remain a necessity for the advancement
of the interests of both groups.
We turn now to brief summaries of three retraining programs that
have served displaced workers in Illinois. The Oscar Mayer Pilot
Program and Labor Economy Project are each the only program of
their type that has been provided for displaced workers in Illinois.
The Waukegan case is important because it gained national recognition
for dislodging confusion about the CETA IIC regulations regarding the
use of this money for retraining displaced workers. The examples
are important for Illinois because they represent sources of expertise
should the State decide to replicate any of the programs.
Unfortunately, however, none of the programs have conducted a long-
term follow-up of their participants. Thus we know very little about
the impacts of these programs, except for some of the participants
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in the Labor Economy Project.
Oscar Mayer Pilot Program
Oscar Mayer closed the hog slaughtering operation of its Davenport,
Iowa, plant in the spring of 1981, thus laying off 700 workers. When
asked about the reasons for the closing, the local union president
stated that,
"the company said that they had an obsolete building--
the slaughtering house was about eighty years old, and
they said environmental regulations were a problem. I
think that they wanted to have someone else custom-
kill for them at a lower wage rate through subcontracting."
Since many of the Oscar Mayer employees lived on the Illinois
side of the Mississippi River, the local union president called the
Illinois Federation of Labor for assistance in setting up a plant
closings program.
"I knew about Melva Meacham because she had been involved
in the Rochelle closing, and I had heard alot of good
comments from my brothers in the trade union movement up
there. Melva was happy to come out here, and she knew
that our local had about 2,500 members on the Illinois
side. She went through the program that she had done
in Rochelle, and that is where the idea came from of
getting together with the community college, and
different agencies in the community to see what kind
of program and services could be worked out. She was
very instrumental. It is hard to read from a book
about how you should perform during a closing because
they are all so different. She had the expertise we
needed."
Not long after the closing was announced a meeting was held to
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discuss the program alternatives. This meeting was attended by
Davenport-Scott County Consortium CETA, (Iowa), Oscar Mayer management,
employees, union leaders, Job Services of Iowa and Illinois, other
local social service agencies and representatives of the Eastern
Iowa Community College District, After a series of meetings the
Career Assistance Center of the local community college wrote and
received funding for a program to assist Oscar Mayer employees in
reentering the labor market. Funding was rec-eived from CETA Title
IIC and VII through the Ddvenport-Scott County Consortium, as well as
$10,000 from the company and $500.00 from the union.
This contribution by the company was very rare for the Illinois
closings where the MAP has been involved. The union president
described their approach to Oscar Mayer.
"We felt that we should not go to the company with the
problem, but go to them with a program and a solution.
The company was enthused after they looked at the program.
Also, with a closure of this size, they received some good
public relations from it within the community. It was a
good investment for them."
A second unusual aspect of this program is that it was conducted
before the actual shutdown. 111 employees participated in the program.
The Final Report on the pilot program described the method of training
and the results.
"The method used was a modified Career Assessment Planning
Program (CAPP) that included vocational, aptitude, and
academic assessment, resume writing, instruction in job
seeking/keeping skills, and the development of a career
plant for each participant. The 90-day follow-up revealed
that of those individuals who completed the program and
were available for work and/or training, 54% were employed
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19% had elected for vocational training, and 27% remained
unemployed. ,22
In addition to these labor market orientation activities, a full-day
Employer-Employee Exchange was held for trainees to meet with more
than 30 different Iowa and Illinois employers.
Waukegan Retraining Program
In January 1980, U.S. Steel closed its wire mill in Waukegan,
Illinois, and laid off about 550 workers. Since the closing was
judged to be related to cutbacks in automobile manufacturing due to
imports, the workers were eligible for trade readjustment assistance (TRA)
Sixty workers enrolled in retraining courses at the local community
college and vocational center. About half-way through their re-
training, the TRA funds ran out and the local CETA office sought to
apply CETA IIC funds to the completion of the retraining program.
The efforts of the local CETA Director proved crucial for the use of
IIC funds in other communities, because he was able to get clarification
on certain aspects of the regulations.
To enroll in the program, the applicants met with vocational
counselors at the Illinois Job Service, completed their TRA forms,
took aptitude tests and visited the training institutions. Nine
former steelworkers entered the local comunity college and fifty-one
entered the vocational center program. They ranged in age from 25-55
and there were fourteen minority participants. All but three completed
their courses, which were in fields approved by the Job Service. The
local CETA Director informed me that approximately two-thirds of the
retrainees were employed, but he did not have information about their
new jobs.
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The local CETA director stated that he supports retraining
partly for the problem-solving and work discipline it can impart to the
retrainees. He thought that skill training would not generally be
able to meet the specific needs of employers because most employers
train workers when they hire them. He advocates an eclectic approach
to retraining--one that recognizes the needs of individuals and is
able to respond to their needs with a wide variety of services. He
thought that local offices should be given more flexibility to respond
to crises like plant closings. The state could have a displaced
worker fund to assist communities without adequate funds in their
CETA budgets. While he acknowledged that displaced workers are not
disadvantaged in the conventional CETA sense, he felt that CETA
should be able to serve them.
*
Labor Economy Project Retraining
The Labor Economy Project (LEP) in Peoria has taken a very
different approach to retraining for displaced workers than occurred
in Waukegan or Davenport. LEP has concentrated its efforts on
developing OJT contracts and industry specific training programs for a
small number of displaced workers. The programs have been funded out
of Title CETA IIC and Title VII from the two Prime Sponsors that
serve the Peoria area, the Peoria Consortium Prime Sponsor and the
Tazewell County Prime Sponsor.
Glory Behm, retraining services coordinator, described the
development of the industry specific training programs to me in an
interview.
See Chapter Four for Project history.
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"In general, I am constantly calling employers and visiting
them to explain our program and look for possible OJT
contracts. The diesel mechanic program evolved through
discussions with one employer where I had placed some
people. I knew that he needed a diesel mechanic, and he
was responsive to our program. He couldn't fill the job
with an OJT contract because he couldn't bring someone on
who had no prior knowledge, but the regulations prevented
him from an OJT slot for someone with experience. I asked
if he knew other employers who needed diesel mechanics,
and he said yes, that they were always in demand. Over
the course of several meetings a group of five employers
worked together to develop a curriculum for diesel mechanic
training that would provide job guarantees. They worked
very well together and got involved in the project, and
that is one of the reasons I think this approach is
successful. They selected the instructor; they decided
what should be taught and how it should be taught. They
interviewed the candidates that I referred and then selected
the trainees. They were able to monitor the retraining
on a regular basis, and so they had alot of control over the
program. The employers provided the machines and tools for
the training in one of their shops. The trainees were in
the classroom four hours a day and in the shop four hours
a day. This -aining lasted one month and then was
combined witt a year of OJT. Five individuals went through
the program at a cost of about $30,000. The small engine
repair program trained eight displaced workers for eight
months at a cost of $29,000. These were expensive
programs, but we were training people for good jobs--
not minimum wage jobs that they would quit when they
got fed up with never having enough money."
During FY '80, from April to September, the Project interviewed 177
displaced. workers and completed intake of 138, but had a placement rate
of a much smaller number. They placed 6 workers in OJT situations, 3
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workers in unsubsidized employment, and contacted 45 employers.
The Project served 49 participants in either 0JT or classroom
retraining during FY '81. This total included five trainees in the
diesel mechanic retraining, twelve others in OJT slots, seven in the
Greater Peoria Contractor's and Suppliers training program, and
several others in classroom training.
Several different reasons were suggested for the low number of
retrainees served, relative to the total need in the Peoria area,
As stated previously, almost none of the Prime Sponsors in the state
had experience with TIC programs and the regulations were ambiguous
about job guarantees. Some local officials had a bias against
utilizing CETA funds for displaced workers who were not the "truly
needy". The bureaucratic complications were compounded in Peoria
because the Labor Economy Project had two Prime Sponsors with which to
negotiate. The September '80 Final Report of the Project delineated
some of the early difficulties.
"In April 1980, we contacted both Peoria and Tazewell
in an effort to obtain a non-financial agreement in which
the Labor Economy project staff would develop retraining
contracts for Title II-C eligible participants. After
much negotiation, separate agreements were developed
with the two Prime Sponsors... Two major problems were
encountered immediately. The first is that labor people
typically resist acceptance of social service programs
and this one was no exception. We attempted to address that
problem by emphasizing labor involvement and trying to
operate the program out of the Peoria Labor Temple.
These efforts were resisted by the Peoria Prime Sponsor
staff with gusto. Participants must now go to the CETA
office to take a battery of tests and be determined
eligible for retraining... Since eligibility for retraining
is confined to six months after layoff, many are dis-
qualified."23
The second Prime Sponsor, however, agreed that the Labor Economy
Project staff should do their intake in their own offices.
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A second problem was encountered with the regulations during this
first year. The Peoria Prime Sponsor, which was providing two-thirds
of the first year funding, refused to allow classroom training, thus
limiting the number of clients that could be served initially,
Classroom retraining was refused because of an indication in the
regulations that TIC retraining money could not be used without job
guarantees. This issue was eventually clarified, and the requirement
waived, through the efforts of the Waukegan CETA Prime Sponsor. In
Peoria, however, many workers had long since passed six months their
layoff and were no longer eligible for TIC programs.
By now, Ms. Behm expresses a reserved attitude about her dealings
with CETA.
"I do see a changing attitude from them toward me and
this Project. People resist change and the bureaucracy
is no exception. You can't just walk in with a good idea
and expect them to change their structure when it means
upheaval for them. Things are changing now because we
are getting alot of praise for our success."
These retraining programs, plus a retraining program in Rochelle
that is discussed in Chapter Four, represent the sum total of re-
training that has occurred in Illinois in recent years that has been
explicitly designed for groups of displaced workers. This is in
addition to any retraining that occurred through the Trade Adjustment
Assistance Program, or retraining that individual workers received
through local CETA programs. It appears that the employment and
training response category suffers from the same problems as the
social services category. The ambivalence of public decision-makers
about what employment and training services, if any, should be
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targeted to displaced workers is reflected in the small amount of
resources allocated to these programs and the lack of research attention
given to them. There is also the noticeable absence of private
sector initiatives in retraining. Employment services and retraining,
like social services, are certainly inadequage as a single approach
to the needs of displaced workers, but the potential of retraining to
enable workers, especially those with obsolete skills, to secure
adequate employment has not yet been tapped.
Economic Development
Economic development planning as it is currently practiced in
Illinois is characterized by patterns that are similar to those
observed in social services and employment and training. First, broad
agreement exists among union officials, academics, the business
community and policy-makers that economic development strategies must
be the core of any approach to plant closings. None of the other
responses that provide assistance and/or short-term benefits, however
necessary, can substitute in the. long run for an economy that provides
jobs. Second, as with social services and training, disagreement
exists regarding how to reach this goal. The debate is perhaps most
heated in this category, because it potentially involves the most
intervention in the private sector. One of the central issues of the
debate, similarly to social services and training, is whether special
efforts should be targeted to the plant closing problem, or whether a
state's regular economic development activities should simply be made
available on a case-by-case basis. Another issue of the debate is
the amount of resources that should be allocated, regardless of how
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the response is organized,
Illinois' economic development agency, the Department of Commerce
and Community Affairs (DCCA), has steered a moderate course on these
issues. Even though DCCA does not have a clearly articulated and
institutionalized economic development approach to plant closings, it
has diverted its general economic development resources to this issue
on a case-by-case basis. DCCA has provided specialized assistance to
some firms that were planning to close, and assistance to some firms
that were planning to close, and assistance to communities after they
had experienced a closing. The Agency is currently developing research
methods that could provide early warning of plant closings. Rather
than focus on plant closings or industries in trouble, DCCA has
chosen to target growth industries with supportive services and
thereby replenish the businesses and jobs that have been lost.
The absence of a more targeted approach reflects both an
ambivalence about what the State can or should do about plant closings,
and a lack of resources. An Official of the Illinois Office of State-
wide Employment and Training Services expressed these sentiments in
an interview.
"I struggle about what should anytody do, especially
the state in a plant closing situation. Number one,
I don't think they can be stopped just because the
state has a program. Every plant that has ever operated
is going to close at some point. It is just like dying,
should we do anything? Of course you want to do something
for the people, especially in an economy like this one.
But I'm convinced that we cannot stop plants from closing.
It would take a tremendous amount of money that just
doesn't exist. So any kind of approach we can take
cannot be so much of a preventive strategy, or even an
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interventionist strategy, but a response capability,
But the problem is with our limited resources. Before
it wasn't needed, because the economy was able to absorb
people when their plants closed. But now it is starting
to be a significant problem and there are still no systematic
approaches. Will there be a commitment to support a response
capability for dislocation at the national level? If it is
left to the states, there is going to be less money
available. We can coordinate the linkages, but we can't
pay for it."
The following comment from the Director of the Division of
Commercial and Industrial Development of DCCA illustrates the State's
general approach to working with companies.
"We started looking at David Birch's work and Roger
Schmenner showing that only 6% of businesses cross
state lines and move farther away than the neighboring
state. We realized that the retention program needed to
be more organized, and that we needed to try to make
strategic interventions in the decision-making process.
This means developing a relationship with a company
over an extended period of time. Illinois has 247,000
businesses, and 39,000 manufacturing firms--obviously not
something you can do with a staff of 20 people. We brought
together, on a county-by-county basis, development
professionals, Chambers of Commerce, industrial organizations,
mayors, bankers and utility people. We brought them together
into teams and then we would hit the manufacturing businesses
which has been our primary concentration. We started this
in 1978. The idea was that if we could bring these
professionals together, and get them united on the local
front under the banner of a state agency, then we could
rely on them, They could hold their own ball game together,
and then they would have their own capacity to carry out
a program, and would begin to make those interventions into
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the decision-making process. By and large what we were
trying to develop was an early warning system, as well
as look for expansions."
This Agency's direct experience with assisting community recovery
from plant closings has been mixed, They assisted with feasibility
studies for plants in Peoria and Joliet, neither of which succeeded in
recycling the facility. In Rochelle, they assisted with the sale of
the Swift plant from Esmark to Dubuque Packing. Following is an
account of another successful intervention conducted by the Office of
Commercial and Industrial Development.
Q: Have you had any successes in preventing a closing?
A: Yes, with Federal Signal, the largest manufacturer of
sirens, police equipment and lights in the country. The
plant is located in Oakbrook and they were ready to move
to Tennessee. They did a white paper on why they weren't
going to stay in Illinois--it was a competitive deal. They
sent the paper to the Governor's office and got back a
standard answer. But the President of the company said
that he wanted a better response. So we went out to
Oakbrook to meet with him. We went back after we heard
their concerns and showed them that yes, Illinois is
competitive. We also offered job training to them, and
offered to find them a building. They wanted to buy the
Johnson and Johnson facility in Park Forest South. Well,
Johnson was stalling so the Governor called them up and
got that moving. Federal Signal was going to move in April,
which was the same time that the negotiations with their
union were coming up, So we brought in the Representative
from the union, the Operating Engineers, who also sits on
the Governor's Task Force on Jobs and the Economy, and someone
from the Governor's office and we all sat down with the
corporation President. He explained that he had to move
and so the union Rep. went back to the union and they opened
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up the contract. Federal Signal bought the Johnson
and Johnson facility, and expanded from 300,000--
450,000 square feet."
In terms of research, the State is focussing primarily on the
development of an early warning system by refining the applications
of the Altman Z indicator of a firm's likelihood of bankruptcy. A
labor market analyst from the Illinois Office of Statewide Employment
and Training Services described their approach to me in an interview.
"We are pursuing the Altman Z and how it can be applied
as a valid predictor of when plants might close. Altman
did his work in looking at English firms, and developed
a predictive model which is a multiple regression model
that uses eight factors--three external factors which are
GNP, Dow Jones and M 1 of the money supply; and five internal
factors which are standard financial ratios... It is credit
analysis,. but its real application is for acquisitions--
for other companies that are thinking about acquiring firms.
We were thinking of using it primarily as a supplement
to our targeting for industrial recruitment activities."
"In Illinois, the Altman Z could also be used to keep an
update on plants that are in trouble, to help with the
choice about whether we want to intervene or not. The
issues on the down side of this are data availability
again, and accuracy... A plant based early warning system
would probably work better. Just because there is a plant
somewhere doesn't mean that we have data available for
it, unless it is a profit center for the corporation.
But we can look at layoffs, and we can monitor the sales
activity of a particular plant. There is some information
that is available to us just by observation, and through
working with organized labor that could tell us alot about
what you might expect, Another thing that needs to be looked
at for plant closings is what is happening to the ownership
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structure--who owns it? And has it been acquired by
someone who is going to use ft as a tax write-off? I
don't know whether the MAP folks get into that or not,
If you were really going to use something like this,
you would have to do more basic research on it. Basically
Clark has said the same thing--that we aren't interested
in guys who are going to die because in alot of senses good
riddance, because you will get something more healthy to
replace them. You can always have some kind of response,
but it is an issue of whether or not you should try to
prevent the closing."
At least two problems with relying on the Altman Z as an early
warning system for the prevention of plant closings are identified
in this statement. The first is technical in the sense that much of
the necessary data is either unavailable or difficult to acquire. The
second is more political, or strategic. As this and other statements
have acknowledged, the State is not necessarily prepared to intervene
to prevent a closing even if they have warning of it. A third
problem that was alluded to but not stated explicitly, is that many
plant closings do not occur in firms that are on the verge of bank-
ruptcy. This official's point about looking at ownership structure
to determine the potential that a firm might be closed as a tax
write-off illustrates one possible closing that would not emerge from
an "Altman Z" analysis. Given these limitations it is still important
to develop this type of analysis, Very few states have early warning
systems and it represents an important tool if the state is to develop
its capacity for a greater role in economic planning,
This review of social and economic planning demonstrates that,
while some progress has been made, this response category remains
substantially underdeveloped. The State has not designed a
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comprehensive approach with goals, strategies, programs and resources,
to meet the needs of displaced workers, communities experiencing plant
closings or businesses and industries in trouble. Rather, in a small
number of the actual shutdowns that have occurred, the State has
diverted its regular activities in the areas of social services,
employment and training, and economic development to address the
situation on a short-term, ad hoc basis. The MAP is the one exception
to this, since it constitutes an ongoing program mandated to provide
services and technical assistance to plant closing victims.
These activities represent progress in the sense that plant
closings and displaced workers now have a place on the agenda of public
responsibility that they have not had until recently, Their place
on this agenda, however, is still tenuous. As reflected in the comments
of the state officials, a substantial amount of ambivalence remains
as to whether or not these problems should be higher on the public
agenda. This ambivalence is not unique to Illinois nor the 1980's,
was illustrated by the history described in Chapter One. It is
a question of the extent to which the government should intervene
in the market to mitigate the social costs of private economic
decisions. Professor Louis Ferman, University of Michigan, observed
in his recent book that this conflict underlies a myriad of in-
adequacies in most plant closing policy.
"The design and implementation of policies and programs
to deal with problems associated with plant closings
ineyitably promote suggestions about the development
of a national policy--in fundamental opposition to the
basic assumption that a capital market operates perfectly
and that to intervene in this process risks serious
disturbance of the market, This conflict, which is
seldom, makes explicit in the plant-closing literature,
is at the root of most of the observed inadequacies
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of research, policy development and program design,
implementation and evaluation." 24
Summary
This Chapter has primarily examined the responses to plant closings
in terms of their accomplishments to date, Given their current stage
of development, particularly in Illinois, the responses have been best
able to reach the second goal identified in the Chapter Introduction,
i.e., to provide financial benefits and a variety of services to
displaced workers. Collective bargaining and social and economic
planning have had the most success toward this goal. Assistance to
communities experiencing plantclosings, the third goal, has been
achieved only on an extremely limited basis through the State's
economic development strategies. The legislative response is intended
to achieve this goal, but no progress has been made with this approach.
The prevention of shutdowns has not occurred except in a few instances
of union direct action and economic development activities. Thus,
in terms of recent practice, this range of responses has made some
limited progress, but in general they are quite far from achieving
the goals.
While this Chapter has not analyzed the potential of each of
the responses to achieve the goals in any detail, the questions
relevant to such an assessment may be stated. Particularly in terms
of the goal of preventing, or minimizing, plant closings, we need to
inquire about the potential of each response to address the more
fundamental aspects of economic dislocation. To what extent does the
strategy promote greater public participation in key economic decisions
and control over the distribution and application of resources? To
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what extent does the strategy promote the development of rigorous
alternative economic development plans that have the potential to
revitalize our economy with socially useful production and provide
jobs? Progress on these issues will not occur easily. If the goals
cited at the outset of this Chapter are to be achieved in the long run,
each response category--collective bargaining, legislation, union
direct action and social and economic planning--should be developed
in terms of these questions.
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CHAPTER FOUR
MANPOWER ASSISTANCE PROGRAM, ILLINOIS STATE AFL-CIO
Introduction
The Plant Closing Project of the Manpower Assistance Program
(MAP), Illinois State AFL-CIO, is one example of economic and
social planning discussed in Chapter Three. Since the Project's
beginning in 1980, its efforts have been concentrated mainly on
the coordination of social services and employment and training
for workers displaced by plant closings. It has also done some
work in the economic development category, primarily research.
The limitations of the social and economic planning approach,
at least in its present stage of development in the U.S.,
have already been noted. The MAP, as one example of this approach,
suffers from the same limitations. The Program intervenes only
after a plant shutdown has been announced; it is required to coor-
dinate a community response that depends on the cooperation of a
variety of agencies in an ad hoc fashion; and it lacks the resources
and authority to insure that the response initiated by the Program
will be implemented. Still, services for displaced workers are
a necessity, and the MAP has been an innovator on this front.
Prof. Louis Ferman, an expert and frequent author on the plant
closing issue, cited this achievement in his latest book
entitled, Plant Closings and Economic Dislocation.
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Within the literature reviewed there is also
a lack of evidence [indicating lack of activity]
in respect to union support services . . . Only
a little evidence of this . . . activity on the
part of organized labor has surfaced in print.
One example of where labor took the leading role
in the coordination of available resources can
be found in the Illinois AFL-CIO MAP associated
with the closing of the Rochelle, Illinois
Swift Meatpacking Plant. (1)
The Program is significant for three reasons. First, it
represents progress in the thinking of both the labor movement
and state government about the locus of their self-interest and
responsibility. The President of the Illinois AFL-CIO indicated
his perception of their changed position to me in an interview.
The unions especially were as guilty of it as
anybody. When the plant finally shutdown and the
worker stopped paying dues, we figured he was no
longer a member. Don't worry about him anymore,
he'll join another union or something. To our
own amazement and dismay, many of the people that
were losing their jobs were blaming the union as
much as they did the company. So that's how we
got involved in plant closing work.
The state government has also found its interests served by
supporting organized labor to provide services to both individuals
and local governments. The Program represents an adaptation of
both groups to changing economic circumstances.
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The second important aspect of the Program is the institutional
and individual relationships that are being built among organized
labor, the public sector, business and communities through the
work of the MAP. Representatives of organized labor have, and
continue to serve, on numerous advisory boards concerned with
economic issues, but the MAP is more actively involved and has
more direct influence over the design and implementation of ser-
vices for displaced workers. The Program is still young, and the
linkages being established are still delicate. However, the
MAP is gaining valuable experience and establishing a foundation
from which organized labor can learn and develop additional
approaches to economic dislocation and perhaps, greater involve-
ment in planning.
Finally, the Program represents a value beyond these direct
services to displaced workers and the relationships it is building
with various groups in Illinois. This value is in the questions
it raises, or stimulates us to ask, about how we can best address
the problems associated with plant closings. It raises questions
about the appropriate role for organized labor, and the roles
for the various structures within organized labor--union locals,
State AFL-CIO's, international unions and the national AFL-CIO.
It raises questions about the role of organized labor in relation
to government agencies, companies and community groups on this
issue. Finally, it raises questions about what could be done to
improve programs like the MAP, and what should be done in addition
to the MAP.
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This Chapter begins with the history of organized labor's
involvement with public programs, specifically employment and
training, during the 1960's. It then traces the evolution of the
MAP in Illinois from 1976 to the present.
Organized Labor and Manpower Policy
Dating back to the early 1960's organized labor has displayed
an interest in national employment and training policy. The AFL-CIO
supported all the major manpower legislation of the past two
decades, including the Manpower Development and Training Act of 1962
(MDTA), the Economic Opportunity Act of 1964 (.EOA), the
Emergency Employment Act of 1971 and the Comprehensive Employment
and Training Act of 1973 (CETA).
Organized labor's formal involvement in national employment
and training programs can be traced to 1963.
Under the MDTA and EOA, unions participated
in numerous categorical programs as well as the
Job Corps . . . Contracts with labor organizations
[were] national in scope, usually not tied to state
or local prime sponsors. Typically, a national
training program administered the grant at the
national level of a given union . . . these pro-
grams provided a combination of classroom instruc-
tion and on-the-job training which was designed
to lead to unsubsidized private sector employment. (2)
In 1967, the Chicago United Auto Workers secured two grants,
one from HEW and the other from DOL, to provide OJT and basic
139
education to disadvantaged individuals. Eventually the basic
education component was replaced with pre-apprenticeship training,
in which UAW manpower staff prepared participants for the tests
required for entrance into various skilled trades.
The initial staff for the manpower department of the
UAW began with roughly eleven people, and served
Detroit, Chicago and Philadelphia. [By 1977] the
staff had grown to 90 employees, located throughout
the United States . . . The key to the UAW program
[was] its use of contacts inside union-controlled
plants. (3)
The national AFL-CIO entered the employment and training
program arena in 1968 when it started the Human Resources Develop-
ment Institute (HRDI). Doug Richardson, currently a Field
Representative with the Organizing and Field Services Department
of the Midwestern Region of the AFL-CIO, explained the role of
HRDI in an interview with me.
HRDI was.created in 1968 as an MDTA grant program
and was a contemporary of programs with the Urban
League and OIC. Originally it was a direct job
development and placement services program, and
was structured with offices around the country
in major cities--at its peak it was up to about
80 offices. In theory the reps were supposed to
develop jobs through contacts with unions, and they
had an intake and assessment process for CETA
eligible applicants. Gradually HRDI began to
have more of a national priority on programs for
veterans, the handicapped, minorities. When
CETA started, HRDI was a Title III national
grant program with a budget in the neighborhood
of $7-8 million.
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According to another source,
. . .the purpose of HRDI has been to link
organized labor and CETA programs, to make
labor a resource for information and ideas,
and to establish unions as a base for training
and education--in short, to bring labor into
the mainstream of manpower development." (4)
In addition to HRDI, grants from CETA Title III
were provided during the mid-seventies to unions such
as the International Association of Machinists and Aero-
space Workers, International Union of Operating Engineers,
Carpenters and Joiners Union, Bricklayers, Ironworkers,
and others for OJT slots, skill upgrading, classroom
training, pre-apprenticeship training, and the estab-
lishment of apprenticeship standards.
History of the CETA/Labor Relationship in Illinois
The historical roots of the connection between the
Illinois State AFL-CIO and Illinois state employment
and training policy can be traced; not unlike many
innovative program responses, to a crisis.
The passage of the Emergency Employment Act in 1971
established the role of public service jobs in national
employment and training policy. This concept was in-
cluded in the Comprehensive Employment and Training Act
of 1973 (CETA). From that point, CETA public service
employment (PSE) expanded steadily from $620 million
in FY 1974 to $3.2 billion in 1976. By 1978, 58 percent
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(4.7 billion) of all CETA funds went to public service
employment, not including an additional $650 million for
youth programs.5 The 1978 increases resulted from
President Carter's 1977 economic stimulus package.
From 1973-78, the majority of PSE funds went to Title
VI, which was intended to provide employment for the
cyclically unemployed.
This large influx of relatively flexible dollars
into states and localities led to uses of CETA funds
which later brought the program under public attack.
There were, in effect, two distinct
PSE programs: one, for long term munici-
pal employees, was a revenue sharing program
for fiscally-strapped cities; the other,
for the hard-core unemployed was a short-
term, dead-end jobs program that was viewed
by the participants as the cream of govern-
ment income-maintenance programs, but as
neither a jobs nor a training program
that could lead to unsubsidized employment. (6)
Many of these applications of* CETA funds took local
governments into the domain of organized labor, especially
the building trades and public service employee unions.
Summer youth workers were employed painting public
buildings, repairing bleachers and park benches,
cleaning streets and parks, etc., thus displacing union
laborers, painters, carpenters and others. The transpor-
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tation workers' unions and the American Federation of
State, County and Municipal Employees (AFSCME) exper-
ienced problems as localities substituted CETA-funded
public service employees in street departments and
government offices.
Emotions ran high on both sides. Unions were
resentful that a publicly funded program was displacing
their jobs. They felt that they were being excluded
from local program decisions in the realm of legislation
that had been supported by the national AFL-CIO. CETA
officials did not understand the position of unions
and there were few mechanisms to facilitate a problem-
solving dialogue. They were nervous about the attention
and heat that unions began to focus on their operations.
Finally, resentment resulted from their perception that
unions were interfering with employment programs for
economically disadvantaged individuals. By 1976, the
Illinois Governor's Office of Manpower and Human
Development had a file cabinet filled with grievances,
and no solutions.
A catalyzing event occurred during the summer of
1976 when union members set up pickets at a site in
a state park where the CETA summer youth program was
preparing to present a play on Abraham Lincoln. The
stage was being built, the lights strung, and the
equipment operated with non-union labor. At that point,
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the state CETA office recommended that a study of
CETA-Labor relations be undertaken by the University
of Illinois.
The School of Social Work of the University of
Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, together with the Insti-
tute for Labor and Industrial Relations, submitted a
proposal to study the CETA-Labor relationship to the
Governor's Office of Manpower in late July, 1976. The
grant proposal stated that:
Organized labor in Illinois represents
an essential component in the development
of comprehensive manpower training under
CETA. Unions in some major metropolitan
areas have already engaged with CETA in
planning and programming activities for
CETA clients. However, in many areas of
the state, collaboration between organized
labor and CETA is still uneven or absent
The need for structured communication and
cooperation is increasing, however, as
CETA programs gain increasing visibility.
Across Illinois, unions in the building
trades and other occupations are beginning
to express interest and concern over the
CETA/Labor relationship. At this crucial
stage, links must be created between CETA
and organized labor for exchange of infor-
mation, and eventually, exchange of
resources. (7)
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The objectives of the project were: "1) To
clarify the conditions under which effective CETA/Labor
relations might be developed at the local level;
2) To institutionalize effective CETA/Labor cooperation
by creation of new structures and roles at the Prime
Sponsor level; and 3) To lay the groundwork for improved
university and agency-based training in manpower policy
and organized labor."8 These objectives were to be
achieved by 1) developing a curriculum for a CETA/Labor
specialist; 2) placing a trained specialist into the
Balance of State Prime Sponsor (BOS) Office (See
Appendix) to develop linkages between unions and CETA;
and 3) writing training guides to educate each group
about the other.9
The second step, the decision to place a person into
the BOS office to work on solutions during the course
of the investigation, proved to be critically impor-
tant to subsequent events. Doug Richardson, at the
time a graduate student at the Institute of Labor and
Industrial Relations and a former International repre-
sentative with the Hotel and Restaurant Workers Union,
had joined the project from its inception and became
the first CETA/Labor specialist. Following is an
excerpt from an interview with Richardson that explains
his role.
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I became the demonstration position
with the responsibility to develop the labor
liaison position. During the first six
months, I worked in the Balance of State
Office, which covered 70 of 102 counties in
Illinois. After that, I worked for six
months in the Statewide Office of Employ-
ment and Training Services to develop the
position for the entire state. We boiled
out all the things that CETA did that
interacted with labor groups, which was
an easy task because President Carter's
Economic Stimulus Package meant huge numbers
of dollars going to units of government
all across the state. This impacted on
construction unions, and money went into
bargaining units represented by public
employees unions. My goal was to educate
Central Labor Councils' and the State Feder-
ation about CETA. I also wanted to iden-
tify the proper -place in the labor move-
ment for a liaison type project.
The first year's activity culminated in a conference
on CETA and organized labor during May 1977. The con-
ference focussed on potential benefits and obstacles to
a closer CETA/Labor relationship, as well as recommenda-
tions for future actions.
On the benefit side, it was noted that organized
labor was the "single group most involved with training
and employment of America's workforce . . . Labor can
help to set realistic goals for apprenticeship programs,
and assist prime sponsors in developing and filling
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OJT positions."10 Another advantage of using unions
'as program operators was their success rate with training,
and the universal acceptance of credentials gained
through union-sponsored training. CETA could gain
better access to the private sector through cooperation
with unions. Contacts with unions could provide prime
sponsors with valuable local labor market information
about changes in local businesses.
Unions' negative perception of CETA as "inefficiently
operated, difficult to understand structurally, and
inaccessible for bargaining" was cited as one obstacle
to closer working relationships. The commitment of or-
ganized labor to its primary responsibilities of "col-
lective bargaining, services to members, and political
action to protect workers' rights" can leave little time
for involvement in manpower program planning and service
delivery. One other obstacle is the "tendency of CETA
programs to skirt or ignore existing labor contracts
and labor standards." CETA planners in rural areas
were often unaware of the local unions, and thus did
not develop necessary relationships to avoid conflict
before program implementation.1 1
The conference recommended that a channel for
ongoing communications about problem-solving methods
and model CETA/Labor programs be established. Second,
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they suggested that "prime sponsors and central labor
bodies should add a specialized CETA/Labor liaison role
to promote constructive communication and innovative
program development." The final recommendation hinted
at the Manpower Assistance Program when it suggested
that "a statewide structure to facilitate cooperation
between unions and manpower programs" should be developed. 1 2
Doug Richardson played a key role in molding
what was then a rather vague conference recommendation
into a concrete program. During the summer and fall of
1977, he initiated meetings with the leadership of the
Illinois State Federation of Labor, AFL-CIO, to discuss
these ideas. In September, he wrote a paper entitled
"Labor Union Participation in Job Development and
Placement" as part of his continuing activities as a
CETA/Labor specialist for the Governor's Office of
Manpower. The idea had been developed substantially
since May.
Illinois could create the first formal
'State HRDI'--a statewide version of the
AFL-CIO's official manpower organization.
Similar to the national organization,
there would be a central staff of admini-
strators and development specialists,
which supports an out-stationed field
staff serving as many areas of the state
as is feasible. The organization could be
an independently incorporated not-for-
profit . and its funding from state and
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local CETA funds. Its scope of programs
could be very broad, incorporating the
models above and designing projects both
statewide in impact and others unique to
specific areas. Nothing of this magnitude
and diversity now exists, and cannot be
created overnight. However, it may be
the optimal model for a comprehensive
system that ties CETA and organized labor
together in a joint assault on unemployment.(13)
Richardson provided the following account of the next
step that carried these ideas to fruition:
While at the CETA office, I approached
the State Fed and got excellent cooperation.
I also had success in working with the local
HRDI people in Chicago and East St. Louis
who were very helpful to me. Between HRDI,
Bob Gibson (then Sec. Treas. of the State
Fed and current President), and myself a
proposal was written to create a statewide
liaison program modelled after what HRDI
was doing, but only in Cook County. It
was convenient--I helped write the proposal
that I was to receive in the State CETA
Office. Then I went up and sold it to the
people in the State Agency. In January
1978, they set up the first grant for the
Manpower Assistance Program.
The Manpower Assistance Program was allocated
$83,000 from January 1 to September 30, 1978 out of
the Governor's Special Grants Programs, administered
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by the Office of Statewide Employment and Training
Services. The proposal stated that
Technical change, retraining needs,
industrial expansion, and occupational
displacement of workers by foreign relo-
cation of plants are all issues which
directly affect organized labor, as well
as the Illinois economy as a whole.
These issues require the Federation to
participate actively in attempts to
study the employment and training policy
in the State, and to address identifiable
problems in a positive fashion. (14)
The initial objectives primarily involved educating
organized labor about CETA and vice-versa, and developing
situations where the two organizations could work
together.
Dennis Whetstone, current manager of the Office
of Statewide Employment and Training Services, was
involved with the program when it began and described
its first years of operation to me in an interview:
The grant originally was for the AFL-
CIO to provide technical assistance to
Prime Sponsors to help facilitate their
involvement in working with organized
labor. Our complaint file here in the
office was really growing, and now that
file is almost non-existent. Originally
they were supposed to intervene whenever
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a problem came up, settle it, and they
have been very successful at doing that.
That was the focus for the first year or
so. After that died down, we wanted to
get the swinging door going between or-
ganized labor and economically disadvantaged
people--so that organized labor would have
access to programs being delivered at the
local level, but that they would also help
facilitate placement of CETA trained in-
dividuals into organized labor positions.
The CETA/Labor Liaison Project of the West Central
Illinois Building and Construction Trades Council (WCIBACTC),
located in Peoria, Illinois, illustrates the implemen-
tation of the CETA/Labor concept in one area of the State.
The WCIBACTC received a six month administrative grant
from the Peoria Consortium Prime Sponsor in FY 1979
for its CETA/Labor Liaison Project. The initial grant
supported one staff person whose job was to provide
technical assistance to labor organizations and CETA
agencies in the areas of dispute resolution, program
development, grant applications and general information.
One report stated that
Peoria, typical of many other strong labor
communities, has historically had many CETA/
Labor problems. Most of them have occurred
when CETA agencies, oblivious to collective
bargaining agreements, put workers on public
service projects which include construction
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work. Often these agencies do not even
know the definition of construction,
and exclude painting, land clearing and
other traditionally construction occupations.(15)
During the first six months of its operation, the
project stopped the construction work of certain CETA
projects, and modified other projects to eliminate the
areas of conflict. Several grants were written which
resulted in about $110,000 for programs run by labor
unions in the Peoria area during FY 80. Plans were made
for a workshop to bring together-labor unions and
prime sponsors throughout the state to discuss common
problems. Furthermore, a non-financial agreement was
established between the Peoria Consortium prime sponsor
and WCIBACTC regarding various procedures of interest
to both organizations. The agreement included coverage
of OJT contracts, Public Service Employment and Public
Service Project Subgrants, and Youth Employment and
Training Projects. OJT contracts and other subgrant
applications were to be submitted to the WCIBACTC,
which had the option of responding with objections to
any of the projects. A subcommittee of the Peoria
Consortium's Advisory Council was designated as the
group to mediate the resolution of any disputes
arising from this review process.
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Development of the Concentrated Industrial Outreach Division
Doug Richardson recalls his early thoughts about
the shift that the Manpower Assistance Program adopted
in 1980.
At the time I really felt that the future
of manpower activities ultimately rested
in the private sector. I felt that there
were long term shifts occurring in the
private sector that were producing a num-
ber of changes in the economy and work force
of Illinois, and that these changes would
be important to the labor movement. So,
while we were dealing with the PSE problems,
in the back of my mind was the thought
that we should be dealing with structural
employment . . By that I mean increasing
concentrations of Hispanics in low-wage
occupations, increasing numbers of indus-
trial workers displaced by plant shutdowns,
and areas in Illinois that were like job-
loss ghettoes. During the first couple
of years, however, the MAP didn't really
deal with these problems. It was a func-
tion of two things. Fi~rst, even though in
theory CETA could do things with plant
closings, nobody was--there were literally
no projects. Second, there was also a
large group of unions, mainly in manufac-
turing, that knew nothing about CETA, or
manpower policy, or retraining. So, we
decided to ask the Agency to double the
size of the MAP and target special activities.
We set up the Concentrated Ijidustrial Outreach
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Division, which had three parts to it--to
develop contacts with industrial unions, to
investigate Hispanic employment problems
in the State, and to address the problem
of plant closings.
Dennis Whetstone, who participated in the discus-
sions to expand the scope of the MAP, related the fol-
lowing about the decision.
About 1 to 2 years ago, a big expansion
took place. By this time, everybody who
had anything to say about how we commit
our resources had pretty much agreed that
the AFL-CIO project should be an ongoing
kind of service. In the early years, we
had always concentrated our efforts on the
AFL side of the AFL-CIO. In order for it
to be truly the only project that we would
operate from the state level we wanted it
to be all-encompassing. So we decided to
place an emphasis on the industrial side of
the AFL-CIO, because at that time, it's
where the jobs were.
The preliminary work plan of the CIO Division,
written in March 1980, explained the shift identified
by Richardson and Whetstone.
Where now construction and public employee
unions are the main point of contact by
CETA with organized labor, unions in.other
sectors of the economy are uninformed and
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uninvolved . . . A special program to iden-
tify these private sector industrial unions,
research their structure and interests, and
educate them to programmatic options they
could exercise with CETA support, is unques-
tionably needed to carry through MAP's goals
As CETA slowly turns its attention to struc-
tural unemployment problems, new issues will
tend to come to the fore . . Two such issues
have already surfaced within the activities
of MAP in the past year. The first concerns
the alarming incidence of plant closings in
Illinois . . . Another group of 'structural
problems' are increasingly gaining recogni-
tion in Illinois, namely the barriers which
Hispanic residents are facing as they aspire
to get into the mainstream of economic life. . (16)
The CIO Division lasted formally from October 1980
to the end of September 1981. The CIO Division was
technically eliminated due to budget cutbacks, but the
plant closing project and industrial union outreach
remain in the Program.
We turn next to a discussion of the Industrial Union
Outreach component of the Program. Its activities are
important for several reasons. First, it has a unique
capacity to gather current, qualitative economic infor-
mation through its regular contacts with local unions
in Illinois. This information might consist of potential
plant closings, potential plant expansions, technological
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changes and training opportunities. Second it is able
to link local unions more closely than the State AFL-CIO
and provide an information clearinghouse function for
locals throughout the state. Third, it develops working
relationships with local public agencies in communities
around the state.
Industrial Union Outreach
Industrial Union Outreach was initiated in 1980 as
one component of the Concentrated Industrial Outreach
Division of the MAP. Its initial goals included targeting
fifty international unions in the manufacturing and
transportation industries, that were affiliated with
AFL-CIO and had a substantial number of local unions in
Illinois. The project was intended to research these
organizations and develop relationships with these unions
and develop "A flexible training program that accomodates
various approaches of introducing the target unions to
available public employment and training programs."
The exploratory nature of this first phase is reflected
in the following statement: "Following extended inten-
sive outreach activities with a significant number of
the target unions, assess and recommend how best to con-
tinue and institutionalize the services and program
developments of the CIO Division."17
The MAP program was essentially breaking new ground
with this project. The UAW and other industrial unions
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had been conducting programs with similar goals and
assumptions. MAP, however, was reaching out to unions
that had not been involved before. They were working
with a variety of unions and jobs which gave them an
advantage over the single union/single industry programs.
It was also extending the relationship between the State
Federation and Illinois locals.
The industrial union project was based on certain
assumptions spelled out in a working paper on the project.
Unions, as co-equal partners along with
management, have direct access to jobs, and
are likely to know a great deal about jobs,
and their potential availability. They
are aware when the internal jobs markets
are likely to expand or contract . . . CETA's
private sector programs can be expanded and
made more effective at the local level by
enlisting the aid of certain unions. These
unions gave direct access to job opportunities
that are qualitatively better than those
that CETA normally generates through most of
its other channels. If these jobs can be
rationally made available to CETA participants,
it should follow that the likelihood of
that participant becoming a self-reliant
worker is substantially increased. And
the credit for this success can in large
part be attributed to the AFL-CIO. In this
way, the union, the CETA Prime Sponsor, and
the CETA participant all end up as 'winners'.(18)
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It was also emphasized that this program might
interest local union leaders if the connection could be
made, through education and training, between general
union support for "full employment" and their involve-
ment with successful CETA private sector programs.
The Northern Illinois MAP Office developed an
industrial union survey as one of their first projects.
The survey mailed to 340 locals in Illinois requested
basic information about the number of members in the
local, the skill level of members, the industrial clas-
sification and names of the companies represented.
In addition, it asked about the provision of training
for employees represented by the locals. Following is
a sample of some of the questions that were asked:
In most of your worksites, is the employer responsible
for training new employees?
Is your union usually directly involved in the training
of new employees?
Are the details about the on-the-job training ordinarily
included in the contract?
Could any of your members benefit from a special training
program to upgrade their skills, or acquaint them with
new tools, techniques, or processes?
Are there skilled job slots at your worksites that
go unfilled because it is hard to find and hire workers
who are trained to do those jobs?
Do you expect employers with whom you bargain to be
hiring significant numbers of new entry-level employees
in the next six months?
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Could a special project to hire and train long-term
unemployed and disadvantaged workers for entry-level
jobs be set up with any of your employers?
Has your union ever sponsored such special programs?
Do you expect any significant major permanent lay-offs
or plant closings to affect your Local Union in the
next six months?
Have you had any permanent full or partial plant
closings in the past year?
Larry Stout, who was directing this project in the
Northern Illinois office, described how he used the
results of the survey.
Through the industrial union survey we
were trying to locate what I call 'employ-
ment generating situations'. In a given
worksite, for example, it might be the
addition of a new product line, a revision
in technology, a new contract received at
that firm, or just a general lack of skills
in some area or another. We were trying
*to get industrial union locals to tell us
about those employment generating situations
by answering a series of questions on our
questionnaire. We used the positive leads
in the returns as the basis of a field
plan. We had our field representatives
follow-up on those leads with a personal
visit to get more information about the
workplace. We tried to find situations
where we could try to link a need with CETA
funding in a program that could place CETA
participants, and where possible, laidoff
union members. We had, on a statewide
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basis, about twenty really solid leads,
but the economy, at least in Northern
Illinois, has closed us out.
I asked Mr. Stout if people were reluctant to
cooperate with him because of the stigma of CETA.
We have been getting a good response.
Union reps think it is a good idea, they
would like to cooperate with us, but they
are limited by the economy. This is in
contrast to the attitude that you find with
the building trades or the public service
employees unions who have had a history of
problems with the CETA system. What we
are seeing is that industrial union people
don't know much about CETA. They key
think we are trying to do is capitalize
on the collective bargaining relationship.
We think we have an 'in' to employers
through that relationship--one that CETA
staff generally don't have when they are
trying to solicit an employer about job
information. It has always been my conten-
tion that the collective bargaining rela-
tionship, while it is an adversarial one,
is a relationship that is at least under-
stood, even if it is not trusted. If a
union representative comes forward with a
message that we should try out the CETA
system, that employer is probably going
to take a long look at that suggestion.
Whereas a CETA staff person coming through
the door may not get the same hearing.
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By now the information from the survey is outdated,
but the industrial outreach staff continue to travel
around Illinois, meeting with local union staff,
speaking to various union meetings, and developing
relationships with local CETA job developers. In some
cases they have found information on potential plant
closings that is transferred to Melva Meacham of the
Plant Closings Project. Mr. Stout and I discussed
the potential for the field effort to generate a wealth
of current, high-quality labor market information.
It was part of the original concept that
we would become a clearinghouse for the
kind of labor market information you are
talking about and that we would channel it
to the appropriate CETA office, and thereby
be able to develop quick reactions to
employment situations. We have not really
had a chance to test this assumption.
I'd like to think that we are evolving
labor contacts that will provide us that
kind of information but we are just so
swamped with the bad economy. Of course,
this information system depends on the ag-
gressive field effort of two people who
are covering a large area. Their ability
to have up-to-date information and monitor
changes depends on frequent contact with
union reps.
I asked if he had considered instituting some kind of
reporting system whereby local unions would regularly
inform his office of new developments. Mr. Stout
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responded that it was too early in the development
of the concept to institutionalize the communication.
He feels that his office does not yet have a high
enough profile, and that local union reps already
have enough to think about. One indicator of success
of the field operation is that some local unions
have initiated contact with the outreach staff to
inform them of plants that are hiring.
Before proceeding to a close look at the plant
closing activities of the MAP, two additional programs
are relevant. The common theme of these stories rests
in their linkage to the concept of the CETA/Labor
relationship that developed in Illinois. They are
presented to illustrate the different structures
that evolved from the basic idea.
The Labor Economy Project
Peoria is a river city located on the Illinois
River, the waterway connecting St. Louis and Chicago.
By 1900, Peoria ranked second only to Chicago as a
trading center in Illinois, and was known as a dis-
tillery center.
Peoria, by 1867, boasted fourteen distil-
leries and eight breweries . . . The city
was ideally located for this industry in
the center of the corn belt, over a rich
bed of coal, and near an abundant supply
of excellent water of a uniform tempera-
ture for cooling mash . . . As a result
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of Peoria's capacity, Illinois led the nation in the
manufacture of distilled liquors by 1890, producing
one-quarter of the world's supply.. .Cooperage or barrel
making was a related industry,.. .and thousands of
cattle fed from the cooled mash after distillation.
In addition Peoria ranked fourth in the nation as
a center of production of malt liquor." 19
During the 1970's, however, Peoria's economy was left reeling by
one of the highest rates of plant closings in Illinois. Recently it
lost the few remaining breweries and distilleries--American Distillery,
Standard Brands Distillery, Hiram Walker Distillery, Pabst Malt House
and Pabst Brewery.
In 1979, when Hiram Walker announced its closing two years in ad-
vance, three of the younger workers in the plant formed a Plant Closing
Committee. Melva Meacham, one of the Committee members, described their
early efforts to me in an interview.
At the time there were no plant closing projects in
the State and as a consequence we didn't really know
where to look for anything, and we weren't sure what
to look for. At first we explored avenues to try to
stop the closing, and when we looked at all the
issues and previous court decisions we knew that we
probably didn't have much of a chance. When we
realized it would actually close, we began to take
a look at the kinds of options our people had.
We discussed employee ownership, although we thought
at the time that it would be difficult to generate
the capital, and we didn't have the expertise to
market t e product. After exploring a number of
options, including a lot of assistance, because we
thought we were adversely affected by imports. At
the time a regulation had changed that allowed
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Walker's to import scotch more cheaply in bottles,
instead of in barrels, and imports didn't have to
be the primary reason why a plant closed, only a
contributing factor. We were denied assistance,
so we were left with winding down and killing the
wounded. So we found ourselves looking at the kinds
of social services that were out there that could
help our people. At about this time I met a woman
named Sue Kolker at a union meeting, and she was the
CETA/labor liaison for Peoria. These people had
never met anyone who had been through a closing,
since they were all from the building trades, and
I didn't know very much about CETA. One day the idea
was born between Sue and I, that why couldn't CETA
do something to help us. And that was how the Labor
Economy Project got started--it was evolved out of
our plant closing.
The lack of contact between the early CETA/Labor projects and
plant closings illustrates the previous statement by Doug Richardson
about the emphasis on issues of concern to the building trades and
public employees. This was the problem that led to the development of
the Industrial Union Outreach Project of the MAP. The eventual out-
come of these conversations between Sue Kolker and Melva Meacham about
CETA and the Hiram Walker closing was a proposal to the Peoria Consor-
tium CETA Prime Sponsor, submitted August, 1979. The application,
developed by Sue Kolker on behalf of the West Central Illinois Building
and Construction Trades Council, requested funds from a CETA Title VI
Public Service Project subgrant for an eighteen month Labor Economy
Project. The Project was funded initially to-research the effects
experienced by a community during a major shutdown like Hiram Walker.
Second, the Project planned to work with displaced employees and
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develop services to meet their needs.
The Project began in October 1979, and was housed with WCIBACTC in
the Peoria Labor Temple. One of the initial activities of the Labor
Economy Project was a survey of workers being displaced from Hiram
Walker and American Distillery. Information was collected about the
age, sex, job titles, seniority and pay scales of workers in these
plants. They collected information on local businesses about their
losses due to the closings. During the first six months of the Pro-
ject's operation, four plant closings were announced, affecting 1,700
employees in the Peoria area. In January 1980 and May 1980, the Pro-
ject sponsored workshops for the recently unemployed that included job
seeking skills and presentations from representatives of the Job
Service, Unemployment Insurance, Public Aid and Credit Counseling. In
the workshops, a high number of individuals indicated a strong interest
in retraining programs. Subsequent efforts of the Project have been
aimed toward retraining (see Chapter Three).
Just as the Labor Economy Project began its operation in Peoria,
Doug Richardson was assisting the Manpower Assistance Program to imple-
ment its statewide plant closing project out of the Chicago office. He
had met Melva Meacham through her work with the Hiram Walker Plant
Closing Committee, and told her about the work of the MAP. Shortly
thereafter Melva applied for a position with the Concentrated Industrial
Outreach Division, and was hired to direct the plant closing project.
The Great Lakes Regional Council
The CETA/Labor concept was definitely taking hold. During the
same years that the Labor Economy Project was emerging as a local area
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version of the statewide MAP, a regional structure embodying some of the
same concepts was evolving. "The AFL-CIO Great Lakes Regional Council
(GLRC) emerged in 1978 from a mutually-perceived need on the part of
the six AFL-CIO Region I state federations for an organization to serve
as the focal point for organized labor's cooperative efforts with
government and other actors to promote human advancement in the
region."20 The GRLC received a contract from the Department of Labor
for just under $400,000 to "help improve private sector employment
opportunities and provide unions with information on CETA."21 The pro-
gram was designed to provide education and technical assistance to
unions and prime sponsors in the region, and develop service programs in
the areas of employment and training.
Larry Stout had been a graduate student at the University of Illi-
nois Social Work School in 1976 when he joined the CETA/Labor Relation-
ship Project. From 1976-77, he worked with Doug Richardson and others
to develop the concept of the CETA/Labor Liaisons, and the Manpower
Assistance Program. He later carried this experience to his job as
Executive Director of the Great Lakes Regional Council. Mr Stout des-
cribed the early activities of the Council to me in an interview.
The GLRC, AFL-CIO, was composed of the state AFL-CIO's
of Iowa, Illinois, Michigan, Indiana, Minnesota and
Wisconsin. One of the things that the state Presidents
were concerned about was the plant closing situation,
which was becoming dramatic in this region. The Board
of Directors, made up of the state presidents, was
trying to determine what the Council should be doing
about plant closings. During the first months we
put on four conferences in all the states except Iowa
and Illinois. We did a lot of research on plant
*
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closings, and developed a six-state contact list
that would be able to link people together. All of
our research led to the development of a services
proposal that we submitted to the Labor Department
in the fall of 1980. We were told that the proposal
was a good one, that the need was there. We were
actually promised cash if they were elected, so you
know the end of that story. What that proposal
represents is my idea of what unions should be
doing, collectively, to assist victims of plant
closings.
The proposal was designed to involve labor groups and communities
in developing an "economic defense" capability to respond to economic
crisis. According to the Program summary:
Job loss as a result of plant shutdowns, plant
relocations, and related workforce reductions has
created a crisis situation for hundreds of thousands
of workers, their families, and their communities in
the Midwest. The pervasive incidence of economic
dislocation will apparently continue even if a
cyclical economic upturn occurs as a fundamental
'restructuring' of many American industries takes
place. To assist workers through a difficult
transition period and to minimize the social costs
of plant closings and relocations, new programs
must be established which provide meaningful recom-
mendations and strategies for combating the job loss
crisis. These programs must be structured for easy
access and acceptability; they must be programs
workers will understand and use; they must be labor
programs. 22
The Program contained three components. It would create a "mobile
crisis assistance program" capaHle of resoonding to job loss situations
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throughout the region. It would provide technical assistance to labor
groups and communities seeking solutions to their local situation.
Second, the Program planned to research the incidence of closings in
the regions, the affected industries, communities and workers, and the
programs developed by different communities to address the problem.
It also proposed to research the role of organized labor in job creation
and economic development activities, the role of collective bargaining
and labor management relations as they affect the plant closing process,
the development of early warning systems, workers' need for retraining
and preventive strategies. Third, the Program proposed to establish
four crisis centers in different parts of the region that were experi-
encing especially severe job losses. The crisis centers were intended
to provide "one stop, labor-based assistance for counseling, referral,
support, and further strategy development."23
This proposal was never funded, and the GLRC no longer exists
because no funding was renewed. Larry Stout shut down his own operation,
and is now working in the Chicago office of the MAP.
The Plant CLosing Project of the MAP
Following is Melva Meacham's account of her first experiences as
Coordinator of the plant closing project of the MAP.
Q: What was the first thina you did when you got
the job? A: I helped with a closing that was with
the UAW in Havana, Illinois. At that time the UAW
was not in the State Fed, and so I was a little
apprehensive about being able to work on the
closing. Myself, the Conmunity Services Repre-
sentative, AFL-CIO, from the Peoria area, and
the Peoria CETA/Labor Liaison designed the very
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first Adjustment Assistance Workshop. We didn't
have outsiders, it was just the three of us to talk
about social services, job seeking skills. We wanted
to let those people know that we cared about them,
and we talked about the psychological end of things.
The Company let us do it on company premises and
company time. We did the Workshop twice--once for
each shift. Q: How did you get the Company to
agree to that? A: Very easily. The plant manager
was extrememly upset--he was losing his job as well
since he was not being transferred to another site.
He was upset over what he considered to be a good,
useful new plant that was just being literally let
go down the tubes. The Dana Corporation owned it
and he didn't think that people were getting a fair
shake. He sat throuoh the Workshops, and he assisted
us by saying what he thought an employer would look
for in a worker. So he was a valuable piece of that
whole operation. After that I did not do any out-
reach for aboqt three to four months. I jumped into
the research for the report. The next closing I
worked on was the one in Rochelle."
Ms. Meacham wrote a report entitled, "Preliminary Report on Plant
Closings in Illinois" that was published in October, 1980. The report
assesses pre- and post-closing approaches to the problems of plant
closings. It examines union, public sector and private efforts, and
makes recommendations for additional research.
The Closing of Swift & Co. , Rochelle, Illinois
This story illustrates several key elements of the plant closing
work of the Manpower Assistance Program.
During Ms. Meacham's first months as Coordinator of the CIO Divi-
sion, the plant closing services were publicized throughout the State.
169
A letter was sent by Bob Gibson to the presidents of the fifty indus-
trial unions that the CIO was targeting in its Industrial Union Out-
reach work. A second letter was sent by Mr. Gibson to local leaders
of these international unions to inform them of the services. The MAP
sent a letter to all of the local unions in Illinois. Finally, Melva
Meacham spoke about her program at several union meetings around the
state.
By the time Swift announced its closing in June, 1980, the UFCW
union officers at Swift had already met Ms. Meacham at meetings in the
State. According to the former Vice-President of the UFCW local:
I called Melva when we got notice of our closing.
She came out a couple of times and we talked in
general. In the first part of October she came
to Rochelle for a couple of days and we discussed
how we wanted to coordinate things. We pretty
much turned the whole thing over to her as far
as coordinating and getting things lined up.
During the fall, 1980, Ms. Meacham contacted other key community
leaders, including the local CETA Program Agent and the Rochelle Chamber
of Commerce. In addition to planning for the Adjustment Assistance
Workshop that was held in December, Ms. Meacham was eager to set up a
retraining program in Rochelle.
I had just found out that the CETA Director in
Waukegan had used CETA Title II funds in a
retraining program for plant closing victims.
I was very excited about it and so I gathered that
information and took it to the CETA Program Agent.
Luckily he had worked at the Swift plant several
years ago and knew several of the people over
there. He was really happy to work with me,
170
although he was skeptical at first that I knew what
I was talking about.
The former Program Agent related the events of that fall to me in
an interview.
I first met Melva at the Chamber of Commerce in mid-
November. We met to discuss the kind of program we
wanted, how much it would cost, and what kind of
help we would need from Springfield. I agreed to
develop a questionnaire that would be passed out at
the workshop for Swift employees. We asked them
about their skill level, what kind of training
they would be interested in, their pay scale, and
how far they would be willing to travel for re-
training.
Ms. Meacham took the information about retraining and the Sudden
and Severe Economic Dislocation Program of the Economic Development
Administration to the Chamber of Commerce in Rochelle. They had not
heard of the program and subsequently applied for and received about
$60,000 to assist their efforts in marketing the Swift plant. The
Chamber also agreed to survey local employers to determine what types
of skills would be marketable during the coming few years. Their list
was distributed, without names of employers, at the Workshop. The list
included engineers, welding, mechanics, tool and die operators, punch
press and screw machine operators, printers, electricians, plumbers,
data processors, supervisors and machinists, all relatively skilled
occupations requiring some type of training.
In addition to these meetings, other preparations were underway
for the Workshop.
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I (Ms. Meacham) contacted the area AFL-CIO
Community Services Representative..,to discuss
available social services... I also met periodi-
cally with union officers to inform them of
developments. I toured the plant early in
December to meet and talk with local union
members...Members of my staff contacted all
educational institutions within a 30 mile
radius of Rochelle to collect information and
identify any possibilities for interaction with
CETA or other retraining programs. Staff members
also compiled a list of available social services
in the area.
The MAP also identified all of the local unions within a fifty
mile radius of Rochelle and sent them a letter to inform them of the
closing and ask for assistance with employment contacts. The letter
asked for information on any employers bargaining with AFL-CIO local
affiliates that might be hiring in the coming months. It also offered
the services of the MAP in the case of any upcoming closings.
An Adjustment Assistance Workshop was conducted for the employees
of Swift and Co. on December 20, 1980, about one week before the final
closing date. Approximately 200 employees attended the half-day work-
shop held in the Rochell VFW Hall to hear speakers from the Department
of Public Aid, the Unemployment Insurance Office, the Job Service
Office, Rochelle Career guidance Center, CETA and AFL-CIO Community
Services discuss eligibility requirements, available social services
job seeking skills and the emotional difficulties that the workers
could expect. The CETA Program Agent distributed his questionnaire
about retraining at this meeting. Attendance was not restricted to
union members. When Ms. Meacham had toured the Swift plar in early
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December, the Plant Manager asked her if management employees being
displaced by the closing- could attend the Workshop, which they did.
Since the Rochelle workshop, Ms. Meacham has conducted over a
dozen similar Adjustment Assistant Workshops. We discussed her view of
the key ingredients of a successful Workshop. She feels that the most
important thing is to provide people with the practical information that
they need and want, such as how to apply for food stamps, and what
they will receive in unemployment insurance.
It is very easy to do all kinds of touchy-feely
psychological stuff, which is important and has
its place, but has to be dealt with appropriately.
At that point in time the people are still not
accepting the fact of the closing. They also don't
want to hear about job-seeking skills and social
services, but they need to hear it and they'll
need it down the road. I try to get social ser-
vices done first, and I want them to feel comfort-
able about taking those services--they paid for
them through tax dollars and contributions to
United Way, and I let them know that union people
all over the state have used those services.
She emphasized the importance of logistics to get people to the
workshops and keep their attention. Before the Workshop, her office
sends a letter of invitation to every member of the union. She advises
the union officers to call the employees before the Workshop and her
office provides posters to put up in the plant if the local cannot do
that. The Workshops should be held as close to the closing date as
possible, preferably 1-2 weeks before. The location should be comfort-
able and familiar to the employees, such as the union hall, VFW or
civic center. Ms. Meacham advised against holding the workshops in a
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local community college, From past experience, she has learned that
people will generally not stay for an entire day, and that four hours
is about the maximum. She also schedules the speaker from the unemploy-
ment office to speak last, to encourage people to stay. A question and
answer period is critical, and Ms. Meacham asks her presenters to re-
main at the meeting after it adjourns so that people can speak with
them individually. Informational materials and handouts are another
important aspect of the workshop. People will not retain all of the
information to provide reference material.
After the Workshop in Rochelle, planning for the retraining pro-
gram began in earnest. The interest level was unprecedently high--
about 150 individuals returned surveys to the Rochelle CETA of ice.
This is important because it represented a sizeable proportion of the
approximately 350 employees who did not retire, or leave the area. One
reason often cited against retraining for displaced workers is the lack
of interest, which is indicated by the low participation rates in re-
training available through the Trade Adjustment Assistance Program.
Ms. Meacham argues, however, that people would be interested if they
knew what was available and their suspicion of CETA could be put aside.
She says that at least 75% of participants in her workshops consistently
indicate an interest in retraining.
I asked why the interest in retraining was so high in Rochelle.
The CETA Program Agent stated the following.
I'd like to claim at least some of the credit for
it. I had worked my way through college at the
Swift plant, and I knew most of the people that
worked there. I gave out my home phone number and
got a lot of calls from people who had questions.
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I wasn't just another bureaucrat, they knew me. We con-
ducted two days of intake and counseling at the Union
Hall. I brought several of my staff and we- certified
the people as CETA eligible, and talked to them about
what area of training they should take.
The local union officer stated that:
At the time, the job market in the area was nil. People
knew they had to do something to support their families.
A lot of guys did it to keep themselves out of the bars.
You can go to school and apply yourself or you can go
downtown and drown your sorrows. Other people waited
around because they thought the plant was a good one
and that it would eventually reopen. At the time,
people didn't realize the impact that the closing
would have on their lives. I think that if they
had a chance to do it over a lot more of them would
have taken advantage of the retraining. I know some
people who are going to school now and paying for
it themselves because they have no other choice.
What I hear mostly is that people wish they would
have taken advantage of the program. People thought
that things would get better when spring came.
Well, spring came and now we're looking at another
spring and things haven't gotten any better, in
fact they have gotten worse.
When Melva Meacham talks to displaced workers, she tells them to
forget everything they ever heard about CETA.
Why are people so interested? Perhaps it is the job
market today, perhaps the way we present it to them.
If all those meatcutters in Rochelle went through
retraining paid for by CETA, maybe that cuts through
the stigma. Also, they don't know what is available.
They don't know that they can get paid for child care
and travel expenses, and that they can get retrained
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while they are collecting unemployment insurance, I
think people today realize that they need a skill to
get a job.
The Balance of State CETA Director had been contacted late in the
in the fall and had sent a task force to Rochelle to investigate the
situation. A meeting was held in mid-January that included the CETA
Program Agent, the Balance of State Task Force assigned to Rochelle,
the Mayor of Rochelle, the President of the Chamber of Commerce and
Melva Meacham. At this point it seemed that the program would be able
to begin early in the spring. Unfortunately the program did not begin
until mid-May, after a seemingly endless series of bureaucratic delays.
There were times when we (CETA Program Agent) almost
said to hell with it. That is where Melva came in
extremely well--she wouldn't let me get down on that
stuff. She just kept harping at me. If we were
having problems, she'd go from her end and pull a
few strings, and that helped out. We originally
asked for $360,000 to put 150 people into classes
from the start time of the prog.ram to the end of the
Fiscal Year, 9/30/81. The community college had
agreed to start whenever we were ready, so we got
around their semester system. I sent the proposal
to Springfield in early February. Several weeks went
by and I didn't hear anything. I think that they just
didn't want to redo their annual plan. In the federal
regulations, you have the option of taking TIC money
and putting it into IIB, which is for your under-
privileged clients. Prime Sponsors don't have to
use TIC if they don't want to or if they don't have a
need. Basically, no one in the state was using IIC.
So technically there wasn't any IIC money without
Balance of State redoing their plan. Finally, the
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Department of Labor said that we could have $250,000
without having to redo the plan. And so we cut the
budget by substituting unemployment insurance benefits
for the wage we were going to pay the retrainees. We
got the budget straight by the end of March, and I
thought we would be able to start in April. But there
continued to be delays that were unexplainable. When
we finally got started we had to compress some of the
programs. We ended up paying some of the teachers
overtime so that they could complete the courses by
September.
Approximately 110 individuals entered retraining in May, and took
courses in Diesel Truck Driving, Welding, Machine Tool, Data Processing,
Maintenance, Electrician, Supervisor. The CETA Program Agent reported
that the teachers at the local junior college were impressed with the
high interest level and class participation of the trainees. About
eighty of these individuals attended a job placement workshop that was
held at the college when their training ended. Unfortunately no follow-
up has been conducted in the U.S. The Program Agent's impression was
that all of the retrainees in Diesel Truck Driving found jobs, and that
several other retrainees found jobs using their retraining. The union
official described the individuals having the most difficulty. "It is
the guys in their fifties who are having the hardest time. Some of
them are working part-time, and some of these guys were the best
workers in the plant. Some are working in something totally unrelated
to what they were doing, it has been hard for them to adjust. Some of
them are doing maintenance, and some of them are doing jobs that women
have normally done in the past."
Melva Meacham reflected on her experience in Rochelle in a memo
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in which she wrote about her work there
Perhaps the most interesting development here has been
Labor's involvement in the whole process. The Illinois
State AFL-CIO, through our manpower program, has actually
provided technical assistance to the Chamber of Commerce,
the local CETA office, and the Department of Commerce and
Community Affairs, as well as our own members.....This
particular situation warrants special attention for
two primary reasons: 1) it has the potential to
become one of the largest retraining programs for the
vicitms of plant closings in the country, and 2) all
actors in this drama (the union, government agencies,
and local citizens) have, with our coordination,
interacted in a positive manner.24
This comment illustrates the point stated at the outset of this
Chapter about the linkages among diverse groups that the MAP has
fostered. This cooperation has occurred within the structure of
organized labor, between organized labor and public agencies, and be-
tween organized labor and managment groups. If the case suggests that
such working relationships are both possible and productive, it also
confirms how difficult such relationships are to build and maintain.
This issue is addressed in the following chapter.
Summary
This Chapter has narrowed the focus of the discussion substanti-
ally and has examined the minute details of the plant closing project
of the MAP and other programs related to the MAP. Unlike the analysis
of Chapter Three, which emphasized a 'glass half-empty' view of the
responses to plant closings, including social and economic planning,
this history of the Program has stressed a 'glass half-full' view of
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its progress and accomplishments. Both perspectives contribute to the
analysis. In a sense, this Chapter has viewed the MAP according to
more finely calibrated measurements than was possible in the broader
analysis of Chapter Three,
Compared to what existed in Illinois in 1976, and compared to what
exists in most states today, the MAP represents an important contribu-
tion to the development of services for displaced workers and linkages
between organized labor and social and economic planning agencies.
Even though it is still a small program, its efforts and experience to
date constitute a valuable base from which to build additional capacity
to address the problems associated with plant closings. Its future
development depends both on the recognition and support from its own
base of organized labor, and continued support from the State. These
issues are addressed in more detail in the next Chapter.
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CHAPTER FIVE
ORGANIZED LABOR AND PLANNING: ANALYSIS OF THE MAP PLANT
CLOSING PROJECT
Introduction
"In today's complex society, most government responses
deal with trying to ameliorate the adverse effects of
zshutdownsrather than enphasizing policies which would
intervene in the decision-making process. It has long
been a part of the American 'business ideology' that
free and unregulated capital mobility is essential
for economic prosperity; and that on the whole, the
capital market operates efficiently. These notions
are now, more than ever before, being challenged,..
It is fair to say that if the severity of problems
created by corporate decisions to shut down plants
persists, pressure to intervene in the decision-
making will be likely to grow.... It has been
argued that economic planning and government
intervention are necessary in a modern economy,
Certain questions immediately emerge. Will this
be centralized or decentralized planning? How
will we plan, and in whose interest? Can we develop
strategies to deal with the nation's economy that
involve joint action by business, government, and
labor? Perhaps what is suggested here is a new
frontier for unions." Melva Meacham, Preliminary
Report on Plant Closings in Illinois.
This 'new frontier for unions' exists along all of the borders of
the labor movement's sphere of action -- collective bargaining,
legislation, organizing, and economic and social planning. Each of
these activities represents a different approach to the same general
goal of the labor movement -- to protect the rights and advocate the
ecc omic and social interests of working people. Traditionally,
especially in the U.S., organized labor has concentrated its efforts
on the first three areas. Planning has received some support, but
organized labor's active involvement has been minimal. Today, the
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labor movement is being required to adapt and redesign its traditional
strategies in order to address the challenges posed by the economic and
political changes delineated in Chapter One. Adaptations are already
evident in the collective bargaining arena. The Manpower Assistance
Program (MAP) of the Illinois State AFL-CIO represents one small yet
important step into the planning frontier. This Chapter analyzes the
planning activities of the plant closing project of the MAP. We turn
first to a brief discussion of attitudes toward planning in the U.S.
Planning in the U.S.
"The idea that planning can be a cure for economic fluctuations
and the social inequalities caused by industrialization and economic
growth goes back to the nineteenth century." 1 In the
U.S., planning has endured several cycles of acceptance and rejection.
Both World Wars and the Great Depression triggered national planning
mechanisms into motion. In each case, the call for public planning
subsided as the immediate crisis passed, and was replaced with
policies derived from 'free market' economics. David Moberg, a
journalist specializing in labor and economic'affairs, has noted that
this conflict between planning and laissez faire ideology is reemerging
in the current reindustrialization debate.
"Although the language is different, the debate on re-
industrialization implicitly raises the issue of planning
-- an issue that recurs regularly in time of crisis in
American economic life... Publicly controlled enter-
prise and government planning -- even planning on behalf
of private business -- are far less developed in the
US today than in other capitalist countries. The
Depression and the early New Deal brought a new interest
in planning, but Roosevelt soon backed away from anything
more direct than fiscal and monetary manipulation of the
private economy... But more explicit planning has
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remained in disrepute, a victim of the postwar
discontent with wartime restrictions and of the
anticommunist, conservative temperament of the late
forties and the fifties,2
The labor movement has generally offered more support for
planning than the norm of U.S. opinion. Its enthusiasm and advocacy
of planning, however, has fluctuated with national sentiment. By the
end of WWII, when the federal government owned a substantial stock of
U.S. industry, labor leaders like Walter Reuther of the UAW argued
for the continuation of government control of certain industries, such
as transportation. This position did not represent widespread opinion
during the 1940's, nor does it today, even though some labor leaders
continue to advocate a similar viewpoint. A 1971 report of the
International Labor Office (hereafter referred to as ILO Report) of the
United Nations, entitled Participation by Employers' and Workers'
Organizations in Economic and Social Planning, cited a bias against
planning in the U.S. labor movement, but added that this suspicion of
planning showed signs of abating again by the early 1960's.
"In the United States, one of the major countries not
engaging in economic planning at the national or
industry-wide level, the absence of support for
economic planning on the part of the country's trade
unions seems due to the fact, as stated by a trade
unionist, that, 'American trade unions were steeped
in free enterprise traditions -- of voluntarism, of
hostility to government, of a capitalistic laissez-
faire ideology... It is not only that old, strong
traditions die slowly, but also the fact that labor
has in the past had a large measure of success without
formal planning'... New trends have appeared in
recent years and have been expressed in a statement
made at the 1963 Conference of the AFL-CIO. 'We urge
the creation, in the United States, of a national
planning agency which, through similar democratic
mechanisms, will evaluate our resources and our needs
and establish priorities in the application of
resources to the meeting of needs.'" 3
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It appears that plant closings and the decline of major U.S.
industries are precipitating even more commitment to planning as one
necessary part of the solution. According to David Moberg,
"The American labor movement for its part has
supported modest government planning especially
to maintain full employnent... In recent years,
the decline in skilled industrial jobs has com-
pelled many union leaders to look more favorably
toward public ownership, especially in energy, and
toward tighter restrictions on plant closings...
All these point toward greater planning and regulation
of the market by government." 4
This increasing support for planning by labor and community groups
is occurring simultaneously with an attack on planning by the Reagan
administration and conservative organizations. Thus, the coming
years promise to keep the planning controversy at the forefront of
the national policy debate. As this debate unfolds, it is critical
to remember that the fundamental question is not about planning and
government intervention per se. Indeed, corporations rely extensively
on planning to achieve their business goals. The conservatives, despite
their rhetoric, are not opposed to government intervention in
economic and social matters. They simply have a different agenda
than liberals or radicals. For example, the Human Life Amendment
represents definite government regulation of behavior; and the
Reagan tax code intervenes in the economy, albeit with different goals,
as much as any other tax code.
The planning controversy, then, is essentially a debate about the
goals of planning, whoshould be involved in planning, and hownational
resources should be garnered and distributed to achieve these goals.
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The current debate is one version of the basic dilemma to which this
paper has referred repeatedly - the conflict between the public good
and private economic gain. David Moberg has written that the
reindustrialization debate
"needs to be broadened beyond the narrowly economic
and technological questions, and recognized as a
series of political choices. The debate is really
over the kind of society we want and what values, 5
cultural as well as economic, we seek to encourage."
It is too soon to predict the intensity of this next round in the
planning controversy. The different sides are still vying for position,
and reassessing their strategies in light of the changes being made by
the Reagan administration. As the debate proceeds, the concrete
experience of the MAP may provide some valuable lessons for planning
advocates. Even though it remains a small, limited project, it
provides an opportunity to examine some of the potential advantages and
disadvantages of organized labor's involvement in social and economic
planning.
Planning Defined
The ILO Report surveyed the planning systems of countries in all
parts of the world with a focus on the role played by employers'
associations and trade unions. The analysis of the MAP presented here
refers to the findings of this report, and so we use its definition of
planning.
"Planning may be defined as a fairly well developed
combination of procedures and systems which enable a
coherent body of economic and social goals to be
formulated which is aimed at making the best possible
use of material and human resources and generally
specifies the means and stages by which the goals
are to be duly attained." 6
186
This definition, although overly-simplified, at least states the
key elements of planning activity -- procedures, systems, goals,
resource allocation, means and stages. Two central aspects of planning
are not stated explicitly in this definition. First is the aspect of
participation, i.e., who participates in determining the means and goals,
and how is participation structured and assured? Second regards the
content of the plan, or, more specifically, what is the content of the
goals?
First we address the issue of how the MAP participates in planning,
narrowly defined, in Illinois. According to the ILO Report,
"The possible forms of participation in planning can be
considered from three different angles: the way
occupational organizations are represented, either
directly or indirectly, in the planning process; the place
such organizations occupy during the various phases
through which planning passes; and, finally, the levels
at which participation takes place." By 'phases" the
Report means "when plans are being drawn up, when plans
are being put into effect, and when plans are being
supervised." The 'level' 5efers
to local, state, regional or national planning.
MAP's Involvement in Planning
In terms of direct or indirect participation, the MAP represents
one step toward more direct participation in planning compared tc -e.
indirect participation that characterizes organized labor's role on ad
hoc advisory committees and/or ongoing policy councils, such as the
Private Industry Councils or CETA Advisory Boards. In its advisory role
organized labor can influence policy and indirectly monitor programs.
The MAP, however, is involved directly with State and local planners.
It participates annually in setting goals for a particular target
population and has a large measure of control over the implementation of
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these goals, MAP is thus a part of the program development and service
delivery system of the State economic development planning agency.
The notion of direct can be thought of in other ways than
direct participation in certain decisions of goverment planners. When
we say organized labor, we need to remember that we mean the Illinois
AFL-CIO, and that local unions would not necessarily see themselves as
participating in planning. The MAP is participating directly within the
constraints set by the government agency, and is not acting directly as
an independent agent.
MAP participates in all the 'phases' of planning cited by the ILO
Report. In its annual proposal for funding, it specifies the goals and
means for serving displaced workers. It does not participate actively
in the resource allocation decisions, but it does have substantial
influence as to how the Program is implenented, This type of par-
ticipation also represents a greater degree of participation in planning
than single unions that have received special enployment and training
grants. These special projects do not influence goal-setting for a
target population in the way that MAP does. As one agency official
described it, "The MAP is our way of providing technical assistance to
communities that are experiencing plant closings... Their efforts are
our efforts." Finally, MAP is obviously involved in planning at the
state level, in the sense that it helps to set statewide goals. It is
also involved in localities in planning community responses to plant
closings.
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The Consequences of Participation in Planning
The ILO Report assists us in considering MAP's ability to con-
tribute to substantive goals by identifying three aims that can be
facilitated by the participation of trade unions in planning.
"Looked at from a strictly economic viewpoint, par-
ticipation is conducive to economic development in
that it has an influence on two key factors, namely
the availability of economic data, and the improved
productivity of labor... The principle political aim
seems to be to discover new ways of decision making
in matters of economic and social policy, so that
occupational organizations can assume a greater share
in the government's responsibilities for reaching
decisions that affect the national interest...
(Finally) it is a fair contention that the objective
of participation by occupational organizations in
planning is to pinpoint social opportunities, minimize
the social cost of development, or, more simply, reduce
conflict by making clear the area in which imbalances
are tolerable. "O
The Report notes other potential consequences of this involvement.
A substantially increased level of participation in planning may strain
the resources of unions. It may be difficult to redirect staff and
research from collective bargaining and organizing to develop expertise
for effective planning. 'articipation in planning may also require
more coordination among existing trade organizations.
The ILO Report stated that "the inter-relationships between the
various trade union bodies will also be affected by planning... because
this will require the strengthening of trade union discipline at all
levels."9 The Report also argues that planning activity
can affect the collective bargaining process. Th s potential con-
sequence is not discussed here because MAP does not represent the type
of national-level economic planning to which the Report refers on this
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issue. The MAP's activities do not influence collective bargaining,
except in the few cases where informal information is exchanged
between the MAP staff and local unions involved in bargaining a shut-
down agreement.
A final issue is the extent to which labor unions sacrifice
politica.1 independence when they adopt a more collaborative relation-
ship with the State government. For example, does the existence of
the MAP and its dependence on the State for funding have any impact
on the political positions taken by the Illinois State AFL-CIO? The
ILO Report summarizes this issue as follows:
"The difficulty, for a body that agrees to enter into
such an institutional commitment without wishing to
forfeit its identity, is to avoid being swallowed up
-- i.e. it must do its utmost to preserve the right
and effective power to express its opposition. This
is a delicate aspect of the current trend." 10
We can now analyze the specific experience of the MAP with regard
to the potential consequences of planning cited by the ILO Report, The
discussion focuses on the following questions: 1) What political
benefits or conflicts have resulted from the planning activities of
the MAP? 2) Has the MAP been able to contribute to economic
developnent through the provision of labor market information and
support for productivity? 3) Has the MAP been able to minimize the
social costs of development? 4) Has the MAP had any impact on
relationships among trade unions?
Political Issues
As stated by the ILO Report, the political aim of trade union
involvement in planning is "to discover new ways of decision making
in matters of economic and social policy, so that (trade unions) can
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assume a greater share in the government's responsibilities for reach-
ing decisions..." We address this issue first by examining the extent
to which "new ways of decision-making" have evolved among the primary
interest groups that participate in the determination of economic and
social policy.
The following diagram, although far too simple, illustrates the
multiple relationships that exist among these key groups) 1
PUBLIC SECTOR PRIVATE SECTOR
(including public managers (owners and managers)
and elected officials)
COMMUNITY -TRADE UNIONS
ORGANIZATIONS*
Each group has an agenda and constituency that it represents. Each
strives to maximize its gain vis-a-vis the power and resource distri-
bution decisions in which these groups participate. In this elaborate,
formal and informal negotiation process, the various groups are
simultaneously adversaries and collaborators. The dual nature of each
of these relationships is critically important to understand. This
model of the institutional relationships provides a useful framework
for understanding the experience of the MAP. One of the limitations
of this analysis is its inability to account for the political dynamics
within each group that influence all of the other relationships.
*Community groups and organizations are frequently not included
in tripartite planning institutions. They are included in this diagram
because they constitute an important constituency that both competes
and cooperates with trade unions. The decisions about the allocation
of CETA dollars illustrate some of the dynamics among the State,
community groups and trade unions.
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The relationship between the public sector managers and private
sector managers has been scrutinized extensively. For our purposes, in
the arena of social and economic policy, it can best be described as a
'love-hate' relationship. On the love side, the relationship is based
on a long history of sweetheart deals negotiated between business and
government ranging from the land and zoning breaks given by town
officials to the Illinois Central Railroad investors in the 19th
century, to regulatory and tax breaks offered as location incentives in
the interests of improving the business climate today. On the other
side, an ongoing rhetorical war has raged between business complaining
of undue government burdens and inept public programs; and public
managers bemoaning the unwillingness of business to conform to policies
such as health and safety regulations and affirmative action plans. In
recent years, the Private Industry Councils (PIC's) were created to
provide a mechanism for promoting the public-private partnership that
has been heralded as a 'new way' to make government programs more
effective. While the PIC's may provide an additional forum for
consensus-building dialogue and concerted action, the new organization
is not likely to resolve the basic issues. A comment from an official
of the Office of Commercial and Industrial Development of DCCA illus-
trates the conflictual, yet interdependent, character of this
relationship.
"Usually it is difficult to develop relations with a
company when you are from the State, when the company's
only experience with the State is either through taxation
or regulation. You aren't going to have a company look
you straight in the eye and say: 'We're quitting.' We
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got alot of complaints about Illinois as a place to
do business. Basically we learned about plant closings
by reading the newspaper, or by having a mayor or a
banker who was going to be out of a lot of money call
up and ask us what we could do."
An awareness of difficulties in the relationship between private
and public sector managers was one factor that led CETA officials
and trade unions into cooperative agreements through employment and
training contracts. Unions sometimes provided a better entry into
jobs for CETA eligible trainees than did companies. One of the premises
of the Industrial Union Outreach activities of the MAP was that unions
would provide a liaison between CETA job developers and company
officials. These difficulties between public and private managers were
confirmed to me by a former CETA Program Agert from Rochelle. He
explained that he had invited people from the business community to
train his staff about how to talk with business, because of the absence
of adequate communication.
Public managers find themselves in a difficult situation partly
because they are accountable to the public in a way that private
managers are not. This is tru-e LEcause their fortunes are linked, at
least indirectly, to the electoral political process. Politically, the
Illinois government must be responsive to the labor movement because it
is a highly organized and powerful constituency in the State. The
public managers, as agents of the government, are required to address
the needs of two contenders who are acknowledged competitors --
organized labor and private management. One trade union official in
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Peoria stated his views on the position of public managers with
respect to the participation of organized labor.
"You know they say they want private industry involved --
well, we are private industry. People don't want to
accept the fact that organized labor is a part of the
Private sector, but we are."
Public managers are caught between trade unions and business
organizations in a highly pressured situation in Illinois because the
Department of Commerce and Community Affairs operates both economic
development and employment and training programs. The latter are not
handled through the Labor Department, as is the case in many states.
Thus, one agency is serving these different groups,. although through
different divisions. In addition, the efforts of the economic develop-
ment division to attract business into the State may involve conflicts
of interest between assisting firms that explicitly want to avoid a
unionized workforce, and the need to provide opportunities to transfer
displaced unionized workers into these expanding jobs.
Some of these difficulties are evident in the relationship between
the MAP and the State agency. Even where a formalized working relation-
ship exists, the fundamentally different orientation can impede
cooperation. This point is illustrated by the following comment from
an official of the Ill. Office of Commercial and Industrial Development
of DCCA, also the office that operates the Plant Closing Task Force. 2
We were developing a list of warning signals from our
experience with plant closings. We had talked with
the MAP folks and asked them to put the list in their
labor newspapers. We understood that rank and file
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people wouldn't be too eager to call the Business Dept.
(of DCCA) and so we wanted them to list MAP's number or
Bob Gibson's number. We wanted to say that if you see
these things going on in your plant, the chances are
that you may be looking at a closing, and maybe there
should be some kind of intervention. That never
happened because they developed their own list, which
was significantly different. They approached it very
much from a labor standpoint and we approached it very
much from a management standpoint, and the tone was
very different.... and so we just dropped it.
There is also a lack of clarity regarding the relationship between
plant closing activities of the MAP, and the Plant Closing Task Force
of DCCA. One official of the Office of Statewide Employment and
Training Services stated that
"In some plant closing situations we have had in
the State, it just isn't appropriate for organized
labor to have an up-front, ongoing role. It may
have been a plant that was non-union, or it may be
that the employees are organizing to buy the plant.
The MAP isn't appropriate in every case. Sometimes
the Governor gets a direct call and he wants to garner
his Cabinet resources to figure out the appropriate
response."
The State official in charge of the Plant Closing Task Force was even
less clear about the relationship between MAP and the task Force.
Q: When does the Plant Closing Task Force go in
on a plant closing instead of the MAP?
A: It is not worked out, there is no relationship.
There is not a lot of relationship between what
they are doing and what we are doing.
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It is difficult to interpret these comments because they represent some-
what guarded statements to a university researcher. The tone of these
statements in each case was more matter-of-fact than hostile. The
individual who made the latter statement also commented, during the
course of another story in which he perceived that commitments between
his office and the MAP had fallen through, that
"we have agreed to it (information sharing), and we
all think it is a great idea, but by and large it has
not happened... I don't know what they are up to, they
might just not have enough resources."
The official who stated that MAP was not appropriate in every case also
endorsed the Program highly several times during our interview.
Another instance of positive and cooperative interaction between
the MAP and State agency officials was identified by the Rochelle CETA
Program Agent.
"Melva and I and the other people involved developed
a good working relationship and it was through alot
of Melva's work that the program actually got pushed
through in Springfield... I think Melva worked her tail
off trying to help out some of these people, and it was
good for me to see that because I was really in doubt
about the union at Swift. They were taking alot of
money from these guys in dues and they really didn't
have anything back. This was a return on their invest-
ment and I think it really helped out.
Melva Meacham, speaking from MAP's point of view, stated that
"We need a much more systematic planning process than
we have had in the past, and this is where I think our
agency can work much more closely with DCCA than we do."
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Thus, the MAP's activities have provided an opportunity for
cooperation as well as the chance for underlying conflict to surface.
These difficulties should not be seen as a sign of failure, but rather
as problems to be understood and addressed. These experiences should
not be interpreted solely as a function of personalities, but also as
the inevitable consequence of different organizations trying to learn
to work together in ways that heretofore have remained underdeveloped.
The level of cooperation observed today is certainly advanced beyond
the days of antagonism in the mid-1970's that led to the initiation
of institutional linkages between the public sector and trade unions
in the form of the CETA/Labor Liaison Project in Illinois.
The most highly developed relationship in the model, in terms of
formal law and regulation, and informal codes of practice, exists
between private managers and trade unions through the institution of
collective bargaining. When these two groups have been involved in a
planning relationship outside of the boundaries of collective
bargaining, the experience has demonstrated some potential to overcome
the adversarial relationship.
Q: Have you worked with local Chambers of Commerce?
A: "I (Melva Meacham) think it is important to bring
them into the planning. I was involved with them
in Rochelle and Clinton. I have seen all of the
actors come together so many times. I think I have
them stereotyped, and they do me, being from the
labor movement. But when we work together we can
push all of that into the background during the
process of working on a crisis and figuring out what
is best to do for the people."
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On the other side, a union official from the Oscar Mayer closing told
me, when I asked him about involvement of the local Chamber, "I
personally didn't think that the Chamber of Commerce should be involved.
In know what they stand for, and what their feelings are toward the
labor movement."
To summarize the key issues involved in these relationships, we
quote at length from an interview with Doug Richardson. His comments
highlight several of the issues between labor and management, the State
and organized labor, and the State and private management.
"We recognize that some kind of systematic, empirical
approach is required for rational planning from the
state level. Part of the problem is that this is an
international level issue. Chicago and the State can't
do economic planning in a vacuum. In this office
(Regional Office, AFL-CIO) we have just made a decision
to work with the Dept. of Commerce and Community Affairs
on economic development and industrial retention. The
problem is that these proqrams get developed in bureaucra-
cies that don't have organized labor as a constituency.
There has been a clear distinction between the Depts. of
Labor and Commerce at both the federal and state levels.
So now we are talking about dealing with the Department of
Commerce and they're not too sure that they want to work
with us. And they're also not too sure that we're not
the prpblem. At least that is what business is saying.
The State has an unenviable role when it talks to
business, who tells them about taxes and unemployment
insurance and workman's compensation. Then they (Dept.
of Commerce) look around to see who is interested in
economic planning to help people stay employed in Illinois,
and they find the labor movement. So government has a
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hard course to steer. There is still little cooperation
between corporations and government. It is sort of a
macro form of the problem I stated before -- there is
no mechanism.
Q: What have you observed about private sector
involvement in plant closings?
A: The local employer who closes the plant usually
doesn't care. The services and retail businesses
that rise and fall on the presence of the manu-
facturing business may get more involved. Melva
Meacham has discovered that some Chambers of
Commerce, once they get over their paranoia of
working with the labor movement, discover that they
are all trying to do the same thing. The State
Chamber of Commerce and the business groups have
not been really involved because there is no State
policy focussing on retraining. There is a State
policy on jobs development and industrial retention,
but shifting people from one job to another as a
policy objective I have never heard articulated
in this state. And thus there is probably little
discussion with employers. I haven't had any
indication that corporate board rooms are opening
to state officials more often than they are opening
to union officials.
Q: What is your vision about what the mechanisms for
this planning should be?
A: You have to get the two opposing forces together --
the voice of working people and those people who make
decisions about the jobs, When a dialogue opens, then
you may have some progress. If the government can
facilitate that dialogue, it may not be a bad objective.
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But my guess is that they don't know much about
doing that. We will sit down with DCCA and tell
them what the road map looks like for the labor
movement, but we can't help the State talk to the
private sector. We can help them talk to organized
labor. If we take collective bargaining seriously,
then it may be the battle ground on which alot of
these issues will be fought, because bargaining is
basically a process of resolving adversarial issues.
Bargaining is also a process of integrated planning
and it may well be that some of the initiatives that
we need can come through that process. The role for
government in that process is an open one. But I
think there is some room for optimism here, because
unions take their business seriously. They may not be
always timely or correct, but eventually they are going
to deal with this problem. Right now they deal with it
at the point when the plant is going to close. Eventually
it will back up in the process and be anticipated. And
then you are talking about committees, and planning and
policies. You've got two legs of the stool set up, and
government can be the third. But government has got to
understand that the reason corporations don't do what
they want is that they have offered a lousy product."
Mr. Richardson's comments summarize the complexity of the inter-
relationships among these groups, and the substantial obstacles in
the way of "new ways of decision-making". A key problem that he
identifies is the absence of a formal mechanism whereby these groups
are obligated, in a sense, to share in decision-making on economic
and social questions. Collective bargaining is one such mechanism,
but it only encompasses a certain range of interests- and, at
least in the U.S., is restricted to one-quarter of the workforce.
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While the collective bargaining relationship may not be the appropriate
analogue to the planning mechanism that could insure wider, more
substantive participation in economic and social planning by com-
munity groups and organized labor, it illustrates the value, as well
as the limitations, of such a mechanism. In the absence of such
institutions that bind the public sector, business, trade unions and
community groups together, the MAP is left to move on the margins of
planning decisions. Again, even though the analysis emphasizes the
Program's limitations, it is still argued that the MAP is making
important steps in terms of raising necessary issues, being a catalyst
for dialogue among various groups, and developing networks that would
be less likely to occur in the absence of the Program. It also provides
the opportunity for certain stereotypes to be challenged. The full
potential of these steps, however, remains to be realized.
Looking at intergroup relationships is only one-perspective from
which to view the political implications of the MAP's planning activity.
This issue may also be addressed in terms of the consequences for the
labor movement itself. The answer to this question will have a bearing
on the ability of trade unions to "assume a greater share in the
government's responsibilities for reaching decisions" as the ILO Report
suggests. We can ask, do the planning activities support organized
labor's purpose of representing and protecting the interests of
working people?
The answer to this question is fairly straightforward if we
consider the plant closing services of the MAP as one planning activity
of the Illinois State AFL-CIO. According to Doug Richardson, the MAP
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protects workers by providing services, and supports the labor
movement's goal to organize.
"The unions that are interested in organizing are
the ones that have to be interested in this question
because if you even expect to organize in a town like
Peoria, Ill., you better have done something for those
people when the plant shutdown. If their perception is
that the union was of no great utility to them when
they needed it the most, then, as an organizer, I'm
going to have a tough time talking to those people
about joining a union in the next shop they go to
work for. I have been, along with alot of other
people, frustrated with the Internationals' reluctance
to deal with this head-on. We sow the seeds of at
least ten years of activity and perhaps the destruc-
tion of our membership in regions like the Midwest
without some kind of informed attitude about the
problem."
The issue becomes more complicated with planning activities that
are one or more steps removed from providing direct services to union
members, ex-members or would-be members. Participation in activities
that are less direct-service and more economic development, such as
assisting in the development of an early warning system for plant
closings, is likely to be more controversial. The essence of the
debate is about what activities the labor movement should emphasize
to achieve its goals. According to the Illinois AFL-CIO President,
planning still has a lower priority than organizing.
Q: Does organized labor need to take a more
aggressive role in economic development?
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A: Organized labor has got to organize. That is
where we have fallen down. Even in the good
years, we didn't organize and we didn't maintain
our proper percentage of the labor force. Even
though we have not lost any members per se, we
never maintained our percentage of the workforce.
As the workforce grew, :. ie influence of the labor
movement has declined. That has got to change.
Somehow, we have either got to concentrate on the
public employee, the white collar worker, and/or
the highly skilled technical types who are building
computers and servicing computers. But we have not
done it and until we do it, we're not going to have
any great impact on the economic situation."
Planning and organizing are not necessarily mutually exclusive
choices, even though they do consist of different activities. The
Lucas Aerospace workers thought of planning and organizing as com-
plementary activities. The difference, of course, is that the Lucas
planning effort was totally union controlled, whereas the MAP, due to
its funding, is controlled by State government. This raises a question
about how the MAP might be different, in terms of goals, activities
and implications, if it were financially supported partly or wholly
from within organized labor. Another way to think about it is that
each strategy, planning and organizing, is suited to different goals
and problems faced by the labor movement. The challenge is not to
choose between one or the other, but to determine when and how to
apply each.
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Support for Economic Development
The MAP is in an excellent position to generate a substantial
amount of useful economic data. This potential is underdeveloped and
underutilized for several reasons.
First, the MAP is not funded to do extensive economic and/or
labor market research. If funding for this purpose were provided, the
MAP would be able to collect information in three key areas. First,
the MAP could complement the State's efforts in developing an early
warning system for plant closings. As noted in Chapter 3, the labor
market economists at DCCA who are designing applications of the Altman
"Z-Score" early warning system stated that organized labor could play
a useful role in identifying plants that might be preparing to close.
The MAP has demonstrated this capacity internally. For example, the
Industrial Union Outreach (IUO) Field Representatives sometimes learn
about potential closings from their visits with local unions. They are
then able to inform Melva Meacham. This information is not comprehen-
sive and so would not be reliable as the sole approach to identifying
potential and/or actual plant closing situations.
One way to buttress the contacts of the IUO Field Reps would be
to provide technical assistance and training to union locals in
targeted industries so they could identify and monitor changes in the
plant that might signify disinvestment or preparation for a shutdown.
This type of information network could provide early warning about a
variety of job loss circumstances, not just shutdowns. Through such
an approach, the research effort might be decentralized and local
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unions could provide information to the MAP, and, through them, to the
State. MAP does not have the resources to develop this kind of
program.
The second area of information that MAP already collects, although
not comprehensively due to lack of resources, is the reverse of early
warning about job loss. It is, essentially, early warning about job
gains. Larry Stout's industrial union survey to over 1,300 local unions
represented this type of research to locate what he calls 'employment
generating situations'. This research effort could support DCCA's
efforts to identify and assist expanding firms. At present, this
information-gathering occurs on a small scale. The ability of unions to
supply business information to a government agency in cases where,
perhaps, the company is less willing to cooperate, is one example of
the connections of the tripartite relationship cited earlier.
The third area of research would be a comprehensive study of the
impacts that plant closings are having on the Illinois economy. There
is a striking lack of knowledge about this issue. According to
Prof. Louis Ferman University of Michigan.
"we are still without information that is critical,
not just to formulation of national policy, but to
effective development, implementation and administration
of ad hoc programs designed to confront economic
emergencies. We do not have data on the prevalence of
plant closings, on how many facilities shut down during
any given year or for what reasons. We do not know the
number of workers affected or the scope of the effects
on communities. We do not know to what extent companies
that move benefit from this investment strategy, and
have no clear idea of th available interventions or of
their cost-effectiveness.13
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Ferman's point is true for Illinois. For example, no effort has
been made to assess the costs of plant closings to the State, in terms
of lost revenue, loss of consumer demand, and transfer payments. No
follow-up studies have been conducted of the workers who were retrained
in the various programs. No study has been conducted on the erosion
of Illinois' export capacity due to plant closing. MAP, if it had
the research capacity, would be able to develop case material on a
number of closings, and would be able to coordinate follow-up studies
of displaced workers.
One explanation for the underfunding of these research projects,
besides scarce resources, is that the State is not sure what it would
do with all this information if it were collected. In order for the
type of research being described to be valuable to the State, it would
need to be connected to an economic development strategy. In short,
if there is no plant closing prevention or intervention strategy, then
there is no impetus for extensive research -- at least from the State's
point if view.
If more research were to be conducted, MAP and DCCA would need to
have a clear understanding and agreement of procedures for generating
and sharing the information. It appears that there have been some
problems with information flow, even though a substantial degree of
information exchange has also occurred. I was not able to learn many
details about this issue because it is sensitive. However, the DCCA
official reported to me that MAP has not supplied all of the informa-
tion to his agency that he expected. MAP also may not have access to
the information it needs in a timely fashion. Melva Meacham noted
the following problems.
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It would be nice if our people could sit down with
the State and know exactly how much money they had
in certain areas for retraining, Now they are
telling us none. We're not meeting with DCCA on
these closings as soon as we need to. The program
agents and prime sponsors need to be better informed
about the possibilities of retraining through IIC
for example, because I am the one who tells them
about it."
Her final statement illustrates the problem with information
exchange about plant closings in general. In another example, the
Illinois Bureau of Employment Security, which collects mass layoff
reports, routinely sends this information, which may indicate potential
or actual plant shutdowns, to DCCA. Neither agency sends this
information to Melva Meacham, although she can get it by request from
DCCA.
These difficulties with information flow are linked to several
issues. The first is rooted in the complex nature of the relationship
between the State and organized labor. Problems with information flow
are partly a function of a lack of trust, not so much between
individuals, but between the perspectives of the two groups. The
second issue is related to the reason for the underfunding of plant
closing research. Why should additional information be shuffled around
if there is no explicit purpose for it? The lack of leadership for the
State's plant closing strategy is another explanation for problems with
information flow. According to an official of the Office of Employment
and Training Services,
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"No Department has ever been given the direct charge
that whatever state response could be generated, you
are responsible for doing it. So the linkages and
cooperation that has come about in past situations
have been haphazard. It is not the situation where
someone picks up the phone and says, "I am in charge
and this is what we are going to do."
The ILO Report suggested that increased productivity was a second
potential economic benefit from the involvement of unions in planning.
The current structure and purpose of the MAP does not lend itself to
addressing this issue. MAP could only contribute indirectly to
increasing overall productivity by facilitating the reentry of
displaced workers. Since MAP has had limited impact in this regard,
its impact on productivity has been nil.
The structure of the program, however, has the potential to con-
tribute to productivity. Through its relationships with union locals,
international unions and public agencies and private managers, MAP
could, if funded to do so, provide extensive technical assistance and
training to local efforts at improving productivity. The Program could
assist local labor/management committees, unions, managers and PIC's in
developing various programs. There are numerous possibilities in this
area, and the MAP is in an excellent position to coordinate such an
effort. It should be noted that there are definite limits to the
improvements that can be made in productivity by the efforts of
workers or cooperative committees. Productivity depends on several
other additional factors.
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Contributions to labor market information and productivity are
only two ways that organized labor could contribute to economic develop-
ment through participation in planning. The planning efforts of the
Lucas Aerospace workers illustrate a substantially different approach
that involves innovative research and development of new products and
methods of production.
Minimizing Social Costs
The ILO Report states that the social aim of involving trade
unions in planning is to "pinpoint social opportunities, (and) mini-
mize the social cost of development..."
This benefit is difficult to assess because it is less concrete
and harder to measure than, for example, the provision of labor market
information by unions. MAP has achieved this purpose, but to a very
limited extent. The Adjustment Assistance Workshops offered by
Ms. Meacham help displaced workers identify "social opportunities".
The Workshops may minimize problems the workers might have had if
they had been left to seek information individually, without assistance.
This access to resources, by facilitation the worker's adjustment
to su-den job loss, may minimize social costs by motivating the worker
to seek positive coping strategies, such as enrolling in school,
rather han negative ones, such as drinking. This initial assistance
may pr. ent the individual from becoming completely discouraged and
support their motivation to look for work again. Little systematic
research has been conducted on these questions, and so it is difficult
to provide a definite answer about the social benefits of these
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adjustment services, Most of the case study literature, however,
supports these types of programs.
Professors Aronson and McKersie, in a recent study of three
shutdowns in New York State, recommended an approach simi r to that
of the MAP and emphasized the importance of taking services to the
workers.
"The provision of labor-market services is the single
most important factor during the readjustment period
...the program needs to reach out to the displacees
and not wait for them to seek out the labor-market
services that are available.... Thus, an objective
would be to establish a one-stop-center for the
displacees, possibly in the local union hall, where
all of the services...would be presented in a
coordinated and tailored way for the displacees.
...Perhaps a special mobile unit prepared to operate
on a State-wide basis, on short notice, to supplement
the efforts of local office staff would be worth
consideration. "14
It is also important to have organized labor actively involved
in developing these programs because their support is likely to
increase participation of and benefits for displaced workers.
According to Aronson and McKersie,
"the unions also played a very important function,
not in the role of a formal social service agency,
but in insuring that benefits were available...
Very few, if any, of the traditional social service
agencies aimed special programs at the laidoff workers.
The mode of operation was to allow the workers to
come in for food stamps or for special counseling...
One reason found for such a high demand for training
among the Westinghouse dischargees was the role of the
IBEW.Local 1833 in the month preceding the shutdown.
This pre-notification period allowed the local to
explain full all the options involved in the TAA
program, as well as set up meetings between the 15local educational institutions and the displacees.
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Ms. Meacham has reached a similar conclusion and argues that
the labor movement is an essential participant because of their affinity
with displaced workers.
"We are actually helping the State of Illinois. Yes,
they are paying for it through the labor movement,
but a state agency couldn't provide the workshops
we do. We have access to the people and they really
don't have that."
Still, the MAP has not been able to reach all of the people who
need assistance. Even fewer have benefited from retraining.
Ms. Meacham recognizes these limitations.
Q: What more would you like to be able to do if you
had more resources?
A: I don't have time to do justice to any of the
closings I have. One person cannot do this for
an entire state. Anymore, I go into a community,
design a structure, and hope the thing works. I'd
like to have more time to spend in a community.
I'd like to have more staff people. I could see
five people doing this really well across the State.
We could be doing so much more. We could be putting
together community programs and staying there to
see that it stays in place and that it is running.
We don't have to receive the funds and run the
programs, but we could sure help them get off the
ground."
Linkages Within Organized Labor
The preliminary evidence suggests that the activities of the MAP
have built networks, reinforced existing ones and enhanced cooperation
among a variety of trade unions, and organizational levels within the
AFL-CIO hierarchy.
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When Ms. Meacham works on a plant closing in a particular com-
munity, she does not only work with the local union experiencing the
shutdown. She contacts the AFL-CIO Community Services Representative,
if one is assigned to the area, and involves that person in the local
planning process. Her office also contacts all of the local unions in
the vicinity of the closing to ask for their assistance with job
leads, and inform them of the MAP's services.
While most of her work is concentrated on unions affiliated with
the AFL-CIO, there have been exceptions. For example, the first
closing where Melva Meacham assisted was a UAW plant before the UAW had
reaffiliated with the AFL-CIO. Ms. Meacham also consulted with the
organizers of a workshop for the Pabst Teamsters local, also an
unaffiliated union.
In addition, Melva Meacham has also provided technical assistance
to several international unione that are experiencing plant closings.
Recently, Ms. Meacham consulted with the Human Resources Development
Institute (HRDI) of the national AFL-CIO to assist their efforts to
develop a plant closings project.
Thus, the MAP's expertise in planning labor/community responses
to plant closings has been extended to several different divisions
within organized labor. They have been able to initiate and promote
information-sharing and cooperation across union lines in less
traditional areas of trade union activity.
The sentiments of one local UFCW official expressed the good
will that is promoted by the MAP's plant closing work.
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"To this day, our whole local union #787, could never
thank her enough because Melva did an excellent job."
The organizational structure of the AFL-CIO at the state level is
conducive to the wide-ranging networking that the MAP has accomplished.
This is true for MAP's relationship with State officials, as well as
within the labor movement. This point was illustrated when I asked
about how the State Federation compares to international unions as
the appropriate organization to provide plant closing services.
There was general agreement that the state federation of labor
has certain advantages over international unions as the provider of
plant closing services. One advantage is that the state federation
is in a position to be connected with state and local agency
representatives. I asked this question of Melva Meacham.
Q: Why should the State Federation of Labor provide these
services? A: Because we are already working within the
State. Most international representatives have multi-
state jurisdictions. We have our hands on so many resources--
we know the resource people in the Governor's office,
we know the CETA people, we know the job service and
the unemployment insurance people. The State
Federation sits in the perfect place to bring all of the
information to bear in a plant closing situation. Plus,
we hold the Central Labor Council meetings, and most
unions belong to the State Federation. They know what
services we provide.
A local UFCW official from Rochelle concurred with this opinion.
Q: Who should provide plant closing assistance if the
MAP did not exist? A: Perhaps the State Federation could
set up an office and fund it through a per capita tax. I
think it is something that the State Federation would have
to take a long hard look at. It would be devastating if
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the funding would be withdrawn from the NAP. There
are alot of shops that don't have the kind of protection
in their contract that UFCW has, and there are alot of
places that the MAP can get to because of their involvement
around the State, The State Federation is in a good
position because most of the international unions are located
in Washington, D.C., and they have regional offices. Since
the State Federation is located in the state and has the local
information, they can handle the issues better than the
internationals.
A second UFCW official from Davenport, Iowa responded to my question
about the role of the State Federation with a recommendation for an
increased role for the national AFL-CIO.
Q: Can ,he State Federation do anything that an inter-
national union can't? A: You are putting me in a box
since my International has its own plant closure program.
I really think that the national AFL-CIO should have the
program, not an international union. The national program
should originate from the national AFL and then spin-off
into the State Feds.
Another advantage is the ability of the State Federation to share
information and resources across communities and unions. A union
official from Peoria stated that,
"The State Federation could and should run every one
of these programs, and could and should work with
state and local officials to get additional money.
They should put together combinations of state money
and local consortium (CETA) money, to get more dollars
involved. There is no reason in the world for Peoria,
Illinois to have a successful program, and for lack of
knowledge, for East St. Louis to have a need for a good
strong program and not know what we are doing in Peoria
that is working. If it was all handled through a central
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organization like the State Federation, then all of that
information would be available to everyone."
This discussion does not intend to suggest that international
unions do not need plant closings projects if the State Federations are
involved. The key issue is to recognize what each organization Is
best able to provide, and then coordinate their efforts. The point
of the ILO Report about variations in the level of participation in
planning provides a way of distinguishing one difference between the
role that can be played by Internationals as compared to State
federations. Internationals can plan their services at a national
level, have the ability to tap national resources, and can deal with
the problems of an entire industry. Also, the plant closing project of
the MAP is not in a position to provide the technical assistance on
plant shutdown collective bargaining that the internationals can and
should provide. Given the meager resources of the MAP, they are not
able to cover all of the closings that might need their assistance.
Internationals should thus be in a position to provide assistance in
cases where the MAP is unable to serve. Internationals also have
the potential to provide longer tern follow-up than the MAP is
generally capable of. For example, the Distillery Workers union
maintained the local union office for a number of months after the
closing of Hiram Walker in Peoria. One other problem with the state
federation model is that the Illinois situation may not be easily
replicated. Many other state federations might not have the interest
in providing such services, or their state political climate may
limit their funding possibilities.
Findlly, state level planning and programs cannot adequately
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address national economic problems. This point was noted in a study
of poverty in the southern Illinois coal belt, published in 1941 by
the Work Projects Administration,
"The experience of the southern Illinois coal field
suggests that attempts to solve the problems of all
the depressed areas on a purely local basis are fore-
doomed. The interplay of nation-wide forces created
the depressed areas, and neither subsistence farming,
handicraft industry, locally initiated "land-a-factory"
drives, nor ingenious "make your own job" schemes can
basically alter their situation. One can scarcely avoid
the conclusion that a nati nal approach offers the
only hope for a solution."'15
Summary
This Chapter has explored one aspect of the "new frontier for
unions" suggested in Melva Meacham's report--the planning frontier.
The preliminary evidence demonstrates that the MAP is involved in
planning and has contributed to general social goals and union goals
through these activities. These findings are preliminary because the
MAP's plant closing efforts are still relatively new. The Program is
also small and it has not yet been replicated in another state. In
addition, the commitment of organized labor and the government to
the MAP, or programs like it, remains uncertain. Even though the
President of the Illinois State AFL-CIO and key individuals in State
government have voiced strong support for the Program the resources
allocated to it are minimal.
Conclusions about the implications of organized labor's
participation in planning based on observations about the MAP are
limited in two ways. First, the MAP is involved in a narrow range
of the State's planning activities and it does not make decisions about
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the allocation of resources to the Program. Second, the State's
planning activities represent a limited subset of the full range of
possibilities of planning. Thus, the MAP's experience with ad hoc,
crisis intervention planning can only illustrate a small number of the
potential consequences of involvement in planning. Other models of
participation in planning by labor unions, like the Lucas Aerospace
Combine Committee, would yield a different set of conclusions on
this question.
Given these limits, the MAP has provided valuable services; it
has been able to develop the beginnings of an early warning system; and
it has promoted cooperation among diverse groups within organized labor
and among labor, government, business and community groups. Its
experience thus far also raises several important questions about the
relationship between planning and organizing, and the nature of
relationships among the key groups involved in the economic and
social policy debate. It also leads to questions about alternatives
to how planning is viewed and conducted in the U.S.
Finally, this analysis underscores the argument of Chapter Three
that planning cannot be a substitute for collective bargaining, union
direct action or legislation. Rather it is an essential complement
to these-efforts to address the problems associated with plant
closings and economic dislocation.
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CONCLUSION
David Moberg, writing about the reindustrialization debate and
growing support for planning, has argued that:
Nothing can substitute for a political movement, growing
to control of a major party, that makes corporate power
the key question and offers democratic control of invest-
ment as the heart of an alternative approach to planning
the work of society (Working Papers, December 1980, p. 39).
This statement returns us to the central theme of this report.
Decisions about the control, use and distribution of resources in our
society constitute the fundamental question underlying the plant closing
issue. This question has been the crux of economic debates and political
struggles throughout U.S. history. The choices our society has made on
this resource distribution question have resulted in certain patterns
of economic development that have persisted since the nineteenth century.
Plant closinas and other forms of economic dislocation have recurred as
a consequence of these development patterns. Plant closings today thus
pose a familiar set of political questions and challenges for groups who
are attempting to devise solutions to the negative consequences of
economic dislocation.
On the other hand, the specific economic problems we face today re-
present unprecedented challenges that cannot be addressed adequately by
traditional solutions. All of the key groups involved in and affected
by plant closings - unions, community groups, business and government -
will have to devise innovative approaches to these new issues raised by
technological change, the dynamics of the international economy, the
declining manufacturing base of the U.S. and the erosion of the power
of trade unions. The responses discussed in this report, including col-
lective bargaining, plant closing legislation, union direct action and
220
social and economic planning, contain the potential to generate
solutions to the problems associated with plant closings. Each response
however, remains grossly inadequate to cope with the magnitude and
seriousness of these problems. The situation is not completely discour-
aging because some new approaches are evolving, as illustrated by the
examples in this report. The plant closing project of the Manpower
Assistance Program represents an important if small step in this process
of designing, strategies and programs to cope with basic social problems.
In the final analysis, the MAP is an encouraging development both
for its accomplishments and for the insights and questions it generates
about the political and economic tasks that confront our society.
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APPENDICES
TABLE 1
Total Population Change: 1960-1979, By State & Region
(000's)
State/Region
Illinois
Midwest
Northeast
South
West
1960
10,086
42,471
48,364
51 ,610
37,527
Year
1970
11,110
46,893
53,333
58,340
44,533
1979
11,229
48,249
53,731
66,821
51 ,297
% Change
1960-70
10.2
10.4
10.7
13.0
18.7
Source: The State of the Region 1981, Northeast - Midwest Institute
COj
% Change
1970-79
1.1
2.9
0.4
14.5
15.2
TABLE 2
Investment by Region and State, 1970's
($$ millions)
%Change 70-77
77.2
108.4
61.9
163.4
149.9
Nonresidential Structures
1970 1979 %Chanqe 70-79
657.1
2,411.6
3,148.7
- 3,598.3
3,512.6
1 ,521.7
6,511.5
4,541 .5
10,893.5
12,413.6
131 .6
170.0
44.2
202.7
253.4
New Capital Equipment
1970 1977
2,685.0
13,760.8
9,166.7
17,217.1
8,283.2
Source: The State of the Region, 1981, Northeast-Midwest Institute
Illinois
Midwest
Northeast
South
West
1,515.4
6,604.0
5,660.5
6,535.8
3,315.0
TABLE 3
Nonagricul tural Employment Change 1970-80,
(000's)
By State & Region
Manufacturing
1970 1980
1,342.1
5,567.0
5,944.9
4,796.9
3,060.0
1,190.4
5,286.1
5,348.5
5,687.9
3,878.6
Source: The State of the Region, 1981, Northeast - Midwest Institute
Total
1970
Illinois
Midwest
Northeast
South
West
4,328.6
16,793.6
20,157.3
18,863.5
14,935.7
1980
4,799.1
19,809.6
22,335.8
27,085.7
21 ,571.8
%Change
70-80
10.9
17.7
10.8
43.6
44.4
%Change
70-80
Services
1970 1980
-11.3
-5.0
-10.0
18.6
26.8
681.1
,493.6
,530.0
,767.8
,623.0
2
3
2
2
%Change
70-80
37.1
51.1
39.6
69.6
75.3
933.7
,767.8
,927.2
,695.2
,598.6
3
4
4
4
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TABLE 4
The Federal Balance of Payments: Fiscal 1979
(millions of dollars)
Region and State
Illinois
Midwest
Northeast
South
West
Spending
Per Person
$1,849
1 ,627
2,111
2,064
2,355
Taxes
Per Person
$2,530
2,252
2,213
1,844
2,205
Source: The State of the Re ion 1981, Northeast-Midwest Institute
Dollar
Flow
$ -7,650
-30,156
-5,480
14,394
7,607
226
TABLE 5
Cost of Fuels and Electric Energy for Manufacturing: 1977
(thousands of dollars per trillion BTU)
Region and State
Average Fuel
Costs
Average Electric
Costs
Illinois
Mi dwest
Northeast
South
West
U.S.
Source: The State of the Region 1981, Northeast-Midwest Institute
1,894
1 ,782
2,214
1,684
1,579
1,815
24
24
28
21
19
23
227
TABLE 6
Natural Gas Retail Prices: 1970-78
Average Price
Region and State 1970 1978
Illinois $ .74 $2.23
Midwest .74 2.05
Northeast 1.29 3.14
South .72 2.06
West .64 1.82
U.S. .82 2.21
Source: The State of the Region 1981, Northeast-Midwest Institute
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TABLE 7
Average Unemployment Payroll Tax Rates as a
of Taxable and Total Wages: 1976-78
Region and State
Taxable Rates
1976 1978
Total Rates
1976 1978
Illinois
Midwest
Northeast
South
West
U.S.
1981, Northeast-Midwest Institute
Percent
2.0
2.4
3.1
1.9
2.4
2.5
3.3
3.0
3.1
2.1
2.6
2.8
0.8
1.1
1.4
0.9
1.3
1.2
1.4
1.4
1.6
1.2
1.4
1.4
Source: The State of the Region
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TABLE 8
State and Local Effective Business Tax Rates by State, 1975
State and Region
Illinois
East North Central
New England
Middle Atlantic
South Atlantic
West North Central
East South Central
West South Central
Mountain
Pacific
U.S.
Effective Tax Rate
1.50%
1.54
2.46
1.99
1.21
1.74
.96
1.24
1.91
2.22
1.69
Source: Tax rate estimates based on data in Roger Vaughn, State
Taxation and Economic Development (Washington, DC: The
Council of State Planning Agencies, 1979).
TABLE 9
Employees on Nonagricultural Payrolls by Industry 1950-81
Illinois
(000's)
1950 1955
Mining
Contract Construction
Manufacturing
Trans. & Pub. Utilities
Wholesale & Retail
Finance Ins. & Real
Estate
Services
Government
Total
44.6
137.4
1,212.6
298.5
653.8
148.2
366.0
314.3
3,175.2
32.1
163.1
1,290.2
309.5
680.4
169.2
417.4
365.1
3,426.8
1960 1965
28.5 25.3
169.3 166.1
1,225.4 1,318.4
285.8 276.9
746.3 826.6
183.7
482.2
416.9
3,537.9
199.6
565.1
502.4
3,830.4
1970
22.8
188.1
1,353.6
285.2
941.2
231.4
679.4
638.9
4,345.6
1975
25.9
172.3
1,199. 3
272.6
999.0
254.7
780.0
714.5
4,418.9
1980
28.3
190.4
1,182.6
288.0
1,117.6
298.2
936.7
757.4
4,799.2
%Change
1981 50-60
32.2
201.8
1,171.4
282.6
1,132.9
310.6
968.5
765.2
4,865.2
-36.1
23.2
1.1
- 4.3
14.1
23.9
31.7
32.6
11.4
%Change %Change
60-70 70-81
-20.
11.1
10.9
-. 2
26.1
25.9
40.9
53.2
22.8
41.2
7.3
-13.8
-. 9
20.4
34.2
42.5
19.8
11.9
Source: Employment and Earnings, States and Areas, 1939-78; Establishment Data, January 1981 and 1982.
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TABLE 10
Percentage Distribution of Nonagricultural
Illinois, 1950-81
Mining
Construction
Manufacturing
Transportation and
Public Utilities
Wholesale and Retail Trade
Finance, Insurance and
Real Estate
Services
Government
1950
1.4%
4.3
38.2
9.4
20.6
4.7
11.5
9.9
Employees by Industry
1960
.8%
4.8
34.6
8.1
21.1
5.2
13.6
11.8
1970
.5%
4.3
31.3
6.6
21.7
5.3
17.9
16.4
1981
.7%
4.1
24.1
5.8
23.3
6.4
19.9
15.7
Source: Calculations from Employment dataand Earnings
TABLE lla
NONFARM WAGE AND SALARY EMPLOYMENT STATE OF ILLINOIS
ANNUAL AVERAGES (000's)
1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978
%Change
1979 1980 1972-80
4,314.8 4,470.4 4,545.7 4,418.9 4,565.7 4,661.3 4,757.5 4,883.0 4,892.0 13.4Total (000's)
Private Sector 3,660.5 3,803.9 3,864.8 3,704.4 3,848.5 3,935.5 3,994.0 4,140.1 4,128.0 12.8
Manufacturing
Durable Goods
Furn.-Fixt.
Stone-Clay-Gls.
Primary Metals
Fab. Metals
Machinery
Elec. Equip.
Trans. Equip.
Instruments
All Other Dur.
Nondurable Goods
Food Pdts.
Apparel
Paper Pdts.
Print.-Publ.
Chem. Pdts.
Rubber-Plast.
All other Nondur.
1,284.2 1,354.5 1,345.1 1,199.8 1,215.2 1,229.3 1,237.1 1,271.6 1,222.3 - 4.8
845.1 909.1 904.3 789.2 796.2 810.2 828.4 846.2 812.6 - 3.8
25.7
38.1
97.5
150.0
203.2
185.4
47.6
45.5
52.1
28.0
39.7
104.0
159.0
224.1
200.5
53.8
47.8
52.2
26.3
39.4
106.3
154.2
236.9
188.6
52.8
49.8
50.0
22.9
34.9
92.0
132.2
219.1
151.5
47.5
44.3
44.8
23.7
35.7
90.7
136.6
212.8
157.2
47.7
45.3
46.5
23.8
35.6
93.3
139.4
216.5
157.1
49.0
47.5
48.0
21.7
35.4
96.5
140.1
226.9
157.9
51.8
49.9
48.2
24.3
34.8
99.4
146.2
224.9
168.3
58.2
42.9
47.2
24.0
32.7
92.4
136.9
226.1
160.5
56.3
38.9
44.8
- 6.6
-14.2
- 5.2
- 8.7
-11.3
-13.4
18.3
-14.5
-14.0
439.1 445. 4 440.7 410.7 419.0 419. 0 403.7 425.4 409.7 - 6.7
124.7
32.5
39.4
108.8
60.6
43.0
30.1
123.7
32.1
40.4
108.9
62.3
45.9
32.1
122.8
30.0
40.5
107.6
62.8
46.0
31.0
117.1
24.9
36.5
101.2
60.9
41.5
28.6
120.4
24.6
37.0
99.7
64.2
43.8
29.3
118.8
24.3
37.6
100.6
64.6
45.7
27.4
116.5
22.7
36.6
95.1
66.5
45.5
25.8
116.6
22.6
38.4
106.2
66.9
48.6
26.1
113.2 - 9.2
23.4 -28.0
37.1 - 5.8
105.1 - 3.4
64.6 6.3
42.0 - 2.3
24.5 -18.6
Source: Prepared by Current Employment Statistics section of
Employment Service.
Research and Analysis Subdivision of the Illinois State
TABLE 11b
NONFARM WAGE AND SALARY EMPLOYMENT STATE OF ILLINOIS
ANNUAL AVERAGES
(000's)
1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978
%Change
1979 1980 1972-80
Nonmanufacturing
Mining
Construction
Trans.-Comm.-P.U.
Trade
Wholesale
Retail
Fin.-Ins.-Realty
Services
Bus. Serv.
Health Serv.
All Other Service
2,376.3 2,449.4 2,519.7 2,504.6 2,633.3 2,707.5 2,756.9
23.0 23.0 24.4 25.9 27.9
186.9 192.6 183.8 172.3 169.0
282.4 286.1 288.8 272.6 277.6
943.6 972.4 1,001.3 999.0 1,057.8
281.4 287.8 298.6 294.7 312.7
662.1 684.7 702.8 704.2 745.1
240.3 245.5 253.2 254.7 266.8
700.1 727.3 768.3 780.0 834.3
98.1 120.8 124.8 119.3 128.5
192.3 205.6 221.7 238.6 264.2
-- -- -- -- 441.6
27.9
167.9
284.0
1,089.2
320.2
768.6
276.6
861.9
135.8
278.4
447.4
24.5
174.3
289.7
1,090.9
323.6
767.4
285.3
892.1
141.9
291.1
459.1
2,868.5 2,905.7 22.3
31.1
188.0
288.9
1,141.7
348.4
793.3
295.2
923.7
154.4
295.8
473.5
32.3
191.5
285.4
1,139.9
344.6
795.4
312.8
943.8
157.5
304.1
482.2
40.4
2.5
1.1
20.8
22.5
2.0
30.2
34.8
60.5
58.1 N)
Public Sector
Federal Government
State Government
Education
Other
Local Government
Education
Other
654.3 666.5 680.9 714.5 717.2 724.5 763.5 743.2 764.0 16.8
109.0
132.8
61.2
71.6
405.1
209.1
196.0
108.2
133.5
61.4
72.1
424.8
225.7
199.1
108.9
136.8
61.3
75.5
435.1
234.3
200.8
108.3
140.3
63.0
77.4
465.8
251.2
214.6
104.9
139.3
62.2
77.0
473.0
252.6
220.4
103.2
141.0
64.4
76.6
480.3
252.6
227.7
104.2
143.2
66.8
76.4
516.1
273.3
242.8
104.2
144.1
67.0
77.1
494.9
258.4
236. 5
109.1
146.1
69.7
76.4
508.9
261.5
247.4
.1
10.0
13.9
6.7
25.6
25.1
26. 2
Source: Prepared by Current Employment Statistics
State Employment Service
section of Research and Analysis Subdivision of the Illinois
TABLE 12
ILLINOIS MANUFACTURED EXPORTS, PRODUCTION AND EMPLOYMENT, 1976
Industry Production Estimated Exports as Estimated Employment
Exoorts Percent of Employment Related to
(million dollars) Production Related to Exports as
Exports Percent of
(thousands) Total
Employment
Machinery, except electric 12,900 3,237 25.1 39.3 19.5
Food and kindred products 14,339 780 5.4 2.4 2.3
Electric and electronic
equipment 7,545 667 8.8 12.9 9.0
Chemicals and allied
products 6,417 443 6.9 5.2 9.8
Transportation equipment 3,940 405 10.3 4.8 10.9
Instruments and related
products 1,872 258 13.8 6.5 14.3
Fabricated metal products 7,436 240 3.2 4.8 3.4
Primary metal industries 7,349 184 2.5 2.6 2.9
Printing and publishing 4,576 109 2.4 1.8 1.7
Misc. manufacturing
industries 1,332 95 7.1 2.4 6.9
Rubber and plastic products 1,935 70 3.6 1.6 3.8
Petroleum and coal products 5,987 49 0.8 0.2 1.5
Stone, clay, and qlass
products 1,864 47 2.5 1.0 2.7
Paper and allied products 2,152 28 1.3 0.5 1.3
Source: U.S. Department of Commerce, Illinois Exports
TABLE 13
AVERAGE PAY SCALES FULL-TIME
PERMANENT JOB OPENINGS LISTED WITH THE ILLINOIS
JOB BANK BY MAJOR OCCUPATIONAL CATEGORY AND JOB BANK DISTRICT*
FEBRUARY 1981
Chicago
Metro-
politan
Central Area Northwest Southern
Professional, Technical,
and Managerial................ $14,300 $14,630 $12,204 $10,078
Clerical and Sales.............. 8,061 9,351 8,698 7,952
Service......................... 3.66 4.26 3.79 3.64
Farming, Fishery, Forestry...... 3.48 4.32 3.80 3.51
Processing...................... 4.68 5.56 4.09 4.62
Machine Trades.................. 6.19 6.21 5.95 5.82
Bench Work...................... 5.19 4.48 4.27 4.16
Structural Work................. 4.47 5.95 4.88 4.58
Motor Freight/Transportation
Packaging/Material Handling.. 3.74 4.85 4.71 5.08
Source: Job Bank Openings Summary (JBOS), Employment and Training Administration, U.S. Dept. of Labor
* Average pay scales are based on a weighted average--by the number of openings available--of the
pay offered by employers for the occupations listed during the reference month. Salaries listed
for professional/technical/managerial and clerical/sales occupations are annual; wages shown for
all other groups are hourly.
TABLE 14
INDUSTRIES AND OCCUPATIONS POTENTIALLY
TO BE AFFECTED BY ROBOTICS - U.S.
Occupation
Assemblers
Checkers, Examiners and
Inspectors
Packers and Wrappers
(Except meat and produce)
Production Painters
Welders and Flamecutters
Machinists and Machine
Operators
Industry
Fabricated Metals
Machinery (except electrical)
Electrical and Electronic
Equipment
Transportation Equipment
Total Employed,
1979
1,289,000
746,000
626,000
185,000
713,000
3,027,000
1,615,300
2,475,400
2,138,800
1,913,600
% of Jobs Which Could be Done by:
Level I a/ Level II b/
30%10%
15
15
45
25
35
40
65
50
5020
.08
.05
.05
.07
.17
.13
.12
.15
a/Level I robots have no sensory input
b/Level II robots have rudimentary sensory input
Source: ICF, Inc. report to National Alliance of Business, Worker Adjustment to Plant Shutdowns and
Mass Layoffs: An Analysis of Program Experience and Policy Options, 1981.
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TABLE 15
LABOR UNION MEMBERSHIP - TOTAL AND PERCENT
OF NONAGRICULTURAL EMPLOYMENT, 1964 - 1978
Total Percent of
(000's) Employment
1964 1970 1976 1978 1970 1978
U.S. 17,188 19,757 19,864 20,459 28.0% 23.6%
Illinois 1,394 1,548 1,451 1,497 35.8% 31.5%
Source: U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics
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TABLE 16
Source of Plant Closings Information
IBES* Mass Layoff List Other
1978 21 5
1979 24 5
1980 31 14
1981 34 13
*Illinois Bureau of Employment Security, Illinois DeDt. of Labor
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TABLE 17
PLANT CLOSINGS IN ILLINOIS, 1970-1982
1970's-Unspecified Date
1970-75
1976
1977
1978
1979
1980
1981
1982**
Total Number of
Establishments
24
10
20
29
26
29
45
47
87*
315
Number of Employees
1,905
1,400
3,980
6,266
3,339
9,062
13,455
13,831
8,940
62,178
*Includes 81 A&P Stores in Northern Illinois.
**January to March, 1982
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TABLE 18
Illinois Plant Closings by SIC Code1
(12)
(20)
(23)
(24)
(25)
(26)
(27)
(28)
(29)
(30)
(31)
(32)
(33)
(34)
(35)
(36)
(37)
(38)
(39)
(40)
(42)
(51)
(53)
(54)
(55)
(58)
(59)
(70)
(79)
(80)
Mining - 6
Food and Kindred Products - 17
Apparel and Textile Products - 9
Lumber and Wood Products - 2
Furniture and Fixtures - 7
Paper and Allied Products - 11
Printing and Publishing - 4
Chemicals and Allied Products - 6
Petroleum and Coal Products - 2
Rubber and Plastic Products - 2
Leather and Leather Products - 6
Stone, Clay and Glass Products - 8
Primary Metals - 14
Fabricated Metals - 10
Nonelectrical Machinery - 12
Electric and Electronic Equipment - 11
Transportation Equipment
Instruments and Related Products - 2
Miscellaneous Manufacturing Industry - 4
Railroad Transport -
Trucking and Warehousing - 4
Wholesale trade - 1
General Merchandise Stores - 6
Food Stores - 82 (81 A&P stores)
Automotive Dealers - 1
Retail Trade - 1
Retail Trade - 1
Hotels and Lodging - 1
Amusement and Recreation - 1 1 Does not represent entire
Health Services - 1 sample. Information was
not available for every
company
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TABLE19a
PLANT CLOSINGS IN ILLINOISI
1970's - Unspecified Year
Company
Boss. Manuf. Co.
Eastern Rainbird Sales
Franchise Services
Hyster Co.
Hendricks Elec. Co.
Hobson Truck Sales
Laid Law Corp.
McDonnell Douglas Automation
Nelson Irrigation
Nutrena Mills
Princess Peggy, Inc.
Peoria Malleable Castings
Standard Brands Distillery
Sealtest
UNH Engineers
Harter Carter
Mr. Hawley Manuf.
Edmont Hill
Home Comfort
Peoria Packing
Purity Baking
Penn-Dixie Steel
Fennel Corp.
American Bridge
Location
Peoria Area
Peoria Area
Peoria Area
Peoria Area
Peoria Area
Peoria Area
Peoria Area
Peoria Area
Peoria Area
Peoria Area
Peoria Area
Peoria Area
Peoria Area
Peoria Area
Peoria Area
Peoria Area
Peoria Area
Peoria Area
Peoria Area
Peoria Area
Peoria Area
Blue Island
Harvey
Chicago
Number of Workers
200
25
80
500
40
10
150
200
20
25
100
80
150
100
25
100
50
50
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
Product
Gloves
Lawn Sprinklers
Fast-Food Warehouse
Lift-Trucks
Motor Rewinding
Truck Reoair
Metal Forming
Data Processing
Sprinkler Installation
Grain Elevators
Dress Manuf.
Iron Foundry
Liquor
Dairy Products
Engineering Services
Farm Equioment
Boilers
Golf Gloves
Building Supplies
Meat Packing
Wholesale Bakery
Steel
N/A
N/A
1Source of all Peoria Area Closings: Peoria Journal Star, 5/20/79
PLANT CLOSINGS IN ILLINOIS
Company Location Number of W
Goss Manuf.1  Chicago 850
American Roller 3  Chicago N/A
Signode Corp. 3  Glenview N/A
Modern Forge of Tenn. 3  Blue Island N/A
Motorola2 Quincy 205
Georqia Pacific 2  Chicago Hts. 80
Revere Copper & Brass 2  Chicago 400
3 M Co. 2  Chicago 380
National Can Co. 2  Melrose Park 60
Tri-Par Manuf. Co.2  Chicago 75
I.S. Berlin Kress2  Chicago 205
Lily-Tulip Div. of Owens-IL 2  Galva 57
Osgood & Sons, Inc. 2  Decatur 81
Wickes Corp. 2  Des Plaines 60
Rockwell Int. 2  Chicago 810
Weill & Eisendroth2  Chicago 50
Centralia Apparel2  Centralia 185
J.E. Porter Co. 2  Ottawa 74
Intern. Shoe Co. 2  Flora 350
High Life Packing2 Chicago 58
Strachan Machines1  . Rockford 15
Anchor Brush Co.3  Montgomery N/A
GMP Inc. 3  Elgin N/A
Goodman Conveyor 3  Chicago N/A
Switches3  Northbrook N/A
Universal Packing3 Glenview N/A
Wather Tamer3  Chicago N/A
IIPAC (Illinois Public Action Council) Survey
2Mass Layoff List, Ill. Bureau of Employment Security (IBES)
3 Other Research
Reasonorkers
Labor Dispute
Move to Tenn.
Move to Tenn.
Move to Tenn.
Economic
Economic
Consolidation
Moving to West Coast
Economic
Moving to Tenn.
Economic
Economic
Finances
Moved to Mich.
Economic
Union & EPA
Financial
Moved to Georgia
Imports
Markets
Patent Sold
Move to Tenn.
Move to Tenn.
Move to Tenn.
Move to Tenn.
Move to Tenn.
Move to Tenn.
SIC
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
2752
2641
3351
3679
2752
2522
2752
2654
2335
3542
3555
3111
2335
3499
3143
2042
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
Product
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
Union
IAM
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
Paperworkers
UAW
N/A
Amalg. Lithographers
AFL-CIO
N/A
N/A
ILGWU
IAM
IAMAW
Leather Workers
ILGUW
Retail & Wholesale
AFL-CIO
IBT
IAM
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
Date
1976
1976
1976
1976
1976
1976
1976
1976
1976
1976
1976
1976
1976
1976
1976
1976
1976
1976
1976
1976
1977
1977
1977
1977
1977
1977
1977
PLANT CLOSINGS IN ILLINOIS
Company
Shawnee Products
2
Continental Tube
Rexham Corp.
2
Harmony Co.
2
Winnebago Cabinet
Bun-O-Matic Corp.
Mallory Timers Co
Laclede Steel2
The Merit Co. Inc
Chicago Rawhide M
Blue Star Foods 
2
Brown Shoe Co.
2
Crane Co.
2
Zenith
3
Perk Dog Food
2
Scott Fitzer
2
Georgia Pacific C
Wilson Sporting
M & H Zinc Co.
2
Consolidated Pack
Cole Dynamics
2
Florsheim Shoe Cc
Borse Plastic Pro
LaMarche Manuf.
3
Nuturn Corp.
3
Grab-It Food Mkel
Hires Trucking
2
Marty-K Drive In
3-M Companyl
Chemetron1
IIPAC Survey
Location
Shawneetown
Co.2 Bellwood
Chicago
Chicago
Co. 2 Rockford
2 Springfield
2 Pana
Madison
2 Chicago
fg. Co.2  Chicago
Loves Park
Pittsfield
Chicago
Chicago
Chicago
Chicago
orp.2  Taylorville
oods 2  River Grove
La Salle
ing2 Chicago
Elgin
2 Mt. Vernon
d.3  Hinsdale
Chicago
Chicago
2 Danville
Danville
Danville
Freeport
Chicago
2IBES Mass Layoff List
ReasonNumber of Workers
150
160
180
185
54
358
321
280
225
210
95
250
786
1500
187
125
278
300
103
105
74
325
N/A
N/A
N/A
47
44
32
100
180
3Other Research
1977Financial
Economic
Moved to Florida
Imports
Economic
Moved to Iowa
Consolidation
Market
Economic
Moving to N. Carolina
Consolidation
Imports
Moved to Iowa, Arkans
Imports
Market
Merged
Economic
Obsolescence
Financial
Obsolescence
Moved to Conn.
Imports
Move to Tenn.
Move to Tenn.
Move to Tenn.
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
Consolidation, Move to Kentucky
SIC
2517
3317
3569
3931
2517
3634
3613
3312
3995
3293
2099
3131
3494
3651
2047
3642
2621
3949
3369
2653
3621
3144
N/A
N/A
N/A
5411
4212
5812
3679
N/A
Product
N/A
N/A
Food Machinery
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
Zinc Wire, Inun
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
Food Market
Trucking
Fast Food
Printing Material
N/A
Union
Un. Furniture Workers
USW
IAM
Piano & Musical Workers
NONE
Teamsters
Local
USW
AFL-UTU
Meat Cutters utchers
Teamsters
N/A
USW
IBEW & IRWA
IBT
UAW
UPIU
Amal. Meat Cutters
USW
Prt. Spec. & Pr.
~Prod. Wkrs.
NONE
AFL-CIO
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
Paperworkers
IAM
as
1978
PLANT CLOSINGS IN ILLINOIS
Company Location
Material Service Corp.2 Ottawa
Sarama Lighting Corp.2 Streator
Allbright-Nell Co. 2 Chicago
Florsheim Shoe Co.2  Olney
Sweet Adeline Co.2  Chicago
Florsheim Shoe Co.2  Anna
Elder Manuf. Co.2  McLeansboro
Turnstyle Dist.Center2 Elgin
B & B Packing Co.2  Chicago
Walworth2 . Kewanee
Farmland Food Service 2  Franklin Park
Christian Welfare Hospital 2  E. St. Louis
Ainsbrooke2  Carmi
Bush Hog Kraus Mfg. Inc. 2  Jerseyville
Whittaker Chicago Corp.2 Maywood
Regal Ware Inc. 2  Peoria
Apeco Corp.2  Melrose Park
United Wall/Desoto2 Chicago
Obear-Nester2  East St. Louis
American Distillery2  Peoria
American Steel & Wire2  Waukegan
Wire Mill 3  Joliet
Eads Coal Mine2  Belle Reve
Brady of DeKalb 2  DeKalb
Good Year Rubber2  North Chicago
Ohio River Co.1  Kingston
Westclox Watches2  Peru
Eagle Pitcher Ind. Galena
Reed Industries I Rockford
U.S. Steel Products2  Dolton
IIPAC Survey 2IBES Mass Layoffs 30ther Research
Number of Workers
52
79
180
432
100
80
94
125
380
130
140
410
200
126
246
89
8
65
1320
400
560
820
85
4
279
21
450
100
200
135
Reason SIC
Economic 197 3273
Economic 3281
Economic 3551
Imports 3143
Financial 2331
N/A 3143
Imports 2321
Merged 5311
Business 5147
Labor Costs 3321
Financial 2033
N/A 8060
Market 2322
Economic 3523
Economic 3312
Economic 3361
Imports 3861
Technology 2649
Market 1979 3221
N/A 2085
Imports 3481
Imports 3312
N/A 1211
N/A 2337
N/A 3041
Moved South N/A
Moved to Alaba drgiN/A
Imports N/A
Moved to Georgia N/A
Imports 3312
Product
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
Iron Castings
N/A
N/A
Men's Underwear
Bulk Feed
Steel Coils
Kitchen Ware
Copy Toner
Wallcoverings
Glass Containers
Liquor
Steel Products
Steel Products
Coal
Women's Coats
N/A
Riverboat Repair
Clocks, Watches
Lead & Zinc
N/A
Steel Drums
Union
United Glass & Ceramic Wkrs.
United Brick & Clay Wkrs.
IAM
AFL-CIO
ILGW
Retail Clerks
AFL-CIO
Retail Workers
Beef Boners& Sausage Makers
U.S. Steel Workers
Amal. Meat Cutters
Service Empl.
None
USWA
United Elect., Mach. U.E.
UAW
None
United Paper Workers
Glassworkers, Opr. Engineers
Distillery Workers
USWA
USWA
UMW
N/A
N/A
USWA
USWA
USWA
IAM
USWA
PLANT CLOSINGS IN ILLINOIS
Company L
Admiral Corp.2
Autocrat Corp. 2
Carling National 2
Schlegel Illinois Inc. 2
Geo. D. Roper2
Playskool Inc. 2
Rodman Ind.2
Fahralloy Co. 2
Mary Ann Baking2
St. Regis 2
Burmac Corp. 2
Freeman United Coal2
Park Mfg. Co. 2
Ilikon Corp.2
P.J. Gould 2
Vulcan Containers Inc.2
P.J. Gould 2
Continental Can3
Broderick & Bascom2
Peoria Hilton2
Jo Anna Western Mills 3
Waltham Watch 3
Wisconsin Steel2
Fiat-Allis 2
Dana Corp.2
ocation
Harvard
New Athens
Belleville
Chicago
Bradley
Chicago
Rock Island
Harvey
Chicago
Bridgeview
Ottawa
Wattonville
Grant Park
Bridgeview
Joliet
W. Chicago
Chicago
Peoria
Peoria
Peori4
Chicago
Chicago
Chicago
Deerfield
Havana
Number of Workers
1000
225
338
191
341
167
162
120
250
388
157
708
125
171
100
145
100
90
120
127
400
100
3400
580
427
Reason
Imports 1979
Imports & Economic
Economic
Moved to Oklahoma
Economic
Consolidated Operotions
Economic to one an
Bankruptcy
Economic
Economic
Economic
Low Productivity
Economic
Bankruptcy
Economic
Economic
Economic
Technology 1980
Imports, Consolidation
Economic
Moved to New Jersey
Moved to Florida
Economic
Excess Capacity
N/A
sic-
3651-
3433
?082
3293
3524
3944
2431
3325
2051
2649
3569
1211
3469
3079
2392
3469
2392
N/A
3496
7011
N/A
N/A
3312
3531
3465
Product
Televisions
N/A
Beer
Weather Stripping
N/A
Plastic Toys
Wooden Doors
Steel Castings
Bakery
Card Board Boxes
Auto Handling Equipment
Coal
Metal Boxes
Plastic Cup Containers
Textiles & Drapes
Steel Buckets
Textiles & Drapes
Beverage Cans
Wire Rope
Hotel
N/A
Watches
Steel Products
Heavy Machinery
Auto Parts, Gaskets
Union
IBEW
Molders & Allied
Brewer, Electrician, Pipe-
UFCW fitters, Machinery
Machinists & Boilermakers
Teamsters
AFL-CIO
United Steel Workers
Bakery & Conf. Workers
Mach. Loc. Print. Spec.
Int. Assoc.
UMW
N/A
ACTWU
NONE
Teamsters
NONE
IAM
IAM
Hotel & Rest. Emp.
N/A
IJWU
Independent
N/A
UAW
1IPAC Survey 2IBES Mass Layoff List 30ther Research
N)
PLANT CLOSINGS IN ILLINOIS
Company
Carson Pirie Scott 2
Old Chicago Tow Parts
Burdick Aerosol2
Superior Welding 2
Douglas Dunhill 2
Chippewa Freight 2
Diamond Int.2
Essex Int. 2
Federal Paperboard2
Howell Co. 2
General Molded Prod.I
Pullman3
Dawe's Lab3
H.B. Fuller 3
Vesicol Chemical 3
(Div. Closing)
Location
Danville
Bolingbrook
Decatur
Decatur
Oak Forest
Oak Lawn
Willmington
DuQuoin
Morris
St. Charles
Des Plaines
Chicago
Chicago Heights
Chicago
Marshall
Number of Workers
22
450
110
160
167
157
120
217
157
100
120
500
42
13
70
Reason
N/A
Economic
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
Moved to Mexico
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
SIC
5311
7996
3523
3443
5961
4212
2649
3679
2631
2514
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
Product
Dept. Store
Amusement Park
Grain Dryers
Fabricated Plate Works
Retail Mail Order
Motor Freight
Paper Products
Electric Harnesses
Paperboard Packages
Furniture
N/A
Passenger Cars
Animal Feed Supplements
Adhesives
N/A
IIPAC Survey
2
rBES Mass Layoff List
3Other Research
Union
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
Laborers
N/A
N/A
IAM
USWA
OCAW
OCAW
OCAW
Int.
Date
1980
1980
1980
1980
1980
1980
1980
1980
1980
1980
1980
1980
1980
1980
1980
N~)
2
PLANT CLOSINGS IN ILLINOIS
Company
Westclox Military Prod.2
Elgin Watch 3
Montgomery Ward 2
Indiana General 2
Lee-Norse Co. 2
Peabody Coal 2
Am. Pouch Foods 2
Christopher Ind.
nuQuoin Packing 2
First Ford 2
Zeigler Coal2
GAF Automotive2
TRW Cinch Electronics2
Ferro Corp, Color Div. 2
Douglas Press 2
Electric Wheels 2
Rock Island R.R.3
Pabst Malt House 3
W.R. Grace3
Trend Kitchen 3
Ideal Industries3
National Bottle Manuf.2
Location
Peru
Elgin
Chicago
Oglesby
Taylorville
Pawnee
Pembroke
Carbondale
DuQuoin
DesPlaines
Johnson City
Joliet
Chicago
Chicago
Chicago
Qunicy
Peoria
Peoria
Peoria
Peoria
Sycamore
Joliet
Number of Workers
1000
600
900
210
200
1000
102
44
341
40
250
104
123
25
40
123
80
25
29
100
400
70
Reason
Technology
Moved to Florida
N/A
Moved to Mexico
N/A
Fire
N/A
N/A
N/A
Economic
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
SIC
3872
N/A
5311
N/A
3535
1211
2032
2522
2011
5511
1211
2952
3678
2850
2751
3523
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
3221
Product
Military Products
Watches
Dept. Store
N/A
Local Mining Equipment
Coal
C-Rations
Bar Stools
Meat
Auto Sales
Coal
Auto Soundproofing
Elec. Connectors
Plastic Granules
Printing
Rims & Wheels
N/A
Construction Nat.
Kitchen Interiors
N/A
Electric Tools
Glass Bottles
1IPAC Survey
2 IBES Mass Layoff List
30ther Research
Union
USWA, IAM
Teamsters
Teamsters
USWA
USWA
UMW
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
Teamsters
N/A
Carpenters
N/A
N/A
N/A
nate
1980
1980
1980
1980
1980
1980
1980
1980
1980
1980
1980
1980
1980
1980
1980
1980
1980
1980
1980
1980
1980
1980
Company
Montgomery Wards2
Pinkneyville Garment2
Ball Corp.2
W.G. Best Homes2
Boorum & Pease
2
Yellow Freight, Inc.2
Goldblatts 2
Bear Automotive Service Eq. 2
Eagle Range & Manufacturing2
Inolex Corp.2
Joliet Mass Transit 2
B. Brody Seating Co. 2
Certain-Teed Corp. 2
Community Discount Store2
Royal Packing2
Stone Containers2
Peoria Colonial Baking
2
Revere Copper & Brass
Hunter Packing 2
Dr. Scholl1
Fiat-Allis 2
Pratt
3
McGraw Edison Co.3
PLANT CLOSING IN ILLINOIS
Number of Workers Reason
107 N/A
99 N/A
305 N/A
80 N/A
140 N/A
171 N/A
54 N/A
126 N/A
110 N/A
138 N/A
80 N/A
286 N/A
63 N/A
47 N/A
96 N/A
34 N/A
40 N/A
132 N/A
907 N/A
900 Moved to Cleveland
400 N/A Tennessee
120 N/A
Location
Kankakee
Pinkneyville
Mundelein
Effingham
Kankakee
Effingham
Park Forest
Quad Cities
East St. Louis
Park Forest
Coffeen
Chicago
East St. Louis
Chicago
National City
Chicago
Peoria
Clinton
East. St. Louis
Chicago
Chicago
Dixon
Albion N/A
SIC
5311
2335
3221
2452
2645
4231
5311
3549
3631
2834
1211
2599
2952
5311
2011
2653
2051
3351
2011
N/A
3531
N/A
Product
Dept. Store
Dresses
Glass Jars
Panelized Housing
Paper Products
Trucking
Dept. Store
Auto Test Equip.
Stoves
Pharmaceuticals
Coal
Metal Tables & Chairs
Building Materials
Deot. Store
Meat
Corrugated Boxes
Baked Goods
N/A
Meat
Shoes
Const. Machinery
N/A
N/A N/A Stoves, Furnace1981
& Applied App.
Workers
IPAC Survey
2Mass Layoff List, IBES
30ther
Union
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
Teamsters
N/A
N/A
Date
1981
1981
1981
1981
1981
1981
1981
1981
1981
1981
1981
1981
1981
1981
1981
1981
1981
1981
1981
1981
1981
1981
,9
350
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Company
Hiram Walker & Sons 2
Swift Meatpacking2
ATI, Inc. 3
Revere Products, Inc. 3
Rand McNally 3
Trojan Powder Plant3
Hi-Flyer Kite 3
Oscar Mayer Co. 3
Fasco Fabricators3
Del Monte, Division3
American Steel Foundry 3
Nitrogen Corp.3
Trojan Powder 2
Johnson & Johnson2
Gl61 dbltts2
Indal Aluminum2
Roadway Express 2
Armour Pharmaceutical 2
Campana Div, Purex 2
Corn Products Co. 2
Homemakers Sportsline2
M.I. Naken 2
Consolidated Coal 2
Turco Products 2
Location
Peoria
Rochelle
Danvi lie
Clinton
Decatur
Wolf Lake
Decatur
Quad Cities
Amboy
Rochelle
Granite City
Marseilles
Chicago
Park Forest
Chicago
Murphysbor'o
Sauk Village
Bradley
Batavia
Pekin
Salem
Chicago
Coffeen
Rochdale
Number of Workers
1150
700
300
275
28
250
100
400
60
60
196
70
92
700
3000
109
135
100
98
476
90
150
482
25
Reason
to Arkansas
to Mississippi
SIC
2085
2011
N/A
N/A
Product
Liquor
Meat
N/A
N/A
N/A Printing
Moved
Moved
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
Dynamite
Kites
Meat
N/A
Canned Food
Steel
N/A
N/A
Disposable Diapers
Dept. Store
Aluminum Products
Trucking
Blood Hormones
Toiletries
Corn Syrup
Sleeping Bags
Wood Products
Coal
Soap
Union
Distillery Workers
UFCW
AIW
IAM
Typographical Workers.
OCAW
AIW
UFCW
IAN
Retail, Wholesale & Dept.
Store Clerks
USWA
United Glass & Ceramic
N/A Workers
ACTWU
N/A
N/A
Teamsters
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
1 IPAC Survey
2Mass Layoff List, IBES
30ther
Date
1981
1981
1981
1981
1981
1981
1981
1981
1981
1981
1981
1981
1981
1981
1981
1981
1981
1981
1981
1981
1981
1981
1981
1981
N/A
N/A
2011
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
2869
2647
N/A
3,353
4231
2834
2844
2046
2394
2511
1211
2841
,~uIIIoI1 -.
PLANT CLOSINGS IN ILLINOIS
Number of Workers Reason S
Pabst Brewery 3
OMC3
Elgin Metal Casket 3
A&P (81 Stores) 3
Lonestar Cement 3
Schwinn Bicyle 3
Maple City Stamping 3
Woodbrooks1 (1970)
Chicago Rawhide1 (1972)
General Electric1 (1975)
Dale Refrigerator 3 (1975)
Precise Corp. 3 (1975)
Thor Power Tool Comp. 3 (1975)
Garcy Manufacturers 3 (1974)
Grainger, W.W. Inc. 3 (1974)
Wolverine Tube Div., (1974)
Univ. Oil
Wurlitzer Co. 3 (1972)
Peoria
Galesburg
Elgin
Northern Illinois
Dixon
Chicago'
Peoria
Rockford
Chicago
Rockford
Chicago
Lockport
Chicago
Chicago
Chicago
Chicago
Dekalb
800
800
170
6000
170
900
100
400
500
300
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
200
1982
Excess Capacity
Moved to MissiskippiMexico, Hong Kong
Consolidated w Virgina Plant
N/A
N/A
N/A
Loss of Business w/ Caterpillar
Pre-1976
Moved to Mexico
Moved to N. Carolina
Economic, Product Change
Moved South
Moved South
Moved South
Moved South
Moved South
Moved South
Moved to Another State
2082
3524
N/A
5411
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
Beer
Lawn Mowers
Caskets
Foodstore
Cement
Bicycles
N/A
N/A
Industrial Goods
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A N/A
Teamsters
N/A
upholstery Workers
UFCW
N/A
UAW
Boilermakers
Leather Workers,
IAM Neatcutters
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
IIPAC Survey
2Mass Layoff List, IBES
30ther Research
Product Union
N,C,
Company oca onrer Rao sic Product
SICL ti
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TABLE 20
RATES OF CLOSURE, BIRTH, IN-MIGRATION AND OUT-MIGRATION OF
FIRMS BY STATE IN THE EAST NORTH CENTRAL REGION
(In Percent)
State Closure
Rate
E. North Central
Illinois
Indiana
Michigan
Ohio
Wisconsin
33%
33
33
34
33
30
Birth In-Migration
Rate Rate
22%
24
20
25
20
19
Out-Migration
Rate
.05% .08%
.17
.16
.08
.11
.13
.26
.20
.10
.15
.09
Source: "Documenting the 'Decline' of the North" by Carol L. Jusenis
and Larry C. Ledebur
Economic Development Report - 1978
Printed in Economies of the Great Lakes States,
Office of Intergovernmental Relations, Michigan,
November, 1979.
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Appendix
The Structure of Organized Labor in Illinois
There are approximately 1,700,000 union members in Illinois,
counting AFL-CIO union members, unaffiliated unions and professional
associations. These individuals are represented by over 100 inter-
national unions, which have over 3,000 local unions throughout the
State.
The Illinois State Federation was formed in 1881, almost
immediately after the American Federation of Labor. The structure of
the Federation did not change until the late 1950's, when it expanded
as a result of the 1955 merger between the AFL and the CIO. The
Illinois Federation of Labor, AFL-CIO presently represents over 100
unions.* The major unaffiliated unions at present include the United
Mine Workers, the Teamsters, the Illinois Education Association and
the Illinois Nurses' Association.
In addition to the State Federation, there are thirty Central
Labor Councils (CLC) and twnety-four Building Trades Council (BTC)
around the State. The Central Labor Councils are coalitions of local
unions within a given geographic area. The BTC's consist of all the
construction unions in a given area, and have tended to be more
involved with employment and training activities than the CLC's. Both
CLC's and BTC's deal with local community affairs and political issues.
See organizational structure, next page.
STRUCTURE - ILLINOIS AHERICAN FEDERATION OF LABGR-CONGIES OF INVDUSTRTAL ORGANIZATIONlS
MERICAN FEDERATION OF LABOR-CONCRESS TNDUSTRIAL OgRANIZATT~ts
INTERNATTONAL UNIONS
DIRECTLY AFFILIATED LOCAL UNIONS
CONSTITUTION
CG MMITTEES
LEGISLATION
COjitIUNITY
SERVICES
CIVIL RIGHTS
POLITICAL
fDUCATION
ILLINOIS STATE FEDERATION OF LABORCONGRESS OF INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATIONS
PRESIDEtrT
SECRETARY-TREASURER
CREDENTTALS
5 MEMBERS_
DIR ECTOR
COPE & LEGISLATIVE
AFFAIRS
EXECUTIVE BOARD
PRESIDENT, SECRETARY TREASURER
19 VICE PRESIDE'fTS
MEET 4 times per year
AN _NUAL ClonVENTION
(2500 DELEGATES)..
CONVEN TION CC4W74TTEES
APPOINTED BY PRESIDENT
(SEE ATTACHED SHEET)
&
VOTING DELETATES
LOCAL UNILONS
CENTRAL LABOR BODIES
SU3GRDINATE BODY
OR COUNCIL
UBIRDINATE 90111
ILLINOIS JOURNEYMAN
BARBERS ASSOCIATION
ILLINOIS STATE COUNCIL
CARPENTERS
IAFF STATE ASSOCIATION
NEAT CUTTERS - ILLINOIS
STATE BRANCH
BRAC. STATE LEGISLATIVE
C01MITTEE
ILLINOIS STATE COUNCIL SEIU
& OTHERS
CGtIMITTEE ON
POLITICAL EDUCATION
STATE OFFICERS
WC4ENS DIVISION
-SATE
C y
CITY
CONGRESSIONAL ISTRICT 1
PREPARED BY:
CHICAGO LABOR EDUCATION PROGRAM-INSTITUTE OF LABOR
AND INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS - UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS
CIRCLE CAPUS PO BOX 4348, Chicago 60620
4U,
STRUCTURAL ORGANIZATION
of the
AMERICAN FEDERATION OF LABOR AND CONGRESS OF INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATIONS
STAFF
Accounting
Civil Rights
Community Services
Data Processing
Economic Research
Office of Housing and
Monetary Policy
Education
Information
International Affairs
Legislation
Library
Occupational Safety
and Health
Organization and
Field Services
Political Education
Purchasing
Reproduction
and Mailings
Social Security
TRADE AND INDUSTRIAL
DEPARTMENTS
Building Trades
Food & Beverage Trades
Industrial Union
Label Trades
Maritime Trades
Metal Trades
Professional Employees
I Public Employee
IIU
NATIONAL CONVENTION
(Every 2 Years)
EXECUTIVE COUNCIL
9.5
-i I
668
Local Department
Councils
GENERAL BOARD
Executive Council and
one principal officer of
each national and in-
ternational union and
affiliated Department
President, Secretary-Treasurer, 33 Vice Presidents
STANDING COMMITTEES
Civil Rights
0?, OCommunity ServicesOFFICERS 
.- ~~Economic Policy
President and Secretary-Treasurer Education
.. Ethical Prat'eHeadquarters, Washington, D.C. *' '""'Pr Housing
-i- .:- ---- .- .- . -4 .. International Affairs
Legislative
-
Organization
. . x . Political Education
Public Relations
r101 Research
NATIONAL AND Safety and Occupa.tional Health
NTERNATIONAL UNIONS Social Security
Veterans' Affairs
- E
48,000 Local Unions of
National and International
Unions
87 Local Unions Directly
Affiliated with AFL-CIO
Membership of the AFL-CIO, January 1, 1981
01
U,
STATE CENTRAL BODIES
in 50 States and
1 Commonwealth
.aa. a-
ii
LOCAL CENTRAL BODIES
in 744 Communities
11
'A
ti
I)
4
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Appendix
Illinois Agencies Directly Involved with the MAP
Until the late 1970's, Illinois had several different agencies with
programs for economic development and employment and training. These
included the Governor's Office of Manpower and Human Development, the
Bureau of Economic Development and the Department of Local Government
Affairs. Governor Thompson has since combined these agencies into
the Department of Commerce and Community Affairs (DCCA). Within DCCA,
the two divisions that work most closely with MAP include the Division
of Commerce and Industrial Development (CID) and the Office of State-
wide Employment and Training Services (OSETS). According to Tom Clark,
the Manager of CID, "Our mission is the creation of jobs through
assisting the private sector in locating facilities, expanding
facilities, and reinvesting or investing in the State. It is also to
expand the existing tax base to provide services for citizen of the
State." Dennis Whetstone, Manager of OSETS, describes the role of his
office. "We are responsible for administering the Governor's grant
program under CETA. Every Governor, in the CETA system, has a per-
centage of dollars set aside to do a variety of things including labor
market information, research, technical assistance, demonstration pro-
jects and support for the State Employment and Training Advisory
Council."
Even though CETA is in the process of changing, service delivery
has been decentralized through individual Prime Sponsors that typically
serve metropolitan areas, and the Balance of State Prime Sponsor which
covers about two thirds of Illinois counties. The Balance of State
(BOS) Office designates Program Agents to operate programs in more
257
rural areas of the State. (See Map) All of the CETA activities are
housed in DCCA,
The Illinois Department of Labor does not have a formal
institutional relationship to the MAP. The organizations do work to-
gether when MAP works with a community experiencing a plant closing.
Representatives of local Job Service and Unemployment Insurance
Offices are frequently asked to participate in Adjustment Assistance
Workshops.
These selected agencies do not begin to represent the full range
of institutions with some formal involvement in statewide economic
development and employment and training policy. The description is
limited to those public agencies with the most connections to the MAP.
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APPENDIX
Lis.t of Individuals Interviewed for Thesis
Greg Squires, Midwest Regional Office, U.S. Commission on Civil Rights,
Author of "Shutdown: Economic Dislocation and Equal
Opportunity"
Jim Mulholland, Former Swift Employee and Local UFCW Union Officer,
Rochelle
Jim Fuchs, Plant Closings Program, UFCW
Nancy Young, Research & Organizing, Illinois Public Action Council
Ralph Gleissner, Former CETA Program Agent, Rochelle
James Bruehler, Greater Rochelle Economic Development Corporation,
Rochelle
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